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This chapter focuses on the international development plans implemented in Colombia during the regime of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953–1957). It argues that foreign economists and international agencies, such as the World Bank, played a significant role in supporting and strengthening local leaders opposing the regime. By analyzing the creation of the Cauca Valley Corporation in 1955, through the intervention of the former chair of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) David Lilienthal, this study provides two main contributions to the literature on economists and political economy under authoritarian rule. Firstly, it illuminates how local groups mobilized international economists to contrast Rojas. Secondly, it analyses the evolving relationship between World Bank advisors, David Lilienthal, and the regime. After describing the consolidation of political and economic interest groups and their global connections before Rojas coup d’état, it focuses on Rojas’ regime and on how it affected the implementation of the World Bank development started with the General Survey Mission in 1949. In the Cauca Department, local leaders invoked the World Bank and Lilienthal to implement a TVA model in opposition with the central government.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Norway is a small nation state on the northernmost coastline of Western Europe, integrated in the Western world economy. For centuries Norway's integration in the world economy had been based on exports of raw materials such as fish and timber, as well as shipping services. In the early 20th century, furnace-based metals (made possible by cheap hydropower) were added to this export basket. Just as the world economy entered an increasingly unstable phase in 1970s, another natural resource was discovered in Norway: petroleum – that is, oil and natural gas from the North Sea. This chapter analyses the challenges and possibilities inherent in the Norwegian strategy of developing an oil economy in a world economic situation influenced by new and stronger forms of international integration through the four decades between 1970 and 2010.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

Examines the economy of Southeast Asia during the period 1997 to 1999 against a background of socio‐economic theory and a transition from disequilibrium to general stable and equilibrium conditions. Discusses solutions towards establishing self‐regulating mechanisms needed for a free, just and stable economy and society: reform of officially organized securities commodities and foreign exchange makets; reform of the public budget and budgetary policies; and reform of the foreign exchange system and internaitonal commercial and financial relations.

This analysis attempts a comparative specification of certain aspects of the country studies contained in this volume. The point of departure is the banking crises of the early 1990s (deep in Finland, Norway and Sweden, mini-crisis in Denmark and absent in Iceland) and the contrast to Iceland's financial meltdown in 2007/2008 (no crisis in the three, a new mini-crisis in Denmark). Detailed process tracing of the Icelandic crisis is provided. The case account is then used to shed light on the different roles of neoliberalism, economics expert knowledge and populist right-wing party formation in the five Nordic political economies.

The new economic-policy regime in Sweden in the 1990s included deregulation, central-bank independence, inflation targets and fiscal rules but also active labour market policy and voluntary incomes policy. This chapter describes the content, determinants and performance of the new economic policy in Sweden in a comparative, mainly Nordic, perspective. The new economic-policy regime is explained by the deep recession and budget crisis in the early 1990s, new economic ideas and the power of economic experts. In the 1998–2007 period, Sweden displayed relatively low inflation and high productivity growth, but unemployment was high, especially by national standards. The restrictive monetary policy was responsible for the low inflation, and the dynamic (ICT) sector was decisive for the productivity miracle. Furthermore, productivity increases in the ICT sector largely explains why the Central Bank undershot its inflation target in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The new economic-policy regime in Sweden performed well during the global financial crisis. However, as in other OECD countries, the moderate increase in unemployment was largely attributed to labour hoarding. And the rapid recovery of the Baltic countries made it possible for Sweden to avoid a bank crisis.

Questions whether the planned European Monetary Union is capable of solving the social economic challenges of our time. Examines the economic and financial history of modern times; explains the formulation of the impossibility theorem in practice, suggesting the equation of unified knowledge as a solution to the problem of economic calculation; and constructs a plan for a free and stable European Monetary and Economic Union. Looks at the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) questioning its ability to solve the basic problems of the member states of the European Union. Addresses a number of issues contained within the Treaty: acceptable socially beneficial goals; unacceptable socially harmful, adverse anti‐equilibrium means, policies, reforms and regulations; and the phenomenon of physics’ ‘chain reaction’ within economics. Gives a synopsis of anti‐equilibrium elements and forces in the Treaty of Maastricht, debating what needs to be done to ensure that European Monetary and Economic Union can become an immediate and lasting success.