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In 1987, the City of Los Angeles instituted the first gang injunction in the country. Gang injunctions are pursued through the civil courts to seriously restrict the activities and movement of suspected gang members and affiliates. People who have been served with a gang injunction are often prohibited from everyday activities, such as wearing sports jerseys, talking to other gang members, and being out in public past curfew, regardless of age. Though often justified by law enforcement as a necessary tool to fight gang violence, we argue that gang injunctions are similar to Slave Codes, Black Codes, and Jim Crow laws, which established a separate system of justice based on race. As such, gang injunctions serve as an extension of an apartheid-like system of justice that seriously limits the life opportunities of people of color within gang injunction territories.

This chapter draws upon the oral histories of people targeted by gang injunction laws within California, paying particular attention to how gang-identified individuals are surveiled, controlled, and confined.

Gang injunctions operate on an apartheid-like justice system that punishes perceived gang members harsher than non-gang members. These laws affirm the legal tactics that maintain racial boundaries and promote a system of justice that mirrors the Black Codes following the end of slavery. The evidence suggests that gang injunctions solely target low-income youth of color, who have been identified as gang members and served with injunctions.

Despite the ubiquity of gang injunctions within California, there is little research on gang injunctions, and even less literature on how these injunctions shape the life course of suspected gang members. We attempt to address this gap in the literature by showing how gang injunctions are not simply about fighting crime, but rather they are a tool used to control and corral communities of color.

Civil wrongdoings with consequent financial and other loss or damage to employers, employees and third parties may result in the course of various trade union activities. These day to day trade union activities take a variety of forms. The most common ones are inducement of breach of contract, conspiracy, trespass, nuisance, and intimidation. Each of these activities constitutes a tort which, unless the statutory immunities apply, would normally give rise at common law to an action for damages or, as is more frequent, enable the aggrieved party to obtain an injunction.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

December 17, 1968 Trade dispute — Act in furtherance of — Procuring breach of contract — Inter‐union rivalry in hotel industry — Picketing hotel employing no members of union — Interference with oil contracts — Force majeure clause in oil contract — Whether in contemplation or furtherance of “trade dispute” — Whether torts by or on behalf of trade union restrainable by injunction — Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (6 Edw. VII, c. 47), ss. 3, 4(1), 5(3).

This article continues to assess the role of private nuisance as a common law tool for environmental protection, independent of the wider regulatory controls. It evaluates the decision in Cambridge Water and asks the question whether it would stand as good law before the Supreme Court. It concludes with illustrating the enduring role of the injunction in environmental protection and its capacity to coerce restorative environmental justice. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The paper is predominately a classic doctrinal article as it is principally library-based analysing both primary sources (that both pre- and post-date the modern law reporting system) and secondary sources whilst engaging in leading academic commentary.

Nuisance developed to a point in the nineteenth-century where a simple form of the tort was visible. At that juncture, it had an “unchanged” essence that emanated from a strict liability reciprocal identity. Recent judicial activity has visibly adulterated that identity: this article casts doubts on juridical restrictions that assess the conduct of defendants to assess liability. It is suggested that it may not withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court if, and when, they are tested. In light of that analysis and considering the potency of injunctions, it is argued that nuisance law potentially has a positive future in environmental protection.

Owing to the elected research approach, the scope of the article has been necessarily concentrated on succinct areas of a broader subject and viewed in a manner that works alongside the regulatory regime.

This paper recognises that nuisance law has a positive future in environmental protection especially if the courts are willing to embrace the historical paradigm which has served the common law in this field broadly well for hundreds of years.

This article focuses on one court case concerning the regulation of Anti-Abortion protesting and asks: (1) Do the various actors involved in this case recognize a tension between their actions and their broader beliefs concerning the regulation of political protests? (2) If this tension is recognized, how do the actors resolve it, and if it is not recognized, why is it not? While concerned with legal consciousness and cognitive dissonance, the article is framed by broader questions concerning tolerance and the interaction of law and political passions.

Doxing refers to the intentional public release by a third party of personal data without consent, often with the intent to humiliate, intimidate, harass, or punish the individual concerned. Intuitively, it is tempting to condemn doxing as a crude form of cyber violence that weaponizes personal data. When it is used as a strategy of resistance by the powerless to hold the powerful accountable, however, a more nuanced understanding is called for. This chapter focuses on the doxing phenomenon in Hong Kong, where doxing incidents against police officers and their family members have skyrocketed since 2019 (a 75-fold increase over 2018). It contends that doxing for political purposes is closely related to digital vigilantism, signifying a loss of confidence in the ruling authority and a yearning for an alternative form of justice. The chapter therefore argues that public interest should be recognized as a legal defense in doxing cases when those discharging or entrusted with public duty are the targets. Equally, it is important to confine the categories of personal data disclosed to information necessary to reveal the alleged wrongdoer or wrongdoing. Only in this way can a fair balance be struck between privacy, freedom of expression, and public interest.

November 10, 1971 Master and Servant — Contract of employment — Repudiation — Employers' invalid notice of termination — Not accepted by employee — Effect on contract — Whether employers restrainable by injunction — Effect of Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (c.72).

It has been commented that the topic of enforcement needs little introduction ‘since it is readily apparent that the imposition of the [then] new regulatory structure will prove to be a largely futile exercise if regulation cannot be effectively enforced’. Indeed, Professor Gower has made the comment that ‘it is not much use having regulations unless they are enforced’.

Phillips, J. has drawn the distinction between wrongful dismissal at common law and unfair dismissal under statute. He points out the considerable difference which exists between the position at common law and the position under statute. “The common law” he says “is concerned merely with the contractual relationship between the parties, whereas a complaint of unfair dismissal…is concerned with the statutory right of an employee not to be unfairly dismissed.” There thus exists a fundamental difference between the two concepts, both of which are in their different circumstances important. In this monograph, it is proposed to treat the common law of wrongful dismissal. Statutory unfair dismissal will be the subject of discussion in a future monograph.