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Small businesses file taxes in accordance with the personal income tax code because they are considered flow-through entities. Thus, personal income tax reforms directly affect the incentives small business owners face regarding employment and operations. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors use the changes in personal income tax rates during the 1993 and 2001-2003 reforms and micro-level data to estimate the effect of statutory tax rate changes on small business employment decisions.

The authors add two contributions to the current literature: first, the author allow for intertemporal tax planning and second, the author allow the firm’s decision to employ labor to be correlated with the firm’s wage bill decision. Estimation of a Heckman selection model for wage bills shows that the probability that a business will employ labor is 1.18 percent higher when current tax rates increase by one percentage point and 0.70 percent lower when future rates are expected to increase by one percentage point. Among firms that already employ labor, the median wage bill elasticity with respect to current tax rates is −0.64. These estimates are larger than those reported in previous research because my model includes future taxes and allows for correlation between the firm’s employment and wage bill decisions. Omitting the intertemporal tax responses biases the estimates of previous researchers upwards, whereas assuming the two firm decisions are independent biases estimates towards zero.

This paper has been cited in publications published in Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy.

An exciting opportunity that many advanced industrial democracies faced in the late 1990s was the movement from budgetary deficit to surplus. This came after years of persistent deficits. Traditional decisionmaking theories such as budgetary incrementalism failed to explain this longrun relationship, since it has been inherently a short-run theory. This paper uses rational expectations theory to demonstrate its relationship to budgetary decision-making reforms and the deficit (surplus) for Canada, the UK and the United States. The results demonstrated that there was an intertemporal budget constraint in operation in the three countries, and decision-makers at the macro level used rational expectations in the formulation of their annual budget. In the theory, budget actors strived to balance their budget, but did so over the longrun as opposed to the short-run incrementalist interpretation.

The purpose of this paper is to study whether it is a rational choice for a tax authority to impose an exit tax on capitalists.

The tax authority chooses a lump-sum exit tax to maximize a weighted objective of expected tax revenue and expected tax horizon. The tax revene consists of capital income taxes and exit taxes. Capitalists are motivated by sustainable capital accumulation and hence maximize the terminal capital stock.

The author finds that the objective function of the tax authority is strictly increasing in the exit tax, which holds for extensions with sales tax, labor income tax or proportional exit tax, and hence equilibrium exit tax is equal to an exogenous upper bound.

To the author’s knowledge, no existing literature investigates this issue theoretically, and hence the current paper represents the first attempt. The author hopes this theoretical analysis can trigger related empirical studies.