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Institutional investors have increasingly gained importance since the early 1990s. The assets under management in these funds have increased threefold since 1990 to reach more than US$45 trillion in 2005, including over US$20 trillion in equity (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Further, the value of institutional investors' assets represents roughly 162.6% of the OECD gross domestic product in 2005 (Gonnard, Kim, & Ynesta, 2008). Given the magnitude of institutional investors' holdings relative to the world market capitalization, challenging questions on the economic role of these investors have been raised. One such question concerns their impact on the stability of stock markets. On the one hand, active strategies of buying and selling shares by these investors may contribute to moving stock prices away from their fundamental values. On the other hand, if all institutional investors react to the same information in a timely manner, they are in fact helping to increase market efficiency by speeding up the adjustment of prices to new fundamentals (for competing theories on the role of institutional investors, see, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992). This view of institutional investors as “efficiency drivers” generated considerable debate for many years (see, e.g., Ferreira & Laux, 2007; French & Roll, 1986).

This study empirically examines the relationship between institutional ownership and innovation activity in the unique setting of the clinical trials for US biopharmaceutical companies. We used multiple statistical techniques in the period from 1990 through 2006 for firms in the biopharmaceutical industry to examine this relationship. Contrary to the widely believed relationship discussed in the literature, our findings suggest that institutional investors vary in their reactions to innovative progress. Specifically, we find that institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon (i.e., dedicated owners) increase their holdings of a firm’s equity as the number of the firm’s products increases in phases I and II of FDA clinical trials. These findings are robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as well as for different operationalizations of the change of institutional ownership.

Purpose – This chapter presents the results of an exploratory study carried out on activist institutional investor strategies. It aims to identify the way in which different types of institutional investors are reacting to new institutional pressures in the French context.

Design/methodology/approach – Our methodology is based on a series of semi-directive interviews, combined with additional relevant data.

Findings – The interpretation of results makes use of institutional theory, more specifically the work of Oliver (1991). Our study shows that active institutional investors may opt for different responses when confronted with new institutional pressures, and that these responses would seem to depend on antecedents underlined by Ryan and Schneider (2002), which in turn depend on the nature of their business relationships with the firm in which they invest. Whereas pressure-sensitive investors (such as banks and insurance companies) generally adopt acquiescence responses, pressure-resistant investors (such as pension funds and investment funds) pursue joint strategies of co-optation, influence or control with key actors such as local and international proxy advisors and French investor associations. Acting conjointly, certain pressure-resistant investors are often considered as institutional entrepreneurs in that they initiate changes and actively participate in the implementation of new norms in the field of shareholder activism in the French context. In parallel to this ongoing professionalization, other pressure-resistant investors such as activist hedge funds seem to lack sufficient legitimate power to be effective.

Originality/value – This chapter illustrates that the level of institutional investor activism depends largely on the relevant national legal framework. It also shows how institutional investor coalitions take advantage of new institutional pressures to enhance their legitimacy or increase the effectiveness of their action.

In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.

Purpose – The global surge in institutional investors in the past decade or so has aroused interest in the role institutions play, or should play, in regard to the monitoring of the company financial performance. This study explores the nature of the relationship that exists between institutional ownership, corporate governance, and company financial performance.

Methodology/approach – Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique on 391 company-year observations between 2005 and 2010 to examine the nature of the relationship that exists between firm performance (PER) and ownership variables, and test whether this relationship is significant.

Findings – Our evidence provides support for the view that top five institutional shareholders take a longer-term view and are more involved with governance suggesting that the size of shareholdings has an effect when it comes to monitoring managerial decisions.

Research limitations/implications – Due to the small sample size, caution should be exercised when interpreting the results of this study. Also, it is to be noted that this study is based on a small country with an open capital market where there is high proportion of institutional ownership.

Practical implications – The results provide useful insights into the role different types of institutional investors play in terms of enhancing both governance and firm performance. Our analyses suggest that in mitigating principal-agent conflicts, size of ownership has an influence.

Originality/value of chapter – Our study adds to the literature by focusing on the role institutional investors’ play in New Zealand. Our study adds to the theory by showing that ownership type is important for mitigating agency conflicts.

Purpose – Examine the role of institutional investors in accelerating the development of capital markets and economies abroad, the determinants of their investment, both in the domestic and foreign markets, and their importance in promoting good corporate governance practices worldwide and facilitating increased financial integration.

Methodology/approach – Review and synthesize recent academic literature (1970–2011) on the process of international financial integration and the role of foreign institutional investors in the increasingly global financial markets.

Findings – Despite the concern that short-term flow of international capital can be destructive to the emerging and developing market economies, academic evidence on a destabilizing effect of foreign investment activity is limited. Institutional investors’ systematic preference for stocks of large, well-known, globally visible foreign firms can explain the presence of a home bias in international portfolio investment.

Research limitations – Given the breadth of the two literature streams, only representative studies (over 45 published works) are summarized.

Social implications – Regulators of emerging markets should first improve domestic institutions, governance, and macroeconomic fundamentals, and then deregulate domestic financial and capital markets to avoid economic and financial crises in the initial stages of liberalization reforms.

Originality/value of paper – A useful source of information for graduate students, academics, and practitioners on the importance of foreign institutional investors.

This study examines the relationship between institutional investors and director remuneration in Malaysia against an important institutional backdrop of political connection. Our panel analysis of 434 firms from 1999 to 2003 finds a negative relationship between institutional ownership and director remuneration suggesting the effectiveness of institutional monitoring. Although we find no evidence to suggest a politically determined remuneration scheme, the negative relationship between institutional ownership and remuneration becomes less in politically connected firms. This suggests that political connections mitigate institutional monitoring in relationship-based economies.

Purpose – Study the firm-level and country-level determinants of US institutional investors' holdings in American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) from emerging markets.

Methodology/approach – We use a sample of 112 firms from emerging markets that listed as ADRs between 1990 and 2005. Rather than adopting the issuer's perspective, we take in this study the point of view of the investor and we focus on the US institutional investors' participation in ADR firms.

Findings – We find that institutional investors hold higher stakes in foreign firms that are listed on more restrictive exchanges, in large, privatized, more liquid, and more transparent firms. Mutual investors and other institutional investors also prefer firms from countries with weaker institutional environments and from civil law legal tradition. Controlling for country-level determinants increases significantly the explanatory power of the model.

Social implications – Our results have important implications for firms from emerging markets seeking to attract foreign institutional investors.

Originality/value of the chapter – We focus on the motivations of investors when they choose to invest in the ADR, rather than on the ADR issuer motivation. In addition, we consider all types of institutional investors that acquire a participation in an ADR firm.

Using initial public offering (IPO) involuntary delisting data, this chapter examines whether and how motivated institutional investors affect the survivability of IPO firms. The empirical evidence shows that the likelihood of future delisting is much lower for IPOs with more motivated institutional investors. This impact is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. The motivated institutional investors also facilitate better post-IPO operating performance. The results are consistent with the prediction of the limited attention theory.

Purpose – Study the impact of the heterogeneity of institutional investors, evident in their investment horizon, on firm credit ratings.

Methodology/approach – Use a large sample of U.S. firms over the period from 1985 to 2006 (20,670 U.S. firm-year observations) to empirically investigate the relationship between institutional investment horizon and firm credit ratings. Test whether institutional investors with long-term investment horizon are associated with important monitoring and informational roles and thus higher credit ratings.

Findings – Stable shareholdings and relationship investing of institutional investors contribute to their monitoring and informational roles and result in higher firm credit ratings. Namely, ownership stakes of long-term institutional investors are associated with higher firm credit ratings than those of short-term institutional investors. In addition, the predominance and number of institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon affect firm's agency costs and information quality.

Social implications – Institutional monitoring incentives seem to be susceptible to the heterogeneity of institutional investors. The results point to the benefits of the long-term investment horizon of institutional investors (beyond their shareholdings) that seem to be associated with more efficient monitoring and thus reduced managerial myopia and opportunism.

Originality/value of the chapter – This is the first work to provide evidence on the extent to which the heterogeneity of institutional investors, evident in their investment horizon, alters firm's credit ratings.