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This study’s purpose is to examine whether providing prior consulting services influences internal auditors’ subsequent assessments when providing assurance services to assist management in its assessment of internal control over financial reporting. A behavioral experiment is used, with internal auditors as participants. We provide some evidence that internal auditors who perform prior consulting services are less likely than others to conclude that an identified control deficiency is a material weakness, but only when the deficiency is directly related to the prior consulting services performed. Limitations include relatively small sample sizes and manipulation check failure rates that, although consistent with several prior studies, are somewhat high. If internal auditors have provided consulting services, they may want to consider limiting the assurance services provided to management that are more directly related to their consulting services. While prior studies have examined the effects of internal auditors’ role in designing internal controls on subsequent services, this is the first study to focus on the impact of providing internal audit consulting services on subsequent assurance services.

This paper aims to explore whether an internal auditor’s evaluation of internal control deficiencies are influenced by the party with primary influence over the internal audit function and by the type of internal control deficiency.

A behavioral experiment is conducted with internal auditors as participants in a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design.

Results indicate that internal auditors are less likely to evaluate a pervasive control deficiency related to “tone at the top” as a material weakness than a process-specific control deficiency. Furthermore, internal auditors are somewhat less likely to evaluate a process-specific internal control deficiency as a material weakness when management has primary influence over the internal audit function than when the audit committee has primary influence. It is also found that the best practice of internal audit oversight (i.e., primary oversight of internal auditors by the audit committee) may lead to potential internal under-reporting of instances where the audit committee represents a material weakness in internal control.

Limitations of this research include lack of economic consequences (e.g. future pay and job loss) associated with the internal control decisions made by the participants; less concise information provided to the participants than would generally be available to them; and lack of generalizability of the findings beyond the specific company setting and internal control scenario portrayed in the case materials.

Not evaluating a pervasive control deficiency related to “tone at the top” as a material weakness seems to not fully align with relevant professional guidance and can possibly result in inaccurate internal information about the quality of internal controls. Furthermore, having an internal auditor’s evaluation of a process-specific internal control deficiency influenced by the party with primary influence over the internal audit function would not appear to align with relevant professional guidance. Finally, primary oversight by the audit committee of the internal auditors may lead to potential internal under-reporting of instances where the audit committee represents a material weakness in internal controls and, thus, possible communication of inaccurate internal control information.

This study is the first to address whether the party with primary influence over the internal audit function influences an internal auditor’s evaluation of internal control deficiencies.

The purpose of this paper is to teach students the fundamental and most critical aspects of performing a financial statement risk assessment, a skill vital to help ensure both auditor and public‐company compliance with guidance found in the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the SEC's Interpretative Guidance regarding Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting, the control deficiency evaluation framework found in Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).

This instructional case study helps students assess the impact of a set of hypothetical internal control deficiency risks in various industries, including inherent and residual financial statement risk assessment, and concludes with determining which identified internal control weaknesses are significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in internal control. Included in the financial statement residual risk assessment process are example entity‐level and process‐level controls described in COSO. Learning objectives, implementation guidance, and the efficacy of using the case study in the undergraduate or graduate auditing or accounting information systems courses are also provided.

The results of classroom testing of the case study at two universities provides evidence the case study increases student understanding of the implications of internal controls and their impact on the reliability of the financial statements significantly. Students also found the case to be challenging, interesting, relevant, clear, understandable, and a realistic approximation of what they might expect to encounter in the real‐world when performing a financial statement risk assessment.

The case study includes the development of skills important to students in performing financial statement risk assessments, either as an auditor or when working in a private industry environment, including making professional judgments related to risk assessment.

The purpose of this paper is to examine information technology (IT) control deficiencies and their affect on financial reporting.

This study examines 278 companies reporting IT control deficiencies in the first three years of the SOX 404 requirements (2004‐2006). Using quantitative analysis, the study evaluates the impact of IT deficiencies on financial reporting and determines significant differences between companies that report IT deficiencies and companies that do not report IT deficiencies.

Four accounting errors: revenue recognition issues; receivables, investments and cash issues; inventory, vendor and cost of sales issues; and financial statement, footnote, US GAAP, and segment disclosures issues stand out as common financial reporting problems in companies reporting weak IT controls. This study also suggests that companies with IT control deficiencies report more internal control (IC) deficiencies, are smaller, pay higher audit fees, and are typically audited by smaller accounting firms.

This research is limited in scope since only SOX accelerated filers are included in the analysis. As of this study, smaller, non‐accelerated filers are not required to report IC control weaknesses under SOX.

As of this research, no analysis exists to support or refute the relationship of IT controls and accounting errors. This study re‐affirms the widespread impact that deficient IT controls can have on the overall IC structure of the business. Our study reveals some of the important issues associated with IT in the financial reporting process. The role of IT in financial reporting systems is destined to escalate. Studies, like ours, can help managers and auditors identify IT problems that affect financial reporting and take remedial steps to correct these weaknesses.

In 2001, the US moved to regulate internal control reporting by management and auditors. While some jurisdictions have followed the lead of the US, many others have not. An important question, therefore, is the relevance of internal control to stakeholders. The more specific issue of the benefits of US-style regulation of internal control reporting is also topical. We review studies on the determinants of internal control quality and its economic consequences for stakeholders including investors, creditors, managers, auditors and financial analysts. We extend previous reviews by focusing on US studies published since 2013 as well as all non-US studies investigating IC quality including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings and both developed and developing economies. In doing so, we identify research questions where evidence remains mixed and new directions in which there are research opportunities.

Three main insights arise from our analysis. First, evidence on the economic consequences of internal control quality suggests that the quality of internal control can have a significant effect on decision making by users of financial information. Second, the results of research on the empirical association between ownership structure, certain board characteristics and internal control quality is generally mixed. Empirical evidence concerning the association between audit committee characteristics and internal control quality generally supports a positive and significant association. Finally, while studies in non-US jurisdictions are increasing, opportunities remain to explore the determinants and consequences of internal control in other jurisdictions. Our review provides evidence for policy makers of whether there are benefits from requiring management and auditors to report on internal control over financial reporting.

For the past 10 years, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has operated as an independent overseer of public company audits. Over 70 percent of PCAOB studies have been published since 2010, evidencing the increasing relevance of PCAOB-related research in recent years. Our paper reviews the existing literature on the PCAOB’s four primary functions – registration, standard-setting, inspections, and enforcement. In particular, we examine PCAOB registration trends and evaluate the effects of PCAOB registration requirements on the issuer audit market, as well as discuss the relative costs and benefits (e.g., auditor behavior changes, improvements in audit quality, auditor perceptions) of the 16 auditing standards the PCAOB passed in its first 10 years of operation. Further, we summarize the literature’s findings on the effects of the PCAOB inspection process on various facets of audit quality. Finally, we analyze the research concerning the PCAOB’s enforcement actions to determine how markets have responded to sanctions against auditors and audit firms. We contend that understanding and reviewing the effects of the PCAOB’s activities are important to future audit research because of the PCAOB’s authority over and oversight of the issuer audit profession. We also identify PCAOB-related research areas that have not been fully explored and propose several research questions intended to address these research areas.

This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s 2013 Framework, by investigating how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses compares for Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the framework, and how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses changed for Early- and Timely-adopters following their adoption of the framework.

The paper uses regression analyses based on a sample of US firms subject to Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b).

Timely-adopters of the 2013 Framework continued to exhibit fewer instances of auditor-reported material weaknesses than Late-adopters, even though they had a marginal increase in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, in the post-2013 Framework period.

The findings suggest that the effectiveness of the 2013 Framework may lie in the iterative nature of the internal control process, and as firms remedy deficiencies they or their auditors identify, they will continuously improve the effectiveness of their internal control systems.

Unlike existing literature, this paper uses data from the pre-2013 Framework, transition and post-2013 Framework periods to examine changes in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, thus differentiating between Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the 2013 Framework. It also shows the effect of adopting the 2013 Framework on the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 404) requires auditors to attest to, and report on, management's assessment and effectiveness of the company's internal control systems. This paper aims to examine investor reaction to companies' announcements of new information technology (IT) or improved existing IT to satisfy requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002.

Using a sample of 124 SOX‐related IT announcements from 2003 to 2007, an event study measuring market reactions using average cumulative abnormal return is undertaken. Additionally, the cross‐sectional variation in the marketplace is analyzed to test the effect of firm‐specific factors on market responses.

The empirical results suggest that the stock market reacts favorably to corporations that invest in SOX 404‐related IT. The reaction is more favorable toward companies without prior reported internal control deficiencies/weaknesses. Additionally, the results marginally support the notion that firms with higher risk and poorer financial reporting quality can demonstrate their commitment to improve internal control over financial reporting by investing in IT for SOX 404 compliance.

The findings will influence companies' IT investment decisions, particularly IT decisions that are SOX Section 404‐related. Potential benefits of SOX 404 IT investments include favorable market returns. Additionally, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of SOX for standard‐setting and regulation bodies examining past rulings and preparing for future regulation.

Part IV provides readers with the extant requirements for the application of materiality to recognition, measurement, presentation, and disclosure in the financial statements. This part also includes a detailed critical review of the recent Practice Statement on materiality, the FASB’s proposed ASU on the notes and the amendments to the Conceptual Framework proposed by the IASB and the FASB.

The part expands to issues that are typical of Management Commentary, including the SEC guidance on materiality in Management Discussion and Analysis.

It informs about the complexities and subtle differences between financial statements and bookkeeping and the different standards of reasonableness versus materiality.

A section moves from materiality to material misstatements and covers the application of materiality in auditing.

Another section goes in depth on internal control over financial reporting, showing the linkages between materiality and risk appetite and risk tolerance and the related application guidance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether Japanese Sarbanes – Oxley Act (J-SOX) impacted earnings management and earnings quality of public firms in Japan.

This archival study compares earnings management and earnings quality of firms that disclose at least one material weakness with a sample matched on size and industry without a material weakness.

The authors investigate whether the differences in regulations, corporate governance and regulatory environment acceptance influence earnings management and earnings management of Japanese listed firms, relative to findings in the USA. They found the Japanese results to be slightly different from the results found in previous USA studies. First, the time-series observations suggest that while accruals management and real earnings management remained unchanged for control firms, accruals management and real earnings management increased for material weaknesses disclosing firms following J-SOX. The regression analyses suggest that accruals management for both the groups is significant in the pre-and post-J-SOX periods, but that real earnings management declined for both the groups post-J-SOX. Second, while, both accruals quality and accuracy of cash flow predictions improved in the post-J-SOX period.

The sample of Japanese firms disclosing a material weakness is small because the number of firms that disclose internal control deficiencies is decreasing in Japan. The authors have no evidence that their results are not generalizable to a larger sample and leave this for future research.

The authors provide evidence that J-SOX, which does not have a direct reporting system, does not constrain earnings management. Their results drive the regulator to reconsider whether the reporting system works in the Japanese business environment. Additionally, their results show that J-SOX has no effect on earnings management; thus, regulators need to reconsider the governance function of directors and internal auditors. This paper communicates to the world how J-SOX works in Japan through changes in earnings quality and management post J-SOX and the root problems.

This paper is the first (of which the authors are aware) to examine whether J-SOX impacted both earnings management and earnings quality in Japan. This paper discusses how the differences in regulations and corporate governance as well as the differences between USA-SOX and J-SOX may explain the results observed in Japan. This paper provides results regarding whether J-SOX improved earnings quality.