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Due to the high levels of crime in Rio de Janeiro, the purpose of this paper is twofold. The first one is to analyze the effects of deterrence variables (such as the adoption of Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) and incarcerations) on violence in the municipalities of the State of Rio de Janeiro, as well as to verify the existence of “revenge effect.” The second is to analyze the effects of socio-economic development on violence, using development indicators.

Besides usual OLS method for panel data analysis, the study makes use of dynamic panel data framework through D-GMM and S-GMM. The estimates are based on a sample of 82 municipalities of Rio de Janeiro, and the period runs from 2003 to 2013. As dependent variables, the estimates use violent deaths (i.e. aggregation of intentional homicides and armed robberies followed by death) and homicides resulting from opposition to police intervention (i.e. civilians killed as a result of police actions against criminals – “opposition deaths”).

The estimates indicate that incarceration presents marginal capacity to reduce violence. Regarding the findings for the adoption of UPPs, the evidence suggests that this project increased violence and, therefore, the possibility of displacement of violence to other regions of the State. With respect to the effect of police deaths over violence, the results are unprecedented and suggest the existence of a “revenge effect.” Besides, the study points to the importance of socio-economic development to reduce violence.

Once the study analyzes the effects of incarceration and UPPs, it contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on the ability of anti-crime policies of reducing (or not) violence. In addition, when considering the death of policemen in the estimates, the study shows an unprecedented way, the effect that these deaths cause over violence (the so-called “revenge effect”). Moreover, the study considers the impacts of the development of employment and income, health and education on violence. When analyzing these development indicators, the study contributes with the literature that looks for non-police alternatives to control crime.

Purpose – This chapter explains what is known about international homicide trends, highlights gaps in existing literature, and proposes avenues for future research that will expand understanding about international homicide.

Design/methodology/approach – We review extant literature on international homicide trends, and draw on data from the World Health Organization from 1990 to 2015 to identify patterns in contemporary international homicide trends.

Findings – We demonstrate evidence of an international homicide drop across most regions around the world. Nonetheless, the homicide decline is not a global event as several countries – particularly countries with high homicide rates – did not experience reductions in homicide during this period. The key question remains as to what the causes of changes in international homicide rates are and why many countries experience very similar reductions in homicide while a few experienced increasing violence. We propose potential explanations and suggest areas for future research.

Originality/value – This chapter documents an international homicide decline occurring between 1990 and 2015. We also demonstrate that homicide trends are likely influenced by factors beyond local phenomena and domestic policies since homicide rates largely track together for regions throughout the world. Accordingly, the chapter suggests potential avenues for future research that can help better explain this trend.

It has been suggested that homicides in Jamaica are partly driven by conflicts among criminals over funds coming from international lottery scams; most of these funds are channeled into the country via remittances. This study aims to determine the empirical relationship between remittances and homicides in Jamaica over the period 1985–2019.

The authors apply an error correction modelling framework while accounting for indicators of changes in socioeconomic conditions.

There are two. First, the authors find from impulse response analysis of the long-run dynamics that an increase in remittances is associated with an increase in homicides, and vice versa. Second, the authors find that there is bidirectional Granger causality between remittances and homicides in the short run.

Two important implications are that policies should be strengthened to channel remittances to productive and legal investment opportunities and that greater efforts may be needed to stem the flow of funds coming from international lottery scamming and other illegal activities.

This is the first study that examines the dynamic relationship between remittances and homicides in Jamaica from a robust statistical perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impacts of left Brazilian political parties and partisan disruption on the homicide rate in Brazil.

The authors use panel data for the states between the years 1980 and 2011. The database used is an unbalanced panel covering a sample of 27 Brazilian states over 32 years, 1980-2011, totaling about 855 observations.

It is estimated that these two political factors are sources that have connection to the increased level of violence in Brazil. These analyses provide several important results. First, partisan disruption is associated with a higher homicide rate, compared to non-partisan disruption. The results from the panel also suggest that left-parties in government have a positive impact on homicide, compared to non-left-parties.

Information regarding premeditated homicides (CID-BR-9 database) is available for all Brazilian states, and may be tabulated from the same micro-data at any level of aggregation. Some of the well-known problems regarding the choice of this variable are as follows. First, deaths resulting from wounds are sometimes included in the statistics whether wounds were intentionally inflicted or not. In addition, some incidents end up not being registered because certain deaths are not reported. This tends to occur more frequently in rural areas. Fortunately, this second problem does not appear to be too significant, as under-registry of deaths due to external causes is much lower than the amount resulting from natural causes (see, e.g. Cano and Santos, 2000). In addition, this problem may be controlled if under-registry remains stable over time by applying fixed effects to the panel data.

The main Brazilian political parties diverge on the causes of crime and how criminals should be punished. For example, in Brazil, the minimum age for one individual to be punished with imprisonment is 18 years old. Practices crimes for young people between 12 and 18 implies only in socio-educational measures. Given the high level of violence in Brazil, there is a bill being debated in the parliament that proposes to reduce the age to 16 years. Based on the research, 90 percent of the population approves the reduction of age to 16 years. However, the majority of parliament is opposed to changing the law. In general, the more conservative parties are favorable to changing the law.

These divergent postures can be associated with the ideological essence or to belief system of each political party. Political parties have the potential capacity of changing crime trends through economic and social policies as well as by applying stronger sanctions against crime. Given the law enforcement system, the cycle of crime in Brazil may be related to the profile of the political party elected.

The authors assume the hypothesis that the current Brazilian multi-partisan system has an incentive system in which politicians do not respond adequately to the basic wishes of voters. Among such desires, the authors emphasize public safety. This paper evaluates the empirical effect of partisan disruption on homicide rate.

The classification of criminal acts as violent or nonviolent should be a keystone of actuarial predictors of violent recidivism, as it affects their outcome measure and scoring of criminal history, thus influencing many decisions about sentencing, release and treatment allocation. Examination of existing actuarial and clinical violence risk assessment tools and research studies reveals considerable variation in the classifications used. This paper aims to use large samples to develop an alternative, empirically grounded classification that can be used to improve actuarial predictive scores within the offender assessment system (OASys), the tool used by the National Offender Management Service of England and Wales to assess static and dynamic risk.

Two analytical steps are implemented. First, to identify offences that frequently involve violent acts, 230,334 OASys cases are analyzed for indicators of violent content. Second, the ability of dynamic and static risk factors to predict reoffending for various offence types is investigated, analyzing 26,619 OASys cases that have official recidivism data.

The resulting empirical classification of violent offences adds public order, criminal damage, threats/harassment, robbery/aggravated burglary and weapon possession offences to the central group of homicide and assault offences. The need to assess risk of sexual recidivism separately is discussed.

This study has successfully produced an offence classification for use in a new predictor of violent recidivism. The use of empirical methods to select these offences helps to maximise predictive validity.

Brazil and Chile have nearly similar recent political histories. Emerging from protracted military dictatorships at roughly the same time, both developed presidential and representative democratic processes, though with contrasting individual national emphases. Military dictatorships in both countries originated in anti-corruption rationales, among others, and both have emphasized anti-corruption practices since regime changes. Brazil impeached two presidents, ostensibly for corrupt practices. Yet, Chile has managed a corruption level, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, that is among the lowest in Latin America, while Brazil’s is among the highest. This study compares and contrasts the two nations’ experiences with a view to uncover key causal, or at least explanatory, variables in this striking contrast in levels of perceived corruption.

The purpose of this paper is to develop and test theory regarding a geographic halo effect, whereby foreign investors draw overly broad impressions about a country based on high levels of violent crime in specific locations impacting foreign direct investment (FDI) across the country.

The authors analyze the impact of homicides on FDI by source country into Mexican states from 2001 to 2015. They estimate fixed effect and dynamic panel models controlling for several determinants of FDI at the state level and the potential geographic spillover of such violence from adjacent states.

The authors find robust support for the existence of a geographic halo effect caused by violent crime. The results show that the highest number of state homicides is associated with lower FDI across states.

The research provides some evidence of the potential role of cognitive biases on FDI decisions. In addition, its focus on Latin America brings attention to an understudied region in international business research.

For practitioners engaged in FDI decisions, the results imply the need to be more aware of potential cognitive biases that may influence them.

Few papers have explored the influence of cognitive biases on FDI.

This study aims to improve our understanding of violence, focusing on the analysis of the relation between socioeconomic factors and homicide rates from 2005 to 2019 in Brazilian capitals.

Multilevel Poisson models were used to estimate the homicide risk in men and women. The response variable was the homicide rate. Fixed effects were estimated for age group, year and gross domestic product (GDP).

The average homicide rate over the 2005–2019 period was 5.83/100,000 and 83.72/100,000 for women and men, respectively. In both sexes, the homicide rates increased over the period. The highest mortality rates were observed in North and Northeastern capitals. The peak homicide rates were 2010–2014, the risk of homicide decreased as age increased, and the capitals with GDP lower than US$5,000 showed a greater homicide rate.

Brazil remains among the countries with the highest risk of homicide, especially in the north and northeast regions, where socioeconomic conditions are more unfavorable. The improvement of socioeconomic conditions may contribute to changing this situation.