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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosures in UK higher education institutions’ (HEIs) annual reports and examine whether internal governance structures influence disclosure in the period following major reform and funding constraints.

The authors adopt a modified version of Coy and Dixon’s (2004) public accountability index, referred to in this paper as a public accountability and transparency index (PATI), to measure the extent of voluntary disclosures in 130 UK HEIs’ annual reports. Informed by a multi-theoretical framework drawn from public accountability, legitimacy, resource dependence and stakeholder perspectives, the authors propose that the characteristics of governing and executive structures in UK universities influence the extent of their voluntary disclosures.

The authors find a large degree of variability in the level of voluntary disclosures by universities and an overall relatively low level of PATI (44 per cent), particularly with regards to the disclosure of teaching/research outcomes. The authors also find that audit committee quality, governing board diversity, governor independence and the presence of a governance committee are associated with the level of disclosure. Finally, the authors find that the interaction between executive team characteristics and governance variables enhances the level of voluntary disclosures, thereby providing support for the continued relevance of a “shared” leadership in the HEIs’ sector towards enhancing accountability and transparency in HEIs.

In spite of significant funding cuts, regulatory reforms and competitive challenges, the level of voluntary disclosure by UK HEIs remains low. Whilst the role of selected governance mechanisms and “shared leadership” in improving disclosure, is asserted, the varying level and selective basis of the disclosures across the surveyed HEIs suggest that the public accountability motive is weaker relative to the other motives underpinned by stakeholder, legitimacy and resource dependence perspectives.

This is the first study which explores the association between HEI governance structures, managerial characteristics and the level of disclosure in UK HEIs.

This study aims to evaluate the moderating impact of corporate governance on the relationship between internal control mechanisms and financial performance.

The study employs a structured questionnaire to collect data from 250 top managers of rural banks in the capital of Ghana. Cronbach alpha value and Fornell-Larcker tests were performed to assess the reliability and validity of the data used. The study adopted a partial least square structural equation model (PLS-SEM).

The results show that internal control and corporate governance both have a direct positive and significant impact on financial performance. Furthermore, the interaction of internal control and corporate governance also has a positive and significant impact on financial performance, thus confirming the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between internal control mechanisms and financial performance.

This implies that organizations need to strengthen their corporate governance procedures to increase the efficiency of their internal control systems, which would ultimately lead to an improvement in their financial performance.

The present study innovates by assessing the moderating role of corporate governance in the nexus between internal control mechanisms and financial performance. This moderating effect assessment implies that corporate governance may not only affect the technical implementation of the internal control structures but will subsequently make an impact on the overall performance of the organization.

Deregulation shifts the responsibility for mitigation of agency problems from the regulatory parties to the firms' shareholders. We investigate whether and how governance structure changes in response to the dynamics of the new business environment after the Regulatory Reform Act of 1994 for the US trucking industry. We show that deregulation increases market competition in the trucking industry. The deregulated trucking firms not only adjust internal governance structure but also alter antitakeover provisions to adapt themselves to the competitive status of business environment after deregulation.

Through a case study on the governance structures of the UN, the purpose of this paper is to develop a critique of Public and Private Bureaucracies Transaction Cost Economics (PPBTCE) (Williamson, 1999) as a theoretical lens to analyze internal oversight structures.

The authors explore “probity” and “independence” transactions’ attributes through historical narrative case-based research to answer the question – Why did numerous attempts to strengthen the governance of UN internal oversight structures not relieve “probity” hazards?

The analysis shows that at the UN increasing and strengthening the governance of oversight structures, i.e., incentives, did not relieve probity/ethics hazards as predicted in PPBTCE. Secretaries-General and UN General Assembly, entities charged with oversight powers, systematically trumpeted the UN Charter, breaching probity/ethics and disregarding the supervisory independence prerogative of internal oversight structures, hence failing to contribute to the “common good” and to protect the UN mission.

This paper is the first application of PPBTCE to internal oversight transactions within an International organization context testing probity and independence attributes. The authors find that “independence” outweighs the “asset specificity” attribute whenever decisions on the governance of internal oversight arise. As far as sourcing decisions are concerned, the authority of the sovereign and the independence of the judiciary as well as quasi-judiciary transactions are not transferable attributes and, thus, cannot be contracted along with the actors’ ethics. PPBTCE should be modified to include, e.g. “virtues ethics” behavioral assumption as a transaction costs’ reduction device and explanatory framework for “probity” hazards, abandoning the opportunism behavioral assumption.

This paper aims to explore management control structure change related to the development of a shared service centre (SSC).

The paper explores a transaction costs economics perspective (TCE‐perspective) on management control structure change related to the development of an SSC. Particularly, it explores and challenges the scope of such a perspective both in terms of contents (i.e. the nature of management control related to the dimensions of transactions) and process (i.e. the way change is effectuated). It does so by theorizing as well as empirically investigating management control structure change through a case study at PCM (a Dutch newspaper publisher).

The theoretical analysis broadens existing frameworks of management control structures by particularly pointing to the possibility of including governance structures for internal transactions and exit threats (connected to a market mechanism) in the management control structure of an organization. However, the paper's empirical investigations challenge the broader framework: the possibility of an exit threat was not explicitly considered by top management (“the designer” of management control). More profoundly, empirical investigations challenge the calculative approach of the change and show that the change in management control is to a large extent a drifting process.

An instrumental calculative approach towards SSC‐related management control change should be complemented with a relational perspective on such change, in order to further explore its drifting character.

A transaction costs economics approach to change in management control might provide practitioners with insights into the efficiency of specific management control structures.

The paper contributes to the extant knowledge by both exploring and challenging a TCE‐perspective on SSC‐related changes in management control.

The purpose of this paper is to verify the theoretical assumption about a weaker role of internal governance structures (namely, board and CEO) in determining sporting and financial performances in highly concentrated club ownership environment.

Using data from the Italian and English football clubs playing in their national top divisions, over the period 2006–2015, the authors apply agency theory, property rights theory and win maximization logic to test the absence of a significant impact of internal governance structures on financial performances and clubs’ sporting performance. Ownership structure’s variables are used as control variable.

Empirical findings document an overall poor impact of board structure and CEO features on financial performances, in comparison with the influence of ownership structure; the consolidation of win maximization logic of clubs’ owners has been demonstrated in this specific context. However, the authors found that some internal governance elements have also an impact on performance even if their contribute is limited: board size results negatively associated to club profitability, board independence and CEO tenure are positively related to sporting performance; in addition, CEO tenure also increases profitability.

The originality of the paper lies on the contribution arising from this empirical research, since a scarcity of empirical studies analyzing the correlation between internal governance and performance in European football sector is noticed.

The purpose of this study is to explore how governance mechanisms (internal and external) enhance the performance of the return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), earning per share (EPS) and dividend payout ratios (DP) of the banks of Pakistan. The study incorporates not only the internal factors of governance (board size, out-ratio, annual general meeting, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, block holder stock ownership and financial transparency) but also the external factors (legal infrastructure and protection of minority shareholders, and the market for corporate control).

The sample size of the study consists of 30 banks (public, private and specialized) listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) for the period 2008-2014. The panel data techniques (fixed or random effect model) have been used for the empirical analysis after verification by Hausman (1978) test.

The results revealed that not only do the internal mechanisms of governance enhance the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan but external governance also plays a substantial role in enriching the performance. The findings conclude that for a good governance structure, both internal and external mechanisms are equally important, to accelerate the performance of the banking sector.

Internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance can also be checked by adding some more variables (ownership i.e. foreign, female and family as internal and auditor as external), but they are not added in this work due to data unavailability.

The study contributes to the literature and could be useful for the policy makers who need to force banks to mandate codes of governance through which they can create an efficient board structure and augment the performance. The investments from different forms of ownership can be accelerated if they follow the codes properly.

The study facilitates the bankers in incorporating sound codes of corporate governance to enhance the performance of the banks.

This work is unique as no one has explored the impact of external mechanism of governance on the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan.

The study aims to add to the knowledge of governance and control aspects of intrafirm relationships by exploring a transaction costs economics perspective (TCE perspective) on governance and management control structure choices related to the development of a shared service center (SSC).

The notion of governance and control in SSC organizations is explored and a TCE model is developed to analyze management control structure choices for SSC governance. The nature of internal transactions is related to the dimensions of transactions. Then an example case study is used to illustrate the application of the theoretical model.

The theoretical analysis broadens existing frameworks of management control structures by particularly pointing to the possibility of including governance structures for internal transactions and exit threats (connected to a market mechanism) in the management control structure of an organization. Confrontation with the case example illustrates that the possibility of an exit threat was not explicitly considered by top management (“the designer” of management control). Although the TCE model may be a useful tool for analysis purposes, it has little explanatory power in this particular case. Organizational change processes toward SSCs are complex and can only partly be examined with conventional economics-based approaches such as TCE.

Governance and control of SSCs is conceptually theorized, using an instrumental economics approach. The case study is not generalizable but illustrates the use of the model in a particular situation. To understand governance and control change within SSC organizations, more longitudinal case studies are needed.

A TCE approach to governance and control choices regarding SSCs might provide practitioners with insights into the efficiency of specific management control structures.

This chapter contributes to the extant knowledge by both exploring and challenging a TCE perspective on SSC-related changes in management control.

This study aims to identify the factors that lead non-financial companies listed in the UK to use an internal audit function (IAF) as a monitoring mechanism. Although the use of an IAF in the UK is voluntary, no prior research has examined the drivers for using one.

Financial and non-financial data were collected from the annual reports of 332 UK non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) Main Market. Univariate tests and multivariate logistic regression tests were used to test the research hypotheses. A theoretical framework based on both agency theory and transaction cost economics (TCE) theory was used to explain the economic factors affecting the use of an IAF.

The study provides evidence that firm size, level of internal risks, agency problem between owners and managers and existence of an effective audit committee are associated with the existence of an IAF. Thus, the need to have strong internal control and risk management systems and to reduce both internal and external agency costs drives companies to have an IAF. These results suggest the importance of IAF as an internal corporate governance tool and the effectiveness of UK governance regulations in monitoring the effectiveness of internal control systems.

Given the importance of the IAF’s corporate governance role, the study provides some policy implications. Regulators should pay more attention to the issue of maintaining an IAF, especially by large companies, the relationship between the IAF and other governance parties, especially the audit committee, and the disclosure of more relevant information about the IAF’s characteristics and practices.

This is the first study to examine the factors affecting the existence of the IAF within the UK’s distinctive regulatory approach of “comply or disclose reasons”. Furthermore, it provides a theoretical framework that explains how both the agency theory and TCE theory can interpret the adoption of internal audit.

The chapter aims to clarify the relationship between corporate governance structure and corporate subscription to Global Compact standards. Part one of the chapter looks at the relationship between different models of board governance and active Global Compact participation by publicly listed companies. Part two of the chapter examines a number of external mechanisms aimed at bringing corporate behavior in line with Global Compact principles, and argues that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between internal governance structures and external provisions aimed at influencing corporate behavior.

Part one of the chapter uses an independent T-test to compare the average (mean) proportion of publicly listed companies from unitary board countries with an active Global Compact Communication on Progress status with the average proportion of publicly listed companies from two-tier/hybrid corporate governance systems listed as active Global Compact participants. Part two of the chapter uses primary and secondary sources to examine external mechanisms operating across national borders aimed at influencing corporate behavior.

The chapter finds that a higher proportion of public companies from countries with two-tier/hybrid corporate governance structures have become active Global Compact participants compared to public companies from legal systems with unitary board corporate governance structures. Part two of the chapter examines the potentially mutually reinforcing relationship between internal governance structures and external mechanisms for modifying corporate behavior.

While external codes and standards such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises appear to be influencing corporate behavior worldwide, quantitative data confirming and recording the extent and nature of this influence (if any) remains limited.

The chapter provides useful insights for policy makers and corporate leaders into the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and external codes, standards and guidelines aimed at influencing corporate behavior.

This chapter provides original insights into whether and how internal governance structures can complement and reinforce social standards regarding global corporate citizenship, and the legal guidelines reflecting those standards.