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This paper aims to investigate the prevalence of corruption in Ghana to understand how and why it has turned public procurement into a mere money-making scheme instead of a means to provide needed public goods and services.

The study focuses on Ghana as a case study and mobilizes the monetization of politics lenses. Data are collected via interviews with key officials across the procurement sector (including the government, donors and civil society), documents, documentaries and news articles.

The findings suggest that the increasing costs of elections and political financing coupled with the costs of vote-buying, which has become informally institutionalized, intensify corruption practices and, consequently, turns public procurement into a mere source of cash for political ends. Political appointments and legalized loopholes facilitate this by helping to nullify the safeguard accounting and other control institutions are designed to provide. Likewise, enduring poverty and rising inequality “force” citizens into a vote-buying culture which distorts democratic premises that may drive out unscrupulous politicians; thus, perpetuating capture schemes. Civil society's efforts to remedy these have had little success, and corruption and inequality remain rife.

The main practical implication of the study lies in the need for a gradual demonetization of elections, and the consideration of the fundamental function of public procurement as a policy instrument embedded in economic, social, cultural and environmental plans. Additionally, given the connectedness of the various corruption issues raised, a comprehensive system-based approach in dealing with them would be more effective than a piecemeal approach targeting each issue/problem in isolation.

While extant literature has examined the issue of endemic corruption in developing countries using state capture, few have attempted to explain why it remains enduring, particularly in public procurement. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature on corruption and state capture theoretically and empirically by drawing on monetization of politics from political science to explain why corruption and state capture endure in certain contexts (with Ghana as an illustrative example) which reduce public procurement to a cash-milking scheme.

The Botswana Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was created in August 1994 against the background of a number of scandals in Botswana’s public life. The Directorate is now almost four years old. Among its main achievements are its successful orchestration of a campaign among the general public against corruption and a high conviction rate of investigated cases. This in spite of many problems confronting the agency. This article highlights the successes and problems confronting the Botswana DCEC. In addition, the paper gives particular attention to the relevance of the Botswana experience for other LDCs, especially those in Africa, which must win the war against corruption if they are to have a good chance of success in the more important war for economic development and poverty alleviation.

There are four main narcotics operations in the Caribbean: drug production; the consumption and abuse of drugs; drug trafficking; and money laundering. These have numerous effects, including arms trafficking, corruption, crime, and an adverse impact on tourism, an economic mainstay of several Caribbean nations. These operations and effects have implications for several aspects of political, socio‐economic, and security conduct in the region, including the area of governance. This article examines some of the connections involving arms trafficking, corruption and governance.

International experience in combating corruption allows to relatively easily identify its causes and single out the societies with high levels of corruption in their bureaucracies and private sectors. It is much more difficult to prescribe effective remedies and even more problematic to get new approaches applied in an appropriate and sustained fashion. This is particularly true with respect to the post-communist countries that embarked on the road of transition to a new economic and political reality over a decade ago. Making significant advances along this road has turned out to be much more difficult than expected at the beginning and has revealed risks and obstacles not anticipated. The article explores to what extent the task of containing corruption was on the agenda of public management reforms in these countries, the impact of these reforms on the level of corruption, if any, and seeks to identify more effective approaches for combating corruption in transitional states.

The purpose of the study is to explore, with anchorage in theories about the normalization of corruption, under what conditions blockchain technology can mitigate corruptive practices of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in emerging markets (EMs).

By synthesizing a technological perspective and theory on corruption, the authors examine the feasibility of blockchain for fighting corruption in MNEs’ business operations in EMs.

Blockchain technology is theorized to have varying mitigating effects on the rationalization, socialization and institutionalization of corruption. The authors provide propositions describing the effects and the limitations of blockchain for mitigating corruption in EMs.

This paper offers a perspective for how to tackle acute business problems and social problems pronounced in international business but also prevailing elsewhere.

The study contributes to literature in international management by systematically exploring how and under what conditions blockchain can mitigate the normalization of corruption.

This study researched how corruption affects the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). With the help of a qualitative methodology, the results of the analysis show that firms headquartered in countries where corruption is high have an advantage when operating in a foreign country with a similar institutional environment. The reason for this advantage is that such firms may possess knowledge of how to cope with the arbitrary and pervasive dimensions of corruption at home. On the other hand, firms from countries with lower corruption levels than the host country are more affected by corruption in a highly corrupt host country. Finally, even though this study found evidence that all firms operating in a highly corrupt country might participate in corrupt deals, those headquartered in highly corrupt countries are more willing to do so. This claim is based on the fact that firms from less corrupt countries might face stronger pressures from their headquarters to not engage in corrupt deals, whereas firms from more corrupt countries might not encounter such pressures.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the seeming paradox that underpins Nigeria’s war on corruption. This paradox centres on the undue interference of the presidency in the war against corruption. This interference has resulted in selective prosecutions and a deceleration in the tempo of the anti-corruption crusade.

The study used an admixture of primary and secondary data to evaluate whether indeed Nigeria is fighting against corruption to win it. The primary data were derived from key informant interviews. A total of ten diverse experts were interviewed through the instrumentality of unstructured set of questions, which were administered to them with room for elaboration. The secondary data were sourced from archival materials.

The findings of the study centre on three key issues: a characteristic one-sidedness in the prosecution of alleged corruption offenders by the anti-graft agencies. Those with pending corruption cases who have decamped to the ruling All Progressives Congress have had their cases placed in abeyance. There is evidence of the politicisation of the war against corruption as well as evidence of weak institutionalisation, which robs the anti-corruption agencies of the capacity to act independently.

The anti-corruption war may likely be derailed if the operational efficiency of the anti-graft agencies is not enhanced and their independence guaranteed.

If the anti-corruption crusade fails, it will have multiple negative domino effects on national development and quality of life of the Nigerian people.

The paper is original because no recent study has interrogated the declining efficiency of Nigeria’s anti-graft agencies or linked this declining efficiency on weak institutionalisation and interference from the presidency.

This paper aims to focus on understanding and preventing corruption in procurement in public sector settings. Just as not all corruption is the same, not all procurement is the same. One purpose is to analyze different types of procurements: standard, customized, intangible and complex. Corruption in procurement undermines public administration, and the purpose of this paper is to identify different types of procurements and provide readers with a framework for analysis and subsequent intervention.

In all, 42 actual cases of public sector corruption in procurement are examined, and from these, an analytical matrix is developed. These cases are derived from the reports of the New South Wales (Australia) Independent Commission against Corruption. These cases represent all of the procurement cases that the ICAC has taken to a formal hearing in its 30 years of existence.

While fraud is a major feature of corruption in procurement, there are significant organizational facilitators, and a number of slippage points in organizations are identified. These include peer culture, lack of due process, temptation and managerial incompetence/willful disregard, and these are built into a matrix which can be used in different countries or settings by readers wishing to understand and prevent different types of corruption in procurement in their agencies.

This paper uses cases that have not previously been aggregated or analyzed and provides analytical tools for practitioners and academics.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the congruence between Nigeria’s unremitting rule of law deficit, corruption pandemic and its crisis of developmentalism. The paper proves that market failures and state failures are mutually reinforcing and are functions of systemic official corruption in the private and public sectors of the Nigerian economy.

This study is library-based. It relies on secondary data generated by the variegated multilateral agencies, law reports of international and municipal tribunals, relevant books, journals, monographs policy papers and so forth as the basis of analysis.

Findings suggest that Nigeria’s corruption pandemic is a derivative of its unremitting rule of law deficit and that its crisis of developmentalism is a logical function of the pervasive normlessness, very wide latitude for discretion, arbitrariness, weak institutions and lack of centrality of law and its institutions, which characterise its body politik.

Systemic corruption in Nigeria affects the citizens’ perception of social justice and equity and undermines economic efficiency. It has also distorted the work reward causality, which has engendered a rentier social-economic order.

By first demonstrating the congruence between Nigeria’s rule of law deficit, corruption and economic and governance failure; the paper focusses on the total breakdown of norms in the Nigerian private and public sectors and resultant stultification of economic growth, sustainable human development and pervasive impoverishment of the citizenry.