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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of corporate dispersion on tax avoidance from geographical and institutional dispersion perspectives by using evidence from China.

Using a panel data of Chinese listed firms during 2003-2015, this paper estimates with correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis.

Both geographical and institutional dispersion are negatively associated with the degree of corporate tax avoidance. Furthermore, corporate governance mechanisms and female chief executive officers can mitigate the negative relation between corporate dispersion and tax avoidance. The results also indicate that ineffective internal control is one of the channels through which corporate dispersion reduces tax avoidance.

This is the first paper about the impact of firm dispersion on the degree of tax avoidance, complementing the research content of diversification and corporate decision-making.

From the perspective of local government tax administration, the impact of geographic dispersion on the corporate tax burden is investigated in this paper.

Using unbalanced panel data with a sample of listed companies from 2003 to 2020 in China, this paper focuses on the effect of geographic dispersion on corporate tax burden and the mechanisms.

It is found that corporate tax burden is positively related to geographic dispersion. It is also found that geographic dispersion affects the corporate tax burden by increasing the effort of local government tax administration. In addition, the relation between geographic dispersion and corporate tax burden is more pronounced for local SOEs prior to the implementation of Golden Tax Project III and in cases where local governments face stronger financial pressure to obtain revenue.

This study has important implications for the promotion of the coordinated development of the regional economy, as well as the legalization, modernization and informatization of tax administration.

This paper aims to analyse whether and how different types of institutional investors influence shareholder proposal initiations, say-on-pay (SOP) votes and management compensation from a sustainability perspective.

Based on the principal-agent theory, the authors conduct a structured literature review and evaluate 40 empirical-quantitative studies on that topic.

The traditional assumption of homogeneity within institutional investors, which is in line with the principal–agent theory, has to be questioned. Only special types of investors (e.g. with long-term and non-financial orientations and active institutions) run an intensive monitoring strategy, and thus initiate shareholder proposals, discipline managers by higher SOP dissents and prevent excessive management compensation.

A detailed analysis of institutional investor types is needed in future empirical analyses. In view of the current debate on climate change policy, future research could analyse in more detail the impact of institutional investor types on proxy voting, SOP and (sustainable) management compensation.

With regard to the increased shareholder activism and regulations on SOP and management compensation since the 2007/2008 financial crisis, firms should be aware of the monitoring role of institutional investors and should analyse their specific ownership nature (time- and content-driven and as well as range of activity).

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first literature review with a clear focus on institutional investor range and nature, shareholder proposal initiation, SOP and management compensation (reporting) from a sustainability viewpoint. The authors explain the main variables that have been included in research, stress the limitations of this work and offer useful recommendations for future research studies.

European countries are likely to increasingly adopt integrated reporting (IR) voluntarily, after the 2014/95/EU Directive is revised and other initiatives are implemented. Therefore, the present study provides insights on the relevance of IR in voluntary contexts by exploring analysts' reactions to the release of integrated reports in diverse institutional settings.

Drawing on voluntary disclosure theory, a quantitative empirical research method is used to explore the moderating role of country-level institutional characteristics on the associations between voluntary IR release and analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion.

IR informativeness is not uniform in the voluntary context and institutional settings play a moderating role. IR release is associated with increased consensus among analyst forecasts. However, in countries with weak institutional enforcement, a reverse association is detected, indicating that analysts rely largely on IR where the institutional setting strongly protects investors. Although a strong institutional setting boosts the IR release usefulness in terms of accuracy, it creates noise in analyst consensus.

Academics can appreciate the usefulness of voluntary IR across the institutional enforcement contexts.

Managers can use these findings to understand opportunities offered by IR voluntary release. The study recommends that policymakers, standard setters and regulators strengthen the institutional enforcement of sustainability disclosure.

This study is a unique contribution to recent calls for research on the effects of nonfinancial disclosure regulation and on IR “impacts”. It shows on the international scale that IR usefulness for analysts is moderated by institutional patterns, not country-level institutional characteristics.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of ownership concentration on CEO compensation and firm performance relationship in New Zealand.

The paper applies regression analysis to data from New Zealand listed companies from 2001 to 2005.

The study finds a non‐linear effect of ownership concentration on CEO compensation‐firm performance relationship, that is CEO compensation is negatively (positively) related to firm performance in firms with high (low) concentrated ownership structure respectively.

Results provide evidence for the proposition that ownership concentration at a high level in New Zealand does not constrain excessive management power, but exacerbates agency problems associated with executive pay. A highly concentrated ownership structure provides potential explanation for the misalignment between CEO compensation and firm performance in New Zealand. The positive effect of a low ownership concentration level on CEO compensation‐firm performance relationship suggests that monitoring the efficiency of large shareholders works better at a low ownership concentration level.

By exploring the non‐linear interaction between two governance mechanisms – CEO compensation and ownership concentration – the findings of the study make contributions to the current compensation and ownership literature mainly in two ways: although the non‐linearity between ownership concentration and firm value has attracted extensive research interest, little attention is given to the non‐linear effect of large shareholding on the CEO compensation contract in prior studies; and, in the context of a developed country with a small financial market, there are low regulatory “drag” and virtual absence of a litigation threat to organisations, as in New Zealand. This study suggests concentrated ownership as an underlying explanation for the misalignment between CEO compensation and firm performance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between ownership structure and the properties of analysts’ forecasts in China’s unique corporate setting.

Multiple regression models were used to examine the influence of ownership structure mechanisms on analysts’ forecast properties for listed Chinese firms during the period 2008-2012.

The paper finds that analysts’ forecast accuracy is higher for listed firms with high levels of foreign ownership and managerial ownership. However, the complex pyramidal ownership structure could make corporate information less transparent and then increase the complexity of forecasting; hence, it results in less precise analysts’ forecasts. Interestingly, the relationship between state ownership and analysts’ forecast properties appears to be non-linear (an inverted U-shape), and the inflection point at which the relationship becomes negative occurs at state ownership over 45 per cent.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the influence of ownership structure mechanisms on the properties of analysts’ forecasts in an emerging market, and the findings provide some insight on how the properties of analysts’ forecast might be shaped by certain ownership and control features in the context of concentrated state ownership and complex pyramidal ownership structure.

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that investment decision making in the UK direct property market does not conform to the assumption of economic rationality underpinning portfolio theory.

The developing behavioural real estate paradigm is used to challenge the idea that investor “man” is able to perform with economic rationality, specifically with reference to the analysis of the spatial dispersion of the entire UK “investible stock” and “investible locations” against observed spatial patterns of institutional investment. Location quotients are derived, combining different data sets.

Considerably greater variation in institutional property holdings is found across the UK than would be expected given the economic and stock characteristics of local areas. This appears to provide evidence of irrationality (in the strict traditional economic sense) in the behaviour of institutional investors, with possible herding underpinning levels of investment that cannot be explained otherwise.

Over time a lack of distinction has developed between the cause and effect of comparatively low levels of development and institutional property investment across the regions. A critical examination of decision making and behaviour in practice could break this cycle, and could in turn promote regional economic growth.

The entire “population” of observations is used to demonstrate the relationships between economic theory and investor performance exploring, for the first time, stock and local area characteristics.

What drives this diffusion process? One neo-institutional answer to this question is that new models of nationhood, organization, and social identity exist in the larger world environment (Meyer, 2009, p. 36ff). Because they are external, these “identities” and models can be adopted without huge costs and without necessarily entailing the reorganization of society or actors’ personalities. Thus the models of modern society can spread quickly because they are relatively easy to assume and because they have high legitimacy in the international environment. Conformity produces instrumental rewards as well. And it also signals to significant “other” nations and international bodies that a nation has accepted modernity and its responsibilities (see Boli & Thomas's discussion, 1999). Thus, foreign aid, loans, and credit may flow quickly to those developing countries that enact modern institutional structures like mass education and democratic elections.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010.

Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance.

After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.

The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis.

The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation.

Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.

Geographic diversity is a fundamental tenet in portfolio management. Yet there is evidence from the USA that institutional investors prefer to concentrate their real estate investments in favoured and specific areas as primary locations for the properties in their portfolios. Work done in the UK, focusing on the office sector, has drawn similar conclusions. The present paper seeks to examine the extent of real estate investment concentration in institutional Retail portfolios in the UK at two points in time; 1998 and 2003, and to present some comparisons with equivalent concentrations in the Office sector.

To examine this issue two datasets are used at two dates, 1998 and 2003. The analysis is confined to England and Wales because of data considerations relating to the availability of comparable data for the rest of the UK. The first dataset relates to floor space and rateable value statistics for the so‐called “bulk classes” of commercial property at Unitary Authority and District (local authority area, LA) level. The more specific institutional real estate investment data for the study come from the IPD analysis “UK Local Markets”. This provides a detailed view of the performance of institutional real estate investment, by sector, in a number of localities across the UK. For the purposes of this study, IPD made data available showing (but with much less detail) other LAs where the number of properties held was greater than zero, but fewer than the four required normally for disclosure. The approach taken is to map the basic data and the results from a standardising measure of spatial concentration – the Location Quotient.

The findings indicate that retail investment correlates more closely with the UK urban hierarchy than that for offices when measured against employment, and is focused on urban areas with high populations and large population densities which have larger numbers of retail units in which to invest.

Using data sets that account for the entire “population” of observations at these two dates the paper demonstrates the relationships between economic theory and the market performance of the sector. The comparisons with the Office sector also show the differences that would be expected between the sectors, emphasising the point that these markets are dynamic and that their structure, form and content can change dramatically even over quite short periods.