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Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Defines corporate governance, describes the special characteristics of Belgian companies and presents a study of the disciplining of bad management in 165 companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange 1989‐1996. Finds that poor share price performance is generally linked to a higher turnover of directors except in holding companies and that several measures of poor accounting performance are linked to higher director and CEO turnover, although there is more resistance to this in large companies and less in those with a higher proportion of non‐executive directors or total/foreign ownership. Shows that negative after‐tax earnings lead owners with strong monitoring abilities (e.g. holding companies) to increase their stake while others (e.g. families and institutional shareholders) reduce it; and that CEO replacement is followed by increased dividends. Summarizes the findings, noting the differences between the finance sector and others.

This paper aims to highlight some of the more important changes in US prudential regulation and their implications for the operation of large foreign banking organizations (FBOs) in the USA.

This paper begins with a summary of the regulatory status of FBOs prior to the crisis. It then discusses developments during the US financial crisis of 2007-2009 that motivated stricter US prudential regulation. The third part discusses some major post-crisis changes in prudential regulation. Finally, the paper considers two areas where important changes in US rules could not be applied in a straightforward manner to FBOs: non-bank financial subsidiaries and branches and agencies.

Most of the regulatory changes will enhance US financial stability, albeit in some cases at the cost of weakening FBOs consolidated risk management. However, a few of the regulatory changes have given foreign branches and agencies a significant competitive advantage in US money markets.

The paper provides an integrated analysis of both the why and the what of changes in US regulation with some discussion of the economic consequences.

The main provisions of the Act are covered, such as those relating to company and business names, share capital, disclosure of interests in shares, company accounts and reporting exemptions for small and medium‐sized companies.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether and how “living wills” and public disclosure of such resolution plans contribute to market discipline and the effective resolution of too big and too complex to fail banks.

The disorderly collapse of Lehman Brothers is analyzed. Large, systemically important banks are now required to prepare resolution plans (living wills). In the USA, parts of the living wills must be disclosed to the public. The public component is analyzed with respect to contribution to market discipline and effective resolution of banks considered too big and complex to fail. In a statistical analysis of the publicly available section of living wills, this information is contrasted with legislative requirements.

The analysis of public disclosures of resolution plans shows that they are insufficient to facilitate market discipline and, in some instances, fail to enhance public understanding of the financial institution and its business. When coupled with the uncertainty over how an internationally active financial institution will be resolved, the paper concludes that these reforms will do little to reduce market expectations that some financial firms are simply too big or too complex to fail.

A very small data set and the necessity of cross-checking the authors' observations with all publicly available sources. The authors have also tried to infer a purpose for public disclosure of parts of resolution plans. The authorities are remarkably vague on the issue and so the authors have assumed they actually did have a specific intent that would strengthen the system.

The inference from the publicly available portion of living wills is that the authorities are a very long way from abolishing too-big-to-fail.

So far as the authors know, this is the first in-depth analysis of the information available in the public sections of living wills.

This paper is an effort to demystify tax havens – what they mean, what they offer and why they are harmful. It offers a detailed analysis of abusive tax planning by multinational corporations, involving the use of tax havens, shedding light on how corporations use “egregious” tax-sheltering techniques right from their incorporation to avoid payment of income taxes. The paper also discusses global efforts against the phenomenon and policy recommendations.

The paper brings together definitions from various sources to accurately define and identify tax haven economies. The key contribution of the paper is to diagrammatically explain the use of tax havens by MNCs right from the time they are incorporated. It explains how every big and small corporate decision is motivated by the desire to save taxes and how tax havens come in handy for such corporations.

This paper finds that base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) is a pervasive phenomenon, largely due to the suppliers of tax haven operations. Here, corporate decisions are divided into strategic and operational and further subdivided into investing, operating and financing activities, and provide real-life corporate examples of how tax havens fit into almost every corporate decision. This is the key contribution of the paper.

This is a review paper that sums up knowledge about tax havens and their use by MNCs. It does not, however, use empirical data to corroborate its findings. It would be interesting to see empirically whether MNCs with greater tax haven operations actually have lower effective tax rates.

The paper can provide a framework for designing tax policies in a manner that geographical arbitrage can be minimized. It can enable formulation of the necessary incentive structures in the form of penalties, rewards and the like for both the users and providers of tax haven services to curb massive base and profit shifting out of high-tax countries.

The paper is one small step in the direction of bringing about equality in tax payments, i.e. to align real tax systems with the canon of equality that Adam Smith once dreamt of. Taxes should be progressive in nature, implying that the amount of taxes paid should increase with one’s income. However, with the advent of offshore financial centres and egregious tax planning techniques, only the smaller corporations and middle-class individuals end up paying taxes, while the rich and bigger corporations get away easily.

The paper explores in detail the manner in which MNCs use, rather exploit, regulatory loopholes in tax systems of different countries to save on tax payments. By shifting their tax base from one country to another, MNCs not only hamper Treasury collections but also breed disrespect for the global tax system. The paper can help in designing tax laws in tune with such corporate motives.

This study aims to investigate the impact tax shelters and cost of debt in Iran. It also aims determine methods to identify tax-aggressive policies through corporate structure and corporate policies, as well as various solutions to handle these issues.

For this purpose, the data of 155 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during the years of 2008-2015 will be considered. The number of observations includes 1,085 companies. Data was analyzed using logistic panel regression with R software.

The results of the hypotheses show that financial leverage use is not inversely related to companies’ tax-aggressive policies. There is no direct relationship between sales and financial leverage. Overall, there is no inverse relationship between tax shelters and total debt.

The results extend the empirical findings of Graham and Tucker and Wilson. The authors also investigated the relationship between tax shelters and financing (total debt). These findings are crucial to the state; although several studies with similar subjects have been conducted in different countries, the current study is the first of its type in Iran.

This article reviews the history of international coordination in the supervision of financial institutions noting why cooperation developed first and has been most extensive in oversight of banks relative to securities firms and insurance companies. It also poses the question of whether the extent of international coordination can be sustained or may even diminish.

The history of international coordination is used to illustrate the hypotheses that cooperation is more likely: the broader the international consensus on policy objectives and the potential gains from cooperation, the wider the international consensus on policy objectives and the potential gains from cooperation, the deeper the international agreement on the probable consequences of policy alternatives, the stronger the international institutional infrastructure for decision-making and the greater the domestic influence of experts who share a common understanding of a problem and its solutions.

All five of these factors that have enabled deepening and broadening of international cooperation have diminished in strength so that international cooperation is not likely to expand and may even be in retreat.

This article clarifies the factors that facilitate international cooperation and highlights the key obstacles to sustaining international cooperation.

Basel III and the capital stress testing introduced new requirements and new definitions while retaining the structure of the pre-2010 requirements. The total number of requirements increased, making it difficult to determine which and how many constraints are binding. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the new financial regulations in the post-financial crisis period, focusing on the capital and liquidity regulations.

The authors explore the impact of financial regulations using various data sources – financial and accounting data from Y-9C Reports. Market data such as daily bond trading from TRACE through the Wharton Data Research Services and Treasury yield from the Bloomberg. The authors use regression analysis to examine the roles of capital adequacy and liquidity regulations.

The authors’ analysis in this paper suggest that Basel III, CET1 and Level 1 HQLAs requirements post-financial crisis have reshaped the balance sheets of large financial institutions, with some differential impacts on traditional versus capital markets banks. These changes appear to respond to the binding constraints (CET1 being a preponderance of required regulatory capital, Level 1 HQLAs a majority of required HQLAs and the expense of both) created by these new requirements, which also appear to have constrained asset growth at such institutions. Consistent with the authors’ view, their results suggest that the new requirements are less constraining for large traditional banks (such institutions show a rapid increase in CET1 capital to steady-state levels by 2012 and strong retail deposit rebuilding resulting in a relatively low required HQLA) and much more so, particularly the liquidity requirement, for the capital markets banks (such institutions show continuous building of CET1 capital over the post-crisis observation period, declines in the share of trading assets and increases in the share of HQLAs combined with efforts to increase retail deposits). Credit risk spreads rose dramatically during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Although decreased, they remain higher and with greater dispersion (for both groups of banks) than pre-crisis. Preliminary regression analysis suggests that the market responds to changes in measured liquidity, rather than the regulatory capital ratios, when pricing bank risk (as reflected on bond spreads).

The estimation is based on historical relationship in the data. We must be cautious in extrapolating the results in a different environment.

There appears to be an arbitrage between HQLA and retail deposits. Capital markets banks and traditional banks follow different business models as evident in the analysis in this paper.

Market pricing suggests that the liquidity measures are more transparent and easier to understand. Capital ratios are not as easy to interpret.

Original research. To the authors’ knowledge, there is no paper that examines impacts of capital and liquidity regulations after the crisis at capital markets banks vs traditional banks – using both accounting data and market data.

A call for long term incomes policy which will provide managers and professional staffs with rewards comparable to those paid to their counterparts in Europe is made in a statement rejecting the Government's five per cent guide line by APST — the union for managers in science based industries.