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Throughout the history of commerce, individuals have searched for informational advantages that will lead to their enrichment. In a time of global capital markets, 24 hours a day trading opportunities, and a professional services corps of market experts, informational advantages are pursued by virtually every market participant. This paper examines one of the most vilified informational advantages in modern capital markets: insider trading. In the USA during the 1980s, insider trading scandals occupied the front pages of not only the trade papers, but also quotidian tabloids. Assailed for its unfairness and characterised by some as thievery, insider trading incidents increased calls for stricter regulation of the marketplace and its participants. In the aftermath of the spectacular insider trading litigation in the USA in the late 1980s, many foreign states began to re‐evaluate the effectiveness of their own regulatory structures. In large part, this reassessment was not the produce of domestic demand, but constituted a response to American agitation for increased regulation of insider trading.

Some 40 years have now passed since the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began seriously to attack the problem of insider trading in its seminal Cady, Roberts decision. Since then, a complex pattern of regulation has evolved, largely through a common law process of judicial interpretation of the open‐ended anti‐fraud provision of the federal securities laws, Rule 10b‐5. While many interpretative questions still remain open, US law in this area broadly prohibits trading based on material non‐public information when:

The purpose of this paper is to uncover the essence of insider trading, explain why insider trading law is ineffective and provide implications of the effectiveness of the law.

This conceptual paper offers three propositions. The first two are based on a literature review of 62 articles in empirical research to develop an understanding of the essence of insider trading and identify the areas in which insider trading is ineffective. This analysis is used in the third proposition to provide a direction in suggesting effective measures to improve insider trading law.

The essence of insider trading is that corporate insiders exercise informational monopoly power over their trades. This understanding explains why insider trading law is ineffective because it has not taken away the monopoly power that corporate insiders possess and exercise. This understanding also leads to three antitrust suggestions aimed at improving insider trading law.

The findings may provide assistance to the lawmakers and regulators to make insider trading law more effective and enforcement more simplified.

This paper is of value to other researchers attempting to understand the essence of insider trading and to policymakers concerned about the existence of monopolistic behavior in the equity market and income inequality due to corporate insiders’ trading profit.

This paper aims to gauge the issue of insider trading in Malaysia by assessing some selected statutory provisions under the relevant law and examining the issues of enforcement and prosecution.

The paper analyses relevant legislation pertaining to insider trading.

This paper argues that in order to be an effective regulation, the laws enacted must address the concerns and problems insider trading has given rise to. Contrary to popular impression that insider trading is a settled issue due to the lack of investigation and prosecution cases, the paper unearths a number of findings; first it maintains its contention that the provisions under the Companies Act 1965 are not entirely satisfactory and the latter regulations generally provide more creditable rules with regard to the issue. Further the definition of an insider, the requirement pertaining to the manner the information must be obtained and the enforcement of the law are amongst a number of issues that Malaysia has to address if a more competitive capital market is to be created.

Further research could usefully examine the law in the light of investigation cases by the security commission.

The paper reveals how insider trading legislation applies in business situations.

The insider trading legislation is found out to be far from satisfactory, and this paper attempts to fill in the gaps where there is scarcity of literature on this issue.

The purpose of this study is a comparison of anti-insider trading regulations in the European Union (EU) and in Brazil.

The subject of the comparison are three key elements that define the shape of the protection against insider trading, namely, the definition of inside information, the definition of insiders and the kinds of behaviours that are forbidden.

There are both differences and similarities between EU and Brazilian legislations on insider trading. The main discrepancies found in the three foci of the analysis seem to relate strongly to the different rationales for the prohibition of insider trading adopted in the two legal systems. In the EU, market egalitarianism and thus the parity of information, are the central concepts, whereas fiduciary duties originally constituted the point of reference in Brazil, although it has been losing importance over time owing to subsequent changes in the legislation. In sum, while anti-insider trading regulations in the EU have a well-defined identity, in Brazil their policy basis seems to be in the process of redefinition.

As of the time of submission of this study no published academic works dedicated substantially to a comparison of the anti-insider trading legislation of the EU and Brazil could be found.

There was a time in Britain when even senior representatives of the financial services industry were prepared to be quoted in the press as expressing doubts as to whether there was anything intrinsically wrong with directors and other corporate insiders taking advantage of their better knowledge about their companies in their own investment dealings. Indeed, some even went so far as to say that this was both proper and natural. True it is that, in Britain or for that much in continental Europe, there are few, even among the groves of academia, that would have advanced the theories justifying insider dealing that Professor Henry Manne so clearly articulated in ‘Insider Trading and the Stock Market’. Nonetheless, in what was then the leading book on the law and practice of the stock market, the authors, a leading Queen's Counsel and an eminent stockbroker, expressed the view in 1972 that a stockbroker who learnt even privileged information should not allow this to operate to the detriment of his client. Having said this, Sir Winston Churchill complained that it was defamatory to assert that advantage had been taken of ‘inside information’ during the so‐called Marconi scandal in 1911, and there are comments in a report to the House of Commons by special commissioners as early as November 1696 roundly criticising promoters of over‐valued stock selling out, in the entrepreneurial fashion eloquently advocated by Professor Manne, on the basis of their privileged knowledge and position. Thus, discussion of the pros and cons of insider dealing, at least in Britain, has tended to be emotional rather than based on economic or even pseudo‐economic analysis of empirical data. Even the surveys that have been conducted on attitudes to the practice would hardly impress a statistician.

This paper discusses New Zealand's attempt to deal with insider trading by statutory means. New Zealand's attempt is of particular interest since it has two features which distinguish it from other jurisdictions. The first feature is the decision to reject the criminalisation of insider trading and to instead rely upon civil enforcement of insider trading alone. The second feature is the failure to provide a state agency with powers to take action (whether civil or criminal) against insider trading. The New Zealand legislation, the Securities Amendment Act 1988 (‘the Act’), was put in place after the stockmarket crash of 1987 in response to outcries against perceived abuses in the market. The Act has been in force for seven years, yet no case involving allegations of insider trading has been taken to completion. The basis of the insider trading regime is private enforcement which, in the light of its failure to provide effective remedies and control, needs to be reviewed.

This paper adds to the scant literature on the tightening of regulations and its impact on the profitability of insider trades by examining the effects of the recent enactment of the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002 in New Zealand. We investigate the abnormal returns around the date of insider transactions both before and after the introduction of this Act. We find that the number of insider transactions decreased just prior to the introduction of the Act; further we observe a marked reduction in the profitability of directors. However, the difference between the pre and post-change returns lacks statistical significance.

This study investigates the impact of the enhanced continuous disclosure regime introduced in December 2002 on several measures of information risk in NZX‐listed stocks. We employ two microstructure models and an intraday data set to measure information risk in a sample of 71 stocks. Our empirical results show that the reforms enacted in December 2002 had no significant effect on either the level of information‐based trading or the adverse selection component of market spreads in our sample of NZX‐listed stocks.

It is important to note that insider trading is currently outlawed under the Securities Act 17 of 2004 (Chapter 24: 25) as amended (Securities Act) in Zimbabwe. This Act enumerates some practices that may give rise to insider trading liability in the Zimbabwean financial markets. Nonetheless, numerous challenges, such as the lack of adequate financial resources, the lack of sufficient persons with the relevant skills and expertise on the part of the enforcement authorities, lack of political will, inadequacy of insider trading provisions, poor cooperation and collaboration between the relevant authorities and the ongoing coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic have negatively impeded the effective regulation and combating of insider trading in Zimbabwe. To this end, the author explores the stated challenges and recommend measures that could be used by regulatory bodies and other relevant enforcement authorities to enhance the regulation and combating of insider trading in the Zimbabwean financial markets. This study aims to enhance the detection and combating of insider trading in Zimbabwe.

A qualitative research methodology is used through the analysis of relevant legislation and case law.

It is hoped that the findings and recommendations made in this study will be considered by the Zimbabwean policymakers.

The study does not use empirical research methodology.

The findings and recommendations made in this study could enhance the combating of insider trading activities in Zimbabwe.

The study seeks to curb insider trading in the Zimbabwean financial markets and financial institutions in the wake of the covid-19 pandemic-related regulatory and enforcement challenges.

The study provides original research on the regulation and combating of insider trading activities in Zimbabwe.