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In this brief paper the authors consider the duties owed by professional indemnity insurance brokers to their insured clients. Given the prevalence of claims for financial mis‐selling this is an important issue of concern to all authorised advisers. Any failure to obtain or maintain cover leading to uninsured loss will naturally attract the potential attention of the broker’s own insurers. The authors summarise what the law expects of brokers in standard situations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of disclosure of sales compensations on insurance brokers’ intention to make inappropriate product recommendations.

This research examines the insurance brokers’ intention to make inappropriate product recommendations through an application of the theory of planned behavior. Surveys are used as the research instrument, and the hypotheses are tested with a between-subjects experimental design. One case of mandatory disclosure and one case of non-mandatory disclosure are compared in the research.

The results indicate that the disclosure of sales compensations is significantly associated with the subjective norms from the official authority and perceived behavioral control (PBC). The results of this study also indicate that, when the disclosure is mandatory, the PBC has a stronger effect on the insurance brokers’ intention to make biased product recommendations than dose the attitude and subjective norms. When the disclosure is non-mandatory, however, the subjective norms have a stronger effect on the insurance brokers’ intention.

The impacts of compensation disclosures on the financial professionals’ product recommendations have been less examined. This study could make a contribution to the literature by providing some empirical observations from the views of Taiwan’s life insurance brokers.

While competition within car and home insurance increases through more players and also unfamiliar entrants to the market (supermarkets), the purpose of this paper is to report on a study of one large insurer in Ireland which attempts to differentiate itself from its peers.

The paper does this through a literature review of the insurance market and customer relationship management, and a detailed study of the company loyalty programme and its application to its customers.

The loyalty programme employed suits the particular sector in terms of purchase intention and also gives the customer of the insurance brand a sense of belonging and relevance where they can avail themselves of savings on related products.

Information sourced is based on published data from the company and other peer reviewed journals. This is a study on a simple loyalty programme that can be applied to low frequency purchases.

This simplified loyalty programme gives the brand high recognition values in terms of how the brand is made relevant to the customer through discounted related products.

As loyalty programmes are not a usual feature of financial services, this paper highlights a unique programme in operation that is being replicated elsewhere.

The purpose of this paper is to chart the chronology of insurance regulation in Ireland and evaluate the integration within European Union directives.

The approach used was to chart the development of insurance regulation in Ireland and establish the stakeholders in the insurance industry that are affected by regulation. The various aspects of the EU involvement in regulation were also listed.

Ireland is one of the few countries that has a single financial regulator that is the Central (Reserve) Bank. The Central Bank is recognised as the Irish national regulator for all insurance activities in the EU and with that carries responsibility for implementing EU directives. In comparing other regulatory systems, there is a mixture of direct government involvement, sector specific regulation, financial services regulation and Central Bank acting as regulator.

Research is based on literature review and data obtained from the EU regarding national regulators. It does not set a standard of regulation or compare different regulators but establishes the different forms of regulation in Ireland and the EU.

The paper establishes Ireland's insurance regulatory environment amongst its European peers. It also charts the development of insurance regulation from solvency to the current model of solvency and consumer protection with the other offices of Financial Services Ombudsman.

The paper is based on research based on literature review and data obtained from the EU regarding national regulators.

Advice — liability for negligent A person is not liable for giving negligent advice unless it is proved either that the defendants carried on the business of giving advice in respect of the particular subject matter or else that they had let the plaintiff know that they claimed to possess the necessary skill and competence to do so and were prepared to give reliable advice upon the subject matter of the inquiry.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impacts of the size and timing of sales compensations, the management stringency of the insurer and the insurance broker's own moral views on product recommendations made by the brokers.

The data used in this research were gathered from life insurance broker companies in Taiwan.

The results showed that the sales compensations, perceived leniency of the insurer's underwriting and claim policy would affect the product recommendations made by the brokers.

Insurance brokers are one of the most important marketing channels in the insurance industry. However, using the insurance brokers to sell insurance may result in some ethical problems. For example, some insurance brokers may sell insurance to high-risk customers because the high-risk customers may prefer to buy more insurance and that means more sales compensations can be earned. The findings of this research may have some implications for insurance management and insurance regulation.

This study contributes to the understanding of insurance brokers' responses to adverse selection problems (high-risk customers may prefer to buy more insurance) and product recommendation decisions. The issue has been less mentioned in the financial regulation literature.

Discusses the factors which have led to a proliferation of litigation in respect of professional negligence in the field of real estate. Outlines caveat emptor (or ′buyer beware′), fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, innocent misrepresentation and strict liability and statutory liability for misrepresentation. Gives examples of specific cases. Suggests that both the residential market and the commercial sector have been affected to such an extent that it is no longer clear whether the decision‐makers take any responsibility for their actions, but rely solely upon the real estate profession to act as a guarantor of the transaction.

May 10, 1967 Insurance — Employer's liability — Breach by brokers of contract to obtain employer's liability insurance — Damage flowing — Condition precedent in form of policy envisaged that employers should take reasonable precautions to prevent accidents — Accident to employee — Negligence and breach of statutory duty to fence dangerous machine established against employers — Risk not appreciated by employers — Whether employers would have been indemnified by insurers — “Reasonable precautions” — Whether necessary to establish their legal liability to do so — Whether probability of payment as matter of business policy sufficient.

Making law in America is not a simple task. It can be legislated by Congress, enforced by the executive, interpreted by the courts, and augmented by a massive body of rules created by administrative agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) (Dodd-Frank was passed) with an eye to preventing future financial crises. Four years later, many details of Dodd-Frank have yet to be finalized as the SEC is still in the process of developing the regulations that the legislation required them to create. Even once the regulations are finalized by the SEC, the regulations will be challenged by various parties in the courts. The regulations will be either upheld or rejected. Those that are upheld will then face numerous challenges when applied in specific cases, while those rejected will have to be redone all over again. The process of developing these regulations is cumbersome and attracts many of the special interests that were present in the legislative phase of Dodd-Frank and who will also be present in the litigation phases of testing Dodd-Frank in the courts. This paper focuses on the requirement that investment advisors and broker-dealers be deemed as owing fiduciary duties to their clients as a case study for the entangled political economy theory. The paper shows how the development of a simple rule such as whether these fiduciary duties should be owed or not requires years of back and forth between the legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial branches.