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The article looks at the different distributional patterns of two alternative ways of reforming relief for owner‐occupation in UK, namely the reintroduction of income tax on imputed rent (the optimal reform, assuming housing is an investment good) or the withdrawal of tax relief for mortgage interest payments (possibly the more likely political reform). Inland Revenue data show that removal of mortgage interest relief (exclusive of the Option Mortgage) would be the more progressive measure. Removal of relief at higher rates of tax would be one possible step on the road to reform of mortgage interest.

The purpose of this paper is to show that distinguishing between gross and net tax shields arising from interest deductions is important to firm valuation. The distinction affects the interpretation but not valuation of tax shields for the famous Miller’s (1977) model with corporate and personal taxes. However, for the well-known Miles and Ezzell’s (1985) model, the authors show that the valuation of tax shields can be materially affected. Implications to the cost of equity and optimal capital structure are discussed.

This paper proposed a simple tax shield clarification that distinguishes between gross and net tax shields. Net tax shields equal gross tax shields minus personal taxes on debt. When an after-tax riskless rate is used to discount shareholders’ tax shields, this distinction affects the interpretation but not valuation results of the Miller’s model. However, when the after-tax unlevered equity rate is used to discount tax shields under the well-known Miles and Ezzell’s (1985) model, the difference between gross and net tax shields can materially affect valuation results. According to the traditional ME model, both gross tax shields and debt interest tax payments (i.e. net tax shields) are discounted at the after-tax unlevered equity rate. By contrast, the proposed revised ME model discounts gross tax shields at the unlevered equity rate but personal taxes on debt income at the riskless rate (like debt payments). Because personal taxes on debt are nontrivial, traditional ME valuation results can noticeably differ from the revised ME model to the extent that after-tax unlevered equity and debt rates differ from one another.

For comparative purposes, the authors provide numerical examples of the traditional and revised ME models. The following constant tax rates and market discount rates are assumed: T_c=0.30, T_pb=0.20, T_ps=0.10, r=0.06, and ρ=0.10. Table I compares these two models’ valuation results. Maximum firm value for the traditional ME model is 7.89 compared to 7.00 for the revised ME model. At a 50 percent leverage ratio, equity value is reduced from 3.71 to 3.49, respectively. Importantly, the traditional ME model suggests that firm value linearly increases with leverage and implies an all-debt capital structure, whereas firm value stays relatively constant as leverage increases in the revised ME model. These capital structure differences arise due to discounting debt tax payments with the unlevered equity rate (riskless rate) in the traditional ME (revised ME) model. Figure 1 graphically summarizes these results by comparing the traditional ME model (thin lines) to the revised ME model (bold lines).

Textbook treatments of leverage gains to firms or projects with corporate and personal taxes should be amended to take into account this previously unrecognized tradeoff. Also, empirical analyses of capital structure are recommended on the sensitivity of leverage ratios to the gross-tax-gain/debt-personal taxes tradeoff.

Financial managers need to understand how to value interest tax shields on debt in making capital structure decisions, computing the cost of capital, and valuing the firm.

The valuation of interest tax shields in finance is a long-standing controversy. Nobel prize winners Modigliani and Miller (MM) wrote numerous papers on this subject and gained fame from their ideas in this area. However, application of their ideas has changed over time due to the Miles and Ezzell’s (ME) model of firm valuation. The present paper adapts the pathbreaking ideas of MM to the valuation framework of ME. Students and practitioners in finance can benefit by the valuation results in the paper.

No previous studies have recognized the valuation issues resolved in the paper on the application of the popular and contemporary ME model of firm valuation to the MM valuation concepts. The new arguments in the paper are easy to understand and readily applied to firm valuation.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple formula for determining a borrower's APR for mortgage loans after including the effects of mortgage interest tax deductions.

This formula is derived by adjusting the APR provided by the lender for the length of the mortgage, the amount of discount points, the mortgage interest rate, and the borrower's tax rate.

From this formula, it is found that the tax‐adjusted APR is not only lower but also more informative than the traditional APR.

The tax‐deductible items of a mortgage loan used in this formula for after‐tax APR are based on those stipulated under US tax law. However, this formula can easily be adapted to other internal rate of return methods such as the annual effective rate of return (AER). In addition, further research is needed to develop a formula when a mortgage loan is the result of a refinance. Under this situation, mortgage discount points are no longer tax‐deductible in the year of their occurrence. Rather, the deduction of points must be amortized over the life of the loan.

The tax‐adjusted APR formula developed in this paper is tailored to each mortgage applicant by providing a more realistic assessment of the applicant's true cost of borrowing.

Even though it is known that the after‐tax APR decreases as an individual's marginal tax rate increases, no explicit formula existed for determining the after‐tax APR. This is the first such formula. Thus, this formula will help the consumers in the mortgage market to be more informed in their decision‐making process.

We investigate how different cognitive conceptualizations of reference point and tax withholdings jointly influence aggressive tax filing. We utilize a field study with responses captured from actual taxpayers immediately after filing their returns. Consistent with both prospect theory and mental accounting perspectives, we hypothesize and find evidence that more aggressive filing decisions depend on mental categorization of whether taxpayers expect a tax refund or owe additional taxes relative to their expected asset position (EAP). We find a joint and additive impact of EAP with a cognitive link made between taxes and the categorization of amounts owed. Our findings suggest that more aggressive filing behavior is found in taxpayers in a tax loss position relative to their EAP and in those that do not separately categorize taxes owing from their own resources. By highlighting the importance of EAP and the cognitive separation of taxes owed, we provide insight for revenue agencies to use cognitive framing strategies to mitigate aggressive taxpayer behavior. The cognitive framing of EAP may be influenced by the use of installment payments and tax withholdings, but also may be affected by communications that alter taxpayers' expectations of taxes owed.

Both, the UK and Japan abolished the tax credit system for foreign source dividends in 2009 in favour of the exemption system. With the move towards a dividend exemption system the governments intended to enhance the international tax competitiveness of their countries. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the implications of substituting the credit system for the exemption system in the UK and Japan on cross-border transaction prices when competing for international acquisitions.

The paper uses an economic model under certainty to analyse the changes in cross-border marginal purchase and seller prices as a result of the introduction of the newly introduced dividend exemption system.

Shifting to an exemption system has ambiguous effects on the ability to compete for foreign acquisitions: investors from both countries are able to pay higher prices in the course of acquisitions, but while investors from the UK become more competitive, the relative competitive position for Japanese investors hardly changes and remains relatively constrained, independent of the form of double taxation relief. Thus the author verifies that the international tax regime is not the only determinant influencing the competitive position, ranking second to, e.g., the interaction with international tax rate differentials.

The international tax reforms in UK and Japan in 2009 offer a unique opportunity to study the impact of international tax policy on the international tax competitiveness of multinational firms in the course of foreign acquisitions. Evidence from this paper is not exclusively applicable to the UK and Japan setting. The observed effects shed new light on the intensified debate in the USA of changing the international tax system by analysing the impact on the bidding situation in international acquisitions in a real-world transition scenario.

This chapter analyses the recovery of the Danish economy from the crisis of the 1980s, its elevation to a bit of an ‘economic miracle’ or at least an ‘employment miracle’ from 1995 to 2005 and its subsequent decline during the financial crisis, which revealed more long-standing problems that precluded a quick recovery. The solution of Denmark's structural balance of payment problems in the early 1990s paved the way for long-term prosperity, and Denmark managed the challenges of globalisation and deindustrialisation almost without social costs. However, an accumulation of short-term policy failures and credit liberalisation facilitated a credit and housing bubble, a consumption-driven boom and declining competitiveness. In broad terms, the explanation is political; this includes not only vote- and office-seeking strategies of the incumbent government but also ideational factors such as agenda setting of economic policy. Somewhat unnoticed – partly because of preoccupation with long-term challenges of ageing and shortage of labour – productivity and economic growth rates had slowed down over several years. The Danish decline in GDP 2008–2009 was larger than in the 1930s, and after the bubble burst, there were few drivers of economic growth. Households consolidated and were reluctant to consume; public consumption had to be cut as well; exports increased rather slowly; and in this climate, there was little room for private investments. Financially, the Danish economy remained healthy, though. Current accounts revealed record-high surpluses after the financial crisis; state debt remained moderate, and if one were to include the enormous retained taxes in private pension funds, net state debt would de facto be positive. Still, around 2010–2011 there were few short-term drivers of economic growth, and rather unexpectedly, it turned out that unemployment problems were likely to prevail for several years.

In this paper, I provide an empirical work in order to test the tax‐adjusted market valuation (residual income) model. Feltham‐Ohlson's (1995) residual income model can be extended by adding corporate tax: firm market value is a function of the bottom line after‐tax accounting data, e.g., book value and after‐tax earnings. Under this tax‐adjusted framework, certain issues are examined: the information from the firm's operating activities is not enough to measure the firm's market value; financial activities also affect firm market value. In particular, abnormal financial earnings are not equal to zero, due to the tax deduction on interest expenses. An empirical analysis, using the financial reporting data of Canadian firms for the years 1994–1999, demonstrates that the current book value of financial assets and operating assets, abnormal operating earnings, and abnormal financial earnings are all relevant to firm market value. The sensitivity tests, which define the corporate tax rates in different ways, do not change the results. The sensitivity test, which uses the financial analysts' forecasts, does not change the results, either. Furthermore, the empirical analysis shows that abnormal financial earnings enhance firm share price more when the firm has lower non‐tax costs, i.e., firm business risk (financial distress) and bankruptcy costs. It supports the previous research on capital structure to the extent that debt financing benefits a firm more when non‐tax costs are lower.

The tax advantage of debt is considered an important motivation for highly leveraged transactions. The German government limited the tax deductibility of interest expenses to 30.0 percent of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (the interest barrier rule) in 2008 to reduce the tax incentives for debt financing. This study aims to evaluate the impact of the introduction of the interest barrier rule.

The paper analyzes the changes in the value of the tax shield for German leveraged buyouts as a result of the promulgation of an interest barrier rule. Tax shields are computed to quantify the wealth transfer from taxpayers to corporations.

Prior to the 2008 tax reform, tax shields contributed 8.4 percent to the transaction price, thereby raising the equity value by 33.0 percent on average. With the introduction of the interest barrier rule, the value of tax shields is reduced by 35.1 percent. Affecting more than 75 percent of buyouts, the rule significantly lessens the tax incentive for high levels of debt. The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 31.7 percent to 26.3 percent further lowers the value creation potential. The limited interest deductibility may therefore reduce the number of leveraged buyouts and hence economic growth, unless other non‐debt forms of financing can fulfill the need for capital.

As the first continental European study, this research concentrates on the impact of the German interest barrier rule on value creation in highly leveraged transactions. Conclusions can be drawn in a broader European context.

Transaction costs, responsive housing supply, rent controls, tenant protection, and access to credit affect residential mobility – these different parts of housing policy are included in what has been defined as housing regimes, which embrace regulations, laws, norms, and ideology as well as economic factors. In this chapter, we investigate how these regimes change by using institutional theories of path dependence. We use Sweden as an example and study three Swedish housing market reforms during the past decades that may have affected residential mobility, each related to one of the main institutional pillars of housing provision: tenure legislation, taxation, and finance. More precisely, we study the development of the rental regulation since the late 1960s, the tax reform in 1991, and the new reforms on mortgages since 2010. What caused these reforms? What were the main mechanisms behind them, and why did they occur at the time they did? We argue, besides affecting residential mobility, these reforms have the common feature of including interesting elements of path dependence and forming critical junctures that have led the development on to a new path. Institutions of tenure legislation, housing finance, and taxation are often claimed to have effects on residential mobility. Although they are seldom designed with the explicit aim of supporting (or counteracting) residential mobility, they may sometimes do so as more or less unintended consequences.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986, signed into law by President Reagan on October 22, 1986, makes the most sweeping changes to our tax system that we have experienced in over 30 years. Virtually every individual in the United States will feel its impact. In fact, the reverberations began late last year even though most of the law's provisions did not take effect until January 1 of this year.