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Many European-level networks and regulatory constellations in different sectors (e.g., energy, telecommunications) without clear anchorage into the European Union (EU) institutional landscape have been subject to increasing efforts by the EU institutions to tie them closer to the EU. They are serving increasingly as platforms for preparing EU policy or for implementing EU decisions, which may result in closer institutional bonds with the EU. This chapter aims at examining the differences and similarities between the process towards more EU-integration in two different domains (i.e., telecommunications and patents) and regulatory constellations (i.e., supranational and intergovernmental).

The chapter analyzes the evolution in the European telecommunication sector and the European Patent System and juxtaposes this analysis with the literature on institutionalization, Europeanization of regulatory network-organizations, and multilevel governance (MLG). It focuses on the role of the European Commission and the interaction with the national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and networks within the institutional framework.

Irrespective of the particular regime (intergovernmental/supranational) in a certain domain or sector, a common trend of closer coordination and integration prompted by the Commission is taking place, which triggers a certain resistance by the national bodies regulating that domain. As long as a specific competence is considered instrumental in the creation of the single market, the Commission has strong incentives to strengthen its influence in this field, even if those competences have been regulated through an independent intergovernmental regime.

The dynamic described in this chapter allows us to reflect upon the MLG conception as developed by Marks and Hooghe (2004), which distinguish between two types of MLG. Type I MLG refers to different levels of governments, more specifically to the spread of power along different governmental levels and the interactions between them. Type II MLG refers to jurisdictions that are both task-specific and based on membership that can intersect with each other. They respond to particular problems in specific policy fields (Marks & Hooghe, 2004). Our analysis shows that the increase in coordination and integration are the outcome of both MLG Type II processes (coordination between two issue-specific bodies) and of MLG Type I processes (tensions between two governmental levels). Furthermore, the negotiation dynamics regarding this increased coordination and integration reveal that the tensions typical of MLG Type I took place as a consequence of the increased coordination between Type II bodies. Put differently, multi-level coordination and integration mechanisms in the EU can be seen as both Type I and Type II processes. They combine features of both categories and reveal that their Type I and Type II features are interdependent.

The analysis in this chapter shows a need for further strengthening the MLG Type I and II conceptual framework by balancing the analytical distinction between the two types with developments about how Type I and Type II are often entangled and intertwined with each other rather than separated realities.

The chapter describes and compares the dynamics in the European telecommunications sector and the European patent system with interesting observations for NRAs and the European Commission with respect to coordination and integration.

The original nature of the current chapter relates to the two selected areas and the addition to the literature on MLG.

First, with respect to the areas investigated the dynamics of the European telecommunications sector have been analyzed also by other authors, but the European patent system is an area which is relatively unexplored in terms of governance research. The combination of the two sectors with a detailed analysis of similarities and differences is highly original and generates interesting lessons with respect to coordination and integration in supranational and intergovernmental regimes.

Second, Marks and Hooghe (2004) distinguish between the two types of MLG as if they are two different constructs that are not related to each other. Our cases and argument cover both types of MLG and show the interconnection between the dynamics taking place in the two types of MLG.

This paper reports on a case study research regarding the development of capabilities from a multidimensional social capital perspective. Case study research together with a multi-disciplinary literature study are the platform for further theory development on the related questions: “How do organisations build capabilities?” and “What are the antecedents of the development of capabilities?.” We start by describing the theoretical origin of our research problem by focusing on a triangle: (1) the resource-based view; (2) the network approach; and (3) the social capital approach. Following this literature study, we discuss the case study research design that was developed within an industrial company (B2B). We next present the findings and refine our initial tentative conceptual framework.

The aim of the chapter is to examine whether the challenges to administering the EU outlined by Les Metcalfe in his famous article, ‘After 1992, can the Commission manage Europe?’ have now been met. Metcalfe not only identified a ‘management deficit’ in the implementation of the single market programme arising from an oversight among policy makers, but highlighted a neglect of the administrative dimension of European integration among scholars.

The chapter draws on primary and secondary literature to track developments in respect of the three elements identified by Metcalfe: the small size of the European Commission, its poor internal coordination and weak leadership; the responsiveness of administrative bodies in the member states to the need for inter-organizational coordination; and the network-building and management capacity of the Commission.

Despite changes, such as further enlargement, agencification at national and EU levels, and the expansion of EU competencies that have exacerbated the management challenge confronting the EU, there have been significant developments that have closed the deficit. First, the Commission has become far better integrated, coordination upgraded, and leadership strengthened. Second, through networking, cooptation and other strategies the Commission has sought to assure the effective implementation and enforcement of the single market rules. Third, member state governments, ministries and agencies have sought to cultivate networked relations that have increased the manageability of EU administration.

To the knowledge of this author, this is the first attempt to revisit Metcalfe’s diagnosis and to review the extent to which the management deficit he identified has been addressed subsequently.

The chapter has implications for how inter-organizational coordination within the EU administrative system could be improved.

The chapter bears on the administrative capacity of the EU to deliver the policies decided by EU policy makers.

As well as offering an assessment of the extent to which progress has been made in addressing the management deficit identified by Les Metcalfe in his classic article, this chapter conceptualizes the EU administration as an entity that encompasses both EU institutions and administrative bodies in the member states. It advances the concept of the EU as a multi-level administration.

Purpose: We generally ascribe hospitality industry talent shortages to organisations competing for dwindling talent rather than their inability to sustain industry talent pools. This chapter suggests that developing sustainable talent management and development (STMD) initiatives can address the talent attraction and retention issues the industry is facing. Following Ostrom’s (2002) design principles, we advocate for sustainable common pool resource networks as a solution for developing durable STMD initiatives to address talent shortages within the hospitality industry.

Methodology: A conceptual chapter synthesising disparate theories in a new context.

Findings: Despite hospitality organisations’ continued investment in talent management, talent shortages remain systematically embedded within the industry. These are the result of a perennial competition among hospitality firms for talent, when, instead, these firms should engage in collective efforts to sustain industry talent pools. The adoption of a more sustainable approach by incorporating Ostrom’s (2002) design principles to establish long-lasting common talent pool resource in the form of industry rather than firm-level talent pools may halt the decline in available talent.

Research Limitation/Implications: While hospitality organisations have a vested interest in sustainably managing talent, limited attention has been paid to creating sustainable industry talent pools. We propose several design principles for developing durable STMD initiatives, which require empirical testing.

Practical/Social Implications: We address talent shortages for hospitality organisations by offering the blueprint for developing sustainable industry talent pools for a collection of firms, which, on their own, would lack the experience and resources to securing a steady supply of talent. In addition, industry talent pools also have the potential to improve the general working conditions for employees in this industry pool.

Originality/Value of Chapter: This chapter addresses hospitality industry talent shortages by proposing the creation of sustainable regional industry talent pools rather than focussing on firm-level talent management practices.

This contribution argues that there is a fundamental problem for the multi-level governance (MLG) approach in that what the approach is trying to explain has never been fully agreed by the vast group of scholarship that references it. The chapter then examines and proposes that ideas and concepts from network governance, principal–agent (PA) and learning can provide the necessary micro foundations for the MLG approach.

The chapter examines and critiques the original MLG formulations and the later efforts at elaboration. It then reviews the literature and concepts for three public policy approaches that have been associated with European governance to see how core explanations can be elaborated upon in a multi-level context: network governance, principal–agent (PA) and learning.

This contribution suggests that co-ordination, and the resources that help maintain this co-ordination, is the key dependent variable that underpins the MLG approach. With multiple principals and multiple agents, operating at a number of levels of analysis, direct authority and control is harder to evoke. The key explanatory variable underpinning this MLG co-ordination is learning by the participants.

Researchers need to concentrate both their theoretical and empirical efforts in understanding the conditions that support multi-level governance and that sustain its effort.

The contribution outlines some of the key practical questions that policy-makers must face. Can they manage resources and induce learning from all the relevant public and private stakeholders to engage in the MLG effort?

Not only does an effective MLG process involve engaging a wide range of societal stakeholders, these stakeholders have to be persuaded to invest effort in learning about the nature of the governance system, the challenges of the policy problem and the implications of the efforts to resolve these problems.

This chapter isolates the fundamental lacuna at the heart of the MLG project and offers academics and practitioners a conceptual lens for building a clearer analytical structure for studying MLG.

Collaborative advantage and geographical embeddedness of the firm have recently been receiving a growing amount of attention in a dynamic vision of the attainment and sustainability of the competitive advantage of firms. Concepts such as the Industrial District and Regional Cluster have been used in these studies, yet in spite of this interest little effort has been devoted to establishing links between these competitive dimensions and theories of differences in firm performance. This work consists of a multisource case study of the Spanish Ceramic Tile Industry. This empirical study focused on investigating the nature and implications of interfirm relationships and social control. The paper suggests that the competitiveness of clustered firms can be accounted for by low transaction costs and strategic knowledge-based resources.

This chapter provides a framework for organisational analysis of the newly created position of ‘independent’ Commissioner, especially whether it is sufficiently backed by administrative capacities.

In the many variables that determine organisational behaviour (Mintzberg, 1989), this approach follows Olsen (2005) in its analysis through communication structures and strategic directions, and adds procedures (networks) and personnel to this. The chapter is primarily based on interview data in addition to literature and document analysis.

This chapter acknowledges the ‘stickiness’ of institutions and the difficulties in reorganising (formal) institutions. The conclusion shows that there are multiple problems in the current process of institutionalisation of the independent Commissioner. Generalising the findings to the use of an administrative approach, the frugal framework used here indicates that ‘independence’ cannot simply be proclaimed but also demands attentions for organisation design. Organisational analysis helps to understand the organisation and the organisational weaknesses behind the policy objective.

As is often the case with MLG it gives a perspective on governance, but must be complemented with an approach for analysis, in this case organisational design. In the chapter the approach is limited to organisational values, personnel and communication lines. It provides a basic framework to evaluate one of the key elements of European integration – independence. However, additional work is needed to further develop this framework as well as other components of the organisational behaviour of the Commission.

This chapter comes up with suggestions for organisational redesign of the Commission in order to restore trust in its tasks and responsibilities. With the instalment of the new Juncker Commission these findings might provide useful insights for the ongoing process of reorganisation of the Commission.

The new economic legislation and the role of the independent Commissioner have a direct impact on member state budgets (cuts), with a far reaching societal impact. Therefore, the level of (public) trust is critical in the acceptance of the process. Trust is established inter alia by the organisational implementation of principles of good administrative behaviour such as transparency, capability, independence, etc.

The chapter uses the MLG perspective in order to get a comprehensive picture of the organisational implications to effectively embed the ‘independent’ Commissioner in the organisation. The added value is based on the extensive amount of interviews over a longer period of time (2011–2014) during the operationalisation of the European semester.