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The purpose of this study was to examine the moderating role of institutional ownership on the relationship between board gender diversity and earnings management (EM) among listed firms in East African Community (EAC) partner states.

The study used a sample of 71 firms listed in the EAC partner states over 2011–2020. Data were handpicked from the individual firm's audited annual financial reports. Based on the results of the Hausman test, the study used the results of the fixed-effect regression model to test the hypotheses. To test the robustness of the results, the study employed an alternative measure of EM and two additional econometric techniques, including the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and the system generalized method of moments (GMM).

The empirical findings revealed that female directors improve the board's effectiveness in monitoring managerial roles. Specifically, the results showed a significantly negative relationship between the proportion of women in the corporate board and EM (as measured by discretionary accruals (DAs)). The findings further revealed an inverse relationship between the proportion of institutional ownership and EM. Finally, the results further demonstrated that institutional ownership enhances the role of board gender diversity in mitigating EM among listed firms in the EAC.

The findings of this study may be useful to managers, investors and regulators in assessing the role of institutional ownership and women's participation on corporate boards as a strategy for alleviating unethical manipulation of earnings.

The findings of this study contribute to the growing concern on gender inequality, especially the marginalization of women from the paid labor force and decision-making. The findings highlight the importance of having more women in the corporate board since this may help in mitigating corporate fraud. Similarly, the findings highlight the importance of institutional ownership as a corporate governance (CG) tool.

Previous studies have reported mixed empirical results on whether board gender diversity mitigates EM. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first paper to fill the existing gap by exploring whether institutional ownership moderates the relationship between board gender diversity and EM among listed firms in the EAC.

This study examines the effect of stable institutional investors on firms' product quality failures. Furthermore, the authors investigate the channels through which institutional ownership stability enhances product quality management.

This study uses probit, ordered probit and negative binomial regression frameworks to investigate the research questions. In addition, the authors utilize the three-stage least-squares to address the endogeneity issues.

Using a sample of product recall incidents from 2012 to 2021, the authors find that firms with more stable institutional ownership have a lower probability, frequency and severity of recall incidents and adopt a proactive product recall strategy. Institutional investors with significant and persistent holdings improve quality management by reducing overinvestment and the use of option-linked and relative performance executive compensations. Furthermore, the influence of stable institutional owners on product quality failures is more pronounced in firms with low managerial ability and specialist CEOs. Lastly, the empirical evidence demonstrates that stable holdings by active investors have a more substantial impact on reducing product recalls than passive and other stable institutional holdings.

This study is the first to examine the impact of institutional ownership stability on firms' product recalls. The authors contribute to the literature on the benefits of stable institutional ownership on firm outcomes and the determinants of product quality failures.

This study aims to examine the role of institutional investors (using proxy voting and voice) in influencing the decisions and governance landscape of their investee firms.

The authors use exploratory research design due to the underdevelopment of the problem phenomena, especially in the context of emerging economies. Using asset management companies (AMC) as a proxy for institutional investors, the authors use a multiple case study design. This design was relevant in the setting as it assured triangulation by studying the same phenomenon across firms with distinct characteristics. The authors sourced the data for the multiple cases from primary sources (such as semi-structured interviews) and secondary sources (such as official Webpages and social media pages of AMC and examination of archival documents). Finally, the authors used qualitative content analysis to analyse the data.

The findings suggest that shareholder activism by institutional investors has grown in India over the period, particularly in matters related to corporate governance, related party transactions, remuneration and compensation. These AMC in India use proxy voting services for advising on voting resolutions in their investee companies. However, voting by AMC does not generally affect resolution results. This is particularly true in the presence of a high concentration of promoter holdings in investee companies.

The study is a novel attempt in an emerging market context to explore the role of institutional investors in influencing firm decisions and improving the governance landscape of the company using proxy voting and voice. This is especially important as the institutional framework in emerging markets is not as strong as in developed markets.

There is still an ongoing debate on the value relevance of capital structure and its determinants. Recently the issue has been explored in family firms after being explored in mature firms. This paper investigates the role of institutional investors and the firm's innovation activity in influencing the firm's decision and ability to acquire debt capital.

A large sample of 700 privately-held family firms in Italy from 2010 to 2019. Two analysis techniques are used: panel analysis and path analysis. The value of debt and the debt ratio are used as leverage measures. The value of patent (as a proxy for innovation) and institutional investor are the explanatory variables.

The results show that institutional investors have no relationship with financial leverage measures except when controlling for an interaction variable (Institutional investors × Lombardy region). The patent value is positively correlated with debt; however, the ratio patent-to-asset is negatively related to financial leverage indicating higher risk exposure. The nonlinearity test demonstrates a turning point when the relationship between patent value and debt inverts.

Firms should monitor their innovation activity since excessive innovation increases risk exposure and affects financing opportunities and value. The involvement of institutional investors does not always enhance value.

Existing literature focuses separately on family firm innovations and financial leverage as outcome variables, emphasizing the role of institutional investors in both fields by adopting agency theory and socioemotional wealth framework. In this study, the authors go further by merging both relationships, investigating the dynamics of the institutional-family firm innovation relationship in influencing the firm's capital structure. The authors contribute to the ongoing debate by providing original findings on capital structure, governance and innovation, supported by rigorous methods to enhance family firms' decision-making.

This paper examines whether the adoption of Japan’s Stewardship Code by institutional investors influences their preference for investee companies' governance quality. The Code, introduced by the Financial Services Agency in 2014, promotes constructive engagement between institutional investors and investee companies. Engagement with investees should improve institutional investors' ability to assess governance quality across their portfolios. The paper examines if this results in a positive relationship between the levels of Code-compliant institutional shareholding and investee governance quality.

The association between Code-compliant institutional shareholding levels and a governance quality score is examined for Nikkei 500 companies.

A positive association is observed between shareholdings by Code-compliant institutional investors and investee governance, with board independence playing a key role. Analysis shows that the association between institutional shareholding and governance is stronger for the Code-compliant shareholding than for overall institutional shareholdings. In addition, no significant relationship is found between the levels of shareholding by non-Code-compliant institutional investors and the governance quality score of investee companies. Taken together, the results suggest that Code adoption strengthens institutional investors' preference for high-quality investee governance.

Despite the introduction of stewardship regulation worldwide, there is a scarcity of empirical research that examines its operation. The study contributes to the existing literature by providing insights into how compliance with stewardship regulation influences institutional investor decision-making.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings and leverage manipulation and the moderating effects of internal and external supervision.

The authors draw on a sample of Chinese non-financial A-share-listed firms from 2013 to 2020 to explore the effect of ESG ratings on leverage manipulation. Robustness and endogeneity tests confirm the validity of the regression results.

ESG ratings inhibit leverage manipulation by improving social reputation, information transparency and financing constraints. This effect is weakened by internal supervision, captured by the ratio of institutional investor ownership, and strengthened by external supervision, captured by the level of marketization. The effect is stronger in non-state-owned firms and firms in non-polluting industries. The governance dimension of ESG exhibits the strongest effect, with comprehensive environmental governance ratings and social governance ratings also suppressing leverage manipulation.

Firms should strive to cultivate environmental awareness, fulfil their social responsibilities and enhance internal governance, which may help to strengthen the firm’s sustainability orientation, mitigate opportunistic behaviours and ultimately contribute to high-quality firm development. The top managers of firms should exercise self-restraint and take the initiative to reduce leverage manipulation by establishing an appropriate governance structure and sustainable business operation system that incorporate environmental and social governance in addition to general governance.

Policymakers and regulators should formulate unified guidelines with comprehensive criteria to improve the scope and quality of ESG information disclosure and provide specific guidance on ESG practice for firms. Investors should incorporate ESG ratings into their investment decision framework to lower their portfolio risk.

This study contributes to the literature in four ways. Firstly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is among the first to show that high ESG ratings may mitigate firms’ opportunistic behaviours. Secondly, it identifies the governance factor of leverage manipulation from the perspective of firms’ subjective sustainability orientation. Thirdly, it demonstrates that the relationship between ESG ratings and leverage manipulation varies with the level of internal and external supervision. Finally, it highlights the importance of governance in guaranteeing the other two dimensions’ roles by decomposing overall ESG.

This paper investigates the relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility in Chinese and the USA stock markets and explores the potential explanations.

In this paper, the authors use the panel data regressions and the dynamic tests of two-way Granger causality in the panel VAR model to examine the relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility in Chinese and the USA stock markets.

The authors find that the institutional ownership in the Chinese (the USA) stock market is significantly and positively (negatively) related to idiosyncratic volatility through various tests. This paper indicates that institutional investors in the USA are more prudent and risk-averse, while the Chinese institutional investors are not because of high risk-bearing capacity.

This paper deepens the authors’ understanding on the relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility and in the USA and the Chinese stock markets. This paper explains the opposite relationships between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility in the stock markets in China and USA.

This study aims to examine the impact of institutional investors and their classes on the stock return volatility of an emerging market. The paper also determines the moderating role of firm size, crisis and turnover on such relationships.

The study covers nonfinancial companies of the Bombay Stock Exchange-100 index that are listed during the study period. The study uses fixed effects and systematic generalized method of moments estimators to look over the association between institutional investors and firms’ stock return volatility.

The study provides evidence that institutional investors destabilize the Indian stock market. It indicates that institutional investors do not engage in management activities; they earn short-term gains depending on information efficiency. Pressure-insensitive institutional investors have a significant positive relation with stock return volatility, while pressure-sensitive institutional investors do not. The study also reflects that pressure-sensitive institutional investors are underweighted in India, which jointly represents an insignificant nonlinear association between institutional ownership and stocks’ volatility. Furthermore, outcomes reveal that the intersection effect of the crisis, firm size and turnover is positively and significantly related to such relationships.

The outcomes encourage initiatives that keep track of institutional investors in the Indian stock market. To control the destabilizing effect of pressure-insensitive institutional investors, regulators should follow strict regulations on their trading patterns. Moreover, it guides the potential researchers that they should also take into account the impact of other classes of ownership structure or what type of ownership can help in stabilizing or destabilizing the Indian stock market.

Abundant literature studies the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in the Indian context. From the standpoint of making management decisions, the return and volatility of stock returns are both different aspects. However, this study examines the effect of institutional ownership and its groups on the volatility of stock return using the panel data estimator, which was previously not discussed in the literature.

This study aims to examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on financial constraints (FC). Furthermore, the authors investigate the moderating impact of two key ownership variables, insider and institutional ownership, separately and their interacting effect on the CSR-FC relationship.

The study sample consists of 137 nonfinancial Pakistan Stock Exchange listed firms from 2010 to 2019. Firms’ participation in socially responsible activities is measured using a multidimensional financial approach, whereas FC are determined using the WW index. The findings were observed using the dynamic generalized method of moments model.

According to the findings, CSR has a negative impact on FC. In terms of moderating impact, the interactive variable of CSR and insider ownership does not affect FC, implying that when an insider owns a majority of shares, the negative relationship between CSR and FC is weaker. The findings demonstrate the entrenchment effect of insider ownership. In terms of the moderating effect of institutional ownership, CSR and institutional ownership have a significant but positive relationship with FC, implying that when powerful institutional investors are present, the negative relationship between CSR and FC disappears, demonstrating that higher institutional ownership leads to shareholder conflicts. Finally, the interactive variable of insider and institutional ownership has no statistically significant effect on the CSR-FC relationship. This insignificant relationship does not support the substitution or complementarity effect of corporate governance.

The authors measure CSR activities using a multidimensional financial approach; however, in the future, CSR should be measured using qualitative aspects such as content analysis to strengthen the findings. Because the research is limited to a single emerging economy, Pakistan, the generalizability of the findings is limited. In the future, this research could be replicated in other emerging economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The findings of the study will assist regulatory authorities, investors, financial analysts and other stakeholders in better understanding CSR practices in Pakistani firms, as well as the role of CSR and two other important aspects of internal governance mechanisms, namely, insider ownership and institutional ownership, in the CSR-FC relationship.

Few studies in the literature investigate the impact of CSR on FC. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study of its kind in an emerging market to empirically test this relationship and further investigate the role of insider and institutional ownership in this unexplored relationship.

This study provides new insights into the relationship between the heterogeneity of institutional investors (IIs) and corporate tax avoidance (CTA). It also investigates whether family ownership moderates this relationship.

Based on a sample of 200 French-listed firms from 2008 to 2017, we use the generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to address endogeneity and omitted variable concerns.

The results show that passive IIs are associated with an increase in the level of tax avoidance. However, active ones significantly decrease the levels of tax avoidance practices. Moreover, we show that institutional activism is not sufficient to control managerial actions, particularly in the context of controlled family businesses. The results suggest that families may expropriate the rights of minority shareholders through a controlling coalition with passive IIs.

This study has several practical implications. First, the results are useful for policymakers who should constrain passive IIs to provide only one service (asset management). Second, this study may sensitize family owners to the need to cooperate with active IIs that are effective in monitoring the firm. In particular, families should be willing to sacrifice some of their socioemotional wealth to promote a balanced ownership structure, which is important for responsible and effective corporate governance.

This paper extends previous research by investigating the heterogeneity of IIs in terms of horizon, ownership and control. In addition, this paper sheds a new light on how family firms behave regarding tax avoidance practices in the presence of active and passive IIs.