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This chapter explores why a better alternative to current practises in addressing sovereign debt repayment problems has not emerged. It examines the discussions on financing and debt repayment difficulties from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 to the eve of the 1980s debt crisis. Drawing from recent work that highlights the ways with which the power of economics and economists operates in the public realm, the chapter examines the role of economic analysis within the political debate on debt. The chapter details the repeated refusals by creditor groups to any suggestion for improvements to the international debt architecture.

The social protests on the streets of indebted sovereigns in crises across the Eurozone have made debt restructuring an imperative. Further delay in achieving this expeditiously and equitably significantly exacerbates the social costs of crises from which current and future generations will struggle to recover. This article examines the feasibility of the drastic and widespread debt restructuring needed to resolve the problem in the face of existing private law sanctions that protect individual creditor rights. It relies on an analysis of US policy in the transition to a securitized market and of key sovereign debt cases to reveal the historical contingency of private law protections. It concludes by showing that the effectiveness of private law protections have always been constrained by the overriding imperative to achieve debt sustainability with negotiated and consensual workouts. This can be achieved in the Eurozone with statutory constraints on enforcement action pending the settlement of debt workouts as suggested in a recent proposal.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the world's largest official creditor nation with its outstanding debt claims on the rest of the world totaling an estimated US$5.5 trillion in 2019 or more than 6% of global GDP. However, given Beijing’s very limited transparency in its disclosures when it comes to its external lending (and now its alleged culpability in the spread of the coronavirus) the accusation that the PRC has for years engaged in “debt-trap diplomacy” has come under renewed scrutiny. Specifically, the charge is that the Chinese government, which is the world's leading creditor lending via its multibillion dollar “Belt and Road Initiative” as well as various state-owned and controlled entities, lures developing countries, in particular, low-income countries, with easy money to fund often economically unviable projects. This is because China's ultimate goal is to get access to the borrowers' local markets and natural resources and indirectly controlling or outright seizing assets and resources, including extracting economic and political concessions when these countries fail to service their loans – which is often given at market or above-market interest rates and carry shorter maturities, thereby requiring regular refinancing. This paper reviews this claim and concludes that it seems exaggerated.

This chapter analyses the causes and effects of the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, and it examines the dramatic government rescues and reforms. The outcomes of this, the most severe collapse to befall the United States and the global economy for three-quarters of a century, are still unfolding. Banks, homeowners and industries stood to benefit from government intervention, particularly the huge infusion of taxpayer funds, but their future is uncertain. Instead of extending vital credit, banks simply kept the capital to cover other firm needs (including bonuses for executives). Industry in the prevailing slack economy was not actively seeking investment opportunities and credit expansion. The property and job markets languished behind securities market recovery. It all has been disheartening and scary – rage against those in charge fuelled gloom and cynicism. Immense private debt was a precursor, but public debt is the legacy we must resolve in the future.

In October 2020, Zambia failed to make a $42.5 million interest payment on $1 billion in Eurobonds maturing in 2024, becoming the first African country to default on its debt obligations in the aftermath of COVID-19. Zambia's default highlights the fragmented nature of governance in sovereign debt markets. The Zambian default also underscores the continuing impact of colonial hangover in former colonies in Africa. Fragmented governance and colonial overhang create incentives for both debtors and creditors that contribute to cycles of sovereign debt. These cycles of debt pose a particular hazard to residents within countries that issue such debt. In African contexts, this has led to flows of funds for debt repayment that may significantly jeopardize the well-being of people who are already poor. Zambia's default also reflects the increasing need of African countries to navigate among different external actors, particularly China, which has given loans throughout Africa for varied projects, including infrastructure lending as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The Zambian default draws attention to the significant amount of Eurobond debt African countries have incurred in recent years and the burdens that such debt may impose. The circumstances of Zambia's default, as well as recent disputes about external debt in Mozambique, reflect continuing issues about transparency and public scrutiny of sovereign debt transactions and the broader societal impact of debt internally within African countries and in relations between African countries and varied external powers.

Pledging collateral to secure loans is a prominent feature in financing contracts around the world. Existing theories disagree on why borrowers pledge collateral. It is even more challenging to understand why in some countries collateral coverage exceeds, for example, 300% of the value of a loan. This study looks at the association between collateral coverage and country-level governance and various institutional proxies. It investigates the economic implications of steep collateral coverage and sketches policy options to lower ex-ante asymmetric information and ex-post agency problems. Within this framework, should a lender collect the debt forcibly on default and liquidated assets fetch prices below outstanding loan values, the lender’s loss is covered through credit insurance, which would significantly reduce the need for steep collateral coverage. This proposal may increase level of private credit, investment and growth; particularly, in a number of developing countries where collateral spread is the main inhibitor of finance.