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This study discovers the relation between corporate governance factors and earnings quality and finds that increases in dividends and foreign ownership deter earnings management. The author shows that dividend increases and foreign ownership enhance earnings quality, but they appear to be substitutes in that role. In other words, as foreign ownership increases, the influence of dividends in increasing earnings quality decreases. Improving transparency through dividend increases and monitoring by foreign institutional investors are substitutes in preventing earnings management.

There is still an ongoing debate on the value relevance of capital structure and its determinants. Recently the issue has been explored in family firms after being explored in mature firms. This paper investigates the role of institutional investors and the firm's innovation activity in influencing the firm's decision and ability to acquire debt capital.

A large sample of 700 privately-held family firms in Italy from 2010 to 2019. Two analysis techniques are used: panel analysis and path analysis. The value of debt and the debt ratio are used as leverage measures. The value of patent (as a proxy for innovation) and institutional investor are the explanatory variables.

The results show that institutional investors have no relationship with financial leverage measures except when controlling for an interaction variable (Institutional investors × Lombardy region). The patent value is positively correlated with debt; however, the ratio patent-to-asset is negatively related to financial leverage indicating higher risk exposure. The nonlinearity test demonstrates a turning point when the relationship between patent value and debt inverts.

Firms should monitor their innovation activity since excessive innovation increases risk exposure and affects financing opportunities and value. The involvement of institutional investors does not always enhance value.

Existing literature focuses separately on family firm innovations and financial leverage as outcome variables, emphasizing the role of institutional investors in both fields by adopting agency theory and socioemotional wealth framework. In this study, the authors go further by merging both relationships, investigating the dynamics of the institutional-family firm innovation relationship in influencing the firm's capital structure. The authors contribute to the ongoing debate by providing original findings on capital structure, governance and innovation, supported by rigorous methods to enhance family firms' decision-making.

Using a sample of 9,898 firm-year observations from 1,821 unique Chinese listed firms over the period from 2004 to 2019, this study aims to investigate whether the market rewards meeting or beating analyst earnings expectations (MBE).

The authors use an event study methodology to capture market reactions to MBE.

The authors document a stock return premium for beating analyst forecasts by a wide margin. However, there is no stock return premium for firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts, suggesting that the market is skeptical of earnings management by these firms. This market underreaction is more pronounced for firms with weak external monitoring. Further analysis shows that meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is indicative of superior future financial performance. The authors do not find firms using earnings management to meet or just beat analyst forecasts.

The authors provide evidence of market underreaction to meeting or just beating analyst forecasts, with the market's over-skepticism of earnings management being a plausible mechanism for this phenomenon.

The findings of this study are informative to researchers, market participants and regulators concerned about the impact of analysts and earnings management and interested in detecting and constraining managers' earnings management.

The authors provide new insights into how the market reacts to MBE by showing that the market appears to focus on using meeting or just beating analyst forecasts as an indicator of earnings management, while it does not detect managed MBE. Meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is commonly used as a proxy for earnings management in the literature. However, the findings suggest that it is a noisy proxy for earnings management.

As the influence of institutional investors over managerial decision-making grows, so does the importance of understanding the effect of institutional investor ownership (IO) on firm outcomes. The authors take a comprehensive approach to studying the effect of IO on earnings management (EM).

The authors study the relation between IO and EM using a sample of 59,503 listed U.S. firm-year observations from 1981–2019. The authors proxy EM with earnings surprises and with accrual-based and real activity measures. The authors test for nonlinear relations and analyze changes resulting from the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.

The findings support a positive IO-EM relation overall, but show that the relation is dynamic and heavily context-dependent with evidence of nonlinearity. The authors also find evidence that IO positively affects accrual-based EM and real activities EM negatively.

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study of the IO-EM relation to consider evidence of nonlinearity in the U.S. context, measuring changes to the relation over time, and with the use of several measures of EM.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between different types of shareholders that command share ownership, family, institutions or external blockholders and earnings management. In addition, it examines the effect of company size on earnings management.

The sample includes 67 companies listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange for the period 2005-2015. The sample composition is quite industry-balanced. A cross-sectional version of the Jones model (1991) is to measure the earnings management. The GMM (generalized method of moments) model is also estimated.

The results show that family and institutional ownership reduce the earnings management, but the impact is different depending on the company size.

The results show that there is a clear relationship between increasing participation of family and institutional investors and a reduction in earnings management. This is consistent with the literature that establishes that ownership is an effective regulatory mechanism that limits earnings management through closer supervision and involvement in management.

For companies’ corporate governance and regulatory authorities, the results of this study may serve to improve the decision-making.

This study shows that ownership structure can provide corporate governance in Mexican listed companies with different monitoring and control capacities to influence companies’ strategies, particularly in relation to the discretion of earnings management.

This study examines the influence of stock liquidity on stock price crash risk and the moderating role of institutional blockholders in Vietnam’s stock market.

Crash risk is measured by the negative coefficient of skewness of firm-specific weekly returns (NCSKEW) and the down-to-up volatility of firm-specific weekly stock returns (DUVOL). Liquidity is measured by adjusted Amihud illiquidity. The two-stage least squares method is used to address endogeneity issues.

Using firm-level data from Vietnam, we find that crash risk increases with stock liquidity. The relationship is stronger in firms owned by institutional blockholders. Moreover, intensive selling by institutional blockholders in the future will positively moderate the relationship between liquidity and crash risk.

Since stock liquidity could exacerbate crash risk through institutional blockholder trading, firm managers should avoid bad news accumulation and practice timely information disclosures. Investors should be mindful of the risk associated with liquidity and blockholder trading.

We contribute to the literature by showing that the activities of blockholders could partly explain the relationship between liquidity and crash risk. High liquidity encourages blockholders to exit upon receiving private bad news.

This study aims to see the moderating effect of board diversity on the relationship between ownership structure and real earnings management.

This study uses unbalanced panel data of 75 listed energy firms (346 firm-year observations) from three South Asian emerging economies (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) from 2015 to 2019. The two-step system GMM estimation is used for data analysis. This study also uses fixed effect regression to obtain robust findings.

The findings show that firms with a greater ownership concentration and managerial ownership significantly reduce real earnings management. In contrast, the data refute the idea that institutional and foreign ownership affect real earnings management. We also find that board diversity interacts significantly with ownership concentration and managerial ownership, meaning that board diversity moderates the negative link of the primary relationship that reduces real earnings management. On the other hand, board diversity has no interaction with institutional and foreign ownership, implying no moderating effect exists on the primary relationship.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is unique research investigating how different ownership structures affect real earnings management in the emerging nations’ energy sector, which the earlier studies overlook. More specifically, this research focuses on how board diversity moderates the relationships between ownership structure and real earnings management, which could be helpful for future investors.

The purpose of this study is to explore at what stage of a company’s life cycle the theory of market timing has explained debt. Drawing on a unified conceptual framework of market timing theory, the authors scrutinize the impact of life cycle and ownership structure on the market condition.

Based on a sample of 24 Tunisian companies listed on the stock exchange and 100 French firms listed on the CAC All-Tradable on a 10-year period, this paper grounded the market timing theory and attempted to clear the relation between ownership structure, life cycle of the firm and market timing theory by statistical analysis.

The findings of panel data modeling indicate that when the life cycle was used as an explanatory variable, it was found that the variable reflecting the market timing is not significant in either context; it means that no significant support is found in the theory of market timing in both countries. Whereas when the life cycle was used as a dummy variable, it was found that the life cycle has an impact on debt only in the Tunisian context.

This study has several important implications for researchers and practitioners. The findings reported here clarify the strength of the impact of life cycle on the market timing, when it explains the debt in the two contexts and the impact of ownership structure such as the managerial ownership and concentration of capital on debt.

This study contributes to examine the theory of debt in different phases of life cycle. Focused on the case of Tunisian and French firms, this study is unique and valuable.

This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.

This study provides a comprehensive literature review of theoretical and empirical studies published in reputable international journals indexed by Scopus.

The literature review reveals several aspects of the nomination and remuneration committee. These aspects have been classified into the definition of the nomination and remuneration committee, dimensions of the nomination and remuneration committee, measurement and research review results, reasons for conflict empirical findings, company dynamics and research on moderators, as well as recommending future research.

Our literature review shows that nomination and remuneration committees play a role in improving board performance and company performance, reducing agency conflicts and improving corporate governance to provide implications for companies, regulators and investors and pave the way for future research.

This paper identifies issues related to nomination and remuneration committees, their theoretical and practical implications and avenues for future research.

This study aims to examine the effect of company size on social responsibility disclosure. In addition, this study examines the president director's busyness and political connections in moderating the association between company size and disclosure of corporate social responsibility.

The data used in this study were secondary data which included 1,165 observations (company-year). The analysis technique used was multiple regression method and the analysis was carried out by employing STATA software.

Researchers found that company size has a positive effect on social responsibility disclosure. The busyness of the president directors and companies connected to politics significantly weakens the association between company size and disclosure of social responsibility.

This study uses only one measure of the driving force of social responsibility disclosure

This study contributes to the social responsibility literature by examining the effect of company size on social responsibility. Information on social responsibility disclosure has been carried out by companies in Indonesia; however, it is indicated that only large companies provide sufficient information on social responsibility.

Stakeholders can find out information on social responsibility carried out by the company.

Companies with busy CEOs and politically connected firms weaken the association between company size and disclosure of social responsibility.