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This study investigates the relationship between the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) overconfidence and financial reporting complexity in Iran, a context characterized by weak corporate governance and heightened managerial discretion.

The sample consists of 1,445 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2021. CEO overconfidence (CEOOC) is evaluated using an investment-based index, specifically capital expenditures. Financial reporting complexity (Complexity) is measured through textual features, particularly three readability measures (Fog, SMOG and ARI) extracted from annual financial statements. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed to test the research hypothesis.

Results suggest that CEOOC is positively related to Complexity, leading to reduced readability. Additionally, robustness analyses demonstrate that the relationship between CEOOC and Complexity is more distinct and significant for firms with lower profitability than those with higher profitability. This implies that overconfident CEOs in underperforming firms tend to increase complexity. Also, firms with better financial performance present a more positive tone in their annual financial statements, reflecting their superior performance. The findings remain robust to alternative measures of CEOOC and Complexity and are consistent after accounting for endogeneity issues using firm fixed-effects, propensity score matching (PSM), entropy balancing approach and instrumental variables method.

This study adds to the literature by delving into the effect of CEOs' overconfidence on financial reporting complexity, a facet not thoroughly investigated in prior studies. The paper pioneers the use of textual analysis techniques on Persian texts, marking a unique approach in financial reporting and a first for the Persian language. However, due to the inherent challenges of text mining and feature extraction, the results should be approached with caution.

The insights from this study can guide investors in understanding the potential repercussions of CEOOC on financial reporting complexity. This will assist them in making informed investment decisions and monitoring the financial reporting practices of their invested companies. Policymakers and regulators can also reference this research when formulating policies to enhance financial reporting quality and ensure capital market transparency. The innovative application of textual analysis in this study might spur further research in other languages and contexts.

This research stands as the inaugural study to explore the relationship between CEOs' overconfidence and financial reporting complexity in both developed and developing capital markets. It thereby broadens the extant literature to include diverse capital market environments.

Literature documents that executives' inside debt holdings (debt-based managerial compensation) such as defined-benefit pensions and retirement funds are often unfunded and unsecured and have long maturities, and thus provide managerial incentives to pursue strategies to avoid the overall firm risk. This study investigates the effect of managerial inside debt compensation relative to equity-based compensation on a firm's dividend payout policy. We find that a inside debt holdings are positively associated with various measures of a firm's dividend payout policy. Additionally, we find empirical evidence in firms with inside debt holdings that the inverse relationship between high default risk measured by KZ index and dividend payout weakens as the portion of inside debt relative to equity-based compensation rises. This finding indicates that the needs for the firm to restrain dividend payouts to equity holders is reduced as the executive's debt-to-equity compensation ratio becomes larger. Overall, the results suggests the mitigating effect of executives' inside debt holdings on the conflicts between bondholders and shareholders can lead to generous payout policy.

Previous literature provides mixed evidence about the effectiveness of a code of ethics in limiting managerial opportunism. While some studies find that code of ethics is merely window-dressing, others find that they do influence managers' behavior. The present study investigates whether the quality of a code of ethics decreases the cost of equity by limiting managerial opportunism.

In order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an empirical analysis on a sample of US companies in the 2004–2012 period. The results are robust to a battery of robustness analyses that the authors performed in order to take care of endogeneity.

Empirical results indicate that a higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of equity. In other words, firms with a more comprehensive code of ethics and better-designed implementation procedures limit managerial opportunism and pay a lower cost of equity because they are perceived by investors to be less risky.

The authors contribute to the literature in two ways. First, by looking at the market reaction to the code of ethics, thus capturing all its indirect possible benefits and second, by measuring not only the existence but also the quality of a code of ethics. Based on the results, policymakers may choose to further promote codes of ethics as an effective corporate governance mechanism.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers of bankrupt firms are more or less conditionally conservative in their financial reporting relative to non-bankrupt firms. The study further examines the cross-sectional differences in conditional conservatism among bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.

The study employs a sample of US firms to investigate conditional conservatism in firms that experience financial distress and go bankrupt relative to non-stressed non-bankrupt firms. The study also uses switching regression models to identify the drivers of the cross-sectional difference in conditional conservatism among bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.

Empirical results show that bankrupt firms are timelier in recognizing bad news than good news when compared to non-bankrupt firms. The higher level of conditional conservatism in bankrupt firms is mainly driven by their higher levels of leverage and tax-reduction incentives. The cross-sectional analyses show that these results largely hold for more leveraged firms and firms with higher tax costs. Taken together, these results suggest that the conservative tendency of managers of bankrupt firms can stem from the agency problem between lenders and managers and from tax-decreasing motivations.

The novelty of the authors’ research stands in studying the drivers of the cross-sectional differences in conditional conservatism between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms and specifically, the demonstration that taxation also induces conditional conservatism in the setting of ex post bankrupt firms.

This study examines the impact of China’s mixed-ownership reform on the innovation of non-state-owned acquirers, with a particular focus on the impact on firms with high financing constraints, low-quality accounting information or less tangible assets.

We use a proprietary dataset of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges to investigate the impact of mixed ownership reform on non-state-owned enterprise (non-SOE) innovation. We employ regression analysis to examine the association between mixed ownership reform and firm innovation.

The study finds that non-state-owned firms can improve innovation by acquiring equity in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the reform. Eased financing constraints, lowered financing costs, better access to tax incentives or government subsidies, lowered agency costs, better accounting information quality and more credit loans are underlying the impact. Additionally, cross-ownership connections amongst non-SOE executives and government intervention strengthen the impact, whilst regional marketisation weakens it.

This study adds to the literature on the association between mixed ownership reform and firm innovation by focussing on the conditions under which this impact is stronger. It also sheds light on the policy implications for SOE reforms in emerging economies.

This paper investigates whether and how Directive 2014/95/EU affects financial performance as well as its moderation effect on the relationship between financial and non-financial performance, involving different stakeholders' perspectives.

We adopted the panel data approach to perform random effects regression analysis on a sample of 435 European listed non-financial companies, considering a timeframe of six years. Furthermore, the moderation effect of the Directive 2014/95/EU on the relationship between financial and non-financial performance has been tested.

NFD regulation negatively affects firms' operating profitability and shareholder value while produces no effects on debtholders' returns. Nevertheless, the Directive 2014/95/EU has general positive moderating effects on the relationship between non-financial and financial performance, mitigating the direct costs induced by pursuing non-financial performance.

Shifting from mimetic to coercive isomorphism caused a strengthening of the complementarity between financial and non-financial performance dimensions, extending the concept of performance itself. The analysis carried out is limited to a short-term timeframe and on non-financial companies subject to the Directive 2014/95/EU.

The paper highlights trade-offs between the costs induced by non-financial activities and the benefits of being compliant with the non-financial disclosure (NFD) regulation, supporting managers in allocating business resources.

This paper is among the first that investigates the impact of mandatory NFD on the relationship between non-financial and financial performance. It is also one of the earliest in finding some pieces of evidence on the direct impact of Directive 2014/95/EU on EU companies' financial performance.

The effects of board composition on performance have long been discussed in management research using fractionalization measures. In this study, we propose an alternative measurement approach based on board polarization.

Using an exploratory analysis and applying the polarization measure to German Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX)-, Midcap-DAX (MDAX)- and Small Cap-Index (SDAX)-listed companies, this paper applies the polarization index to examine the relationship between board diversity and performance.

The results show that the polarization concept is well suited to measure principal-agent problems between the members of the management and supervisory boards. We reveal that board polarization is negatively associated with firm performance, as measured by return on investment (ROI).

This exploratory study shows that the measurement of board polarization can be linked to performance differences between companies, which offers promising starting points for further research.

The aim of this paper is to examine how managerial ability affects corporate tax aggressiveness.

The study follows the work of Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) and quantifies managerial ability by calculating how efficiently managers generate revenues from given economic resources using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach. The study uses a wide range of measures of tax aggressiveness. Firm fixed-effects regressions and a difference-in-differences approach using information regarding CEO turnover to control for endogeneity are used.

The study finds a negative relationship between managerial ability and corporate tax aggressiveness. Further tests show that this negative relationship is more pronounced for firms with higher investment opportunities or firms with more reputational concerns.

Given the significant costs associated with tax aggressiveness and the negative effect it can have on managerial reputation if discovered, the results suggest that more able managers invest less effort in aggressive tax avoidance activities. This study furthers the understanding of how managerial personal traits affect corporate decision-making.

The effectiveness of fiscal policy is an interesting field in literature of macroeconomics. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of fiscal policy on economic growth under contributions from the differences in institutions and external debt levels.

The authors use panel data from 2002 to 2014 from 20 emerging markets and use GMM estimators for unbalanced panel data.

The results show positive growth effects of fiscal policy across emerging markets in the examined periods. Notably, the improvement in institutions promotes higher crowding-in effects of fiscal policy. In addition, this paper finds interesting evidences that the external debt has non-linear effects on economic growth, whereas the heterogeneous effects of fiscal policy on economic growth as positive effects in low indebted level and negative effect in high indebted level may explain the mechanism of this non-linear relationship.

This study proposes the non-linear relationship of fiscal growth effects in emerging economies under the dynamic of debt levels.