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This study examines the impact of the trading volume on Initial Public Offering (IPO) initial return in the context of an emerging market from January 2006 to December 2016. Models consist of hierarchical and multiple regressions have been evaluated. Our results show, firstly, IPO provides an average of 21.90% of initial return to investors on the first trading day, 9.08% of return on the second day of trading, and 7.12% of return on the third day of return. Secondly, there is a positive relationship between the oversubscription ratio and initial return and no relationship between trading volume and initial return on the first three trading day. Thirdly, the trading volume does not act as a moderator that worsens the relationship between the oversubscription ratio and initial return. Lastly, this study shows that investors should actively participate in the subsequent trading of an IPO. Higher participation will bring greater liquidity and shareholder wealth in the stock market. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study on the moderating effect of trading volume on IPO initial return in an emerging market.

The purpose of this paper is to use fundamental models incorporating structural relationships within the firm in a terminal value model for the second stage of a two-stage valuation model utilized to estimate the value of a company.

The innovation is that growth options are identified within the structural relationships and a model capturing the value of the optionality is incorporated in the second stage of the two-stage valuation model.

Significant outcomes are that terminal value is shown to be a large portion of a company’s total value and the price behavior for initial public offerings produced by the model is consistent with the result of empirical studies.

This paper explicitly incorporates growth options in the second stage of a two-stage valuation model for the firm.

This study examines whether a regulation on mandatory disclosure of financial forecasts since June 1991 and further sanction imposition since March 1998 contribute to lower IPO firms’ initial and aftermarket returns, and shorten honeymoon periods. The study is based on 423 IPO firms after the regulation required them to disclose their forecasts and 53 IPO firms prior to the regulation. The findings report that initial and aftermarket returns are lower, and honeymoon periods are shorter in the post‐regulation period than those in the pre‐regulation. The findings also report that initial and aftermarket returns are relatively smaller, and the honeymoon periods are shorter after the March 1998 regulatory sanction was imposed after controlling other variables. These results document that the financial forecasts disclosure regulation evidently contributes to mitigating information asymmetry.

This chapter presents evidence of persistence in pricing new corporate bond issues. Both transition matrix and regression analyses show that cross-sectional differences in the yields of initial public bond offerings across issuers persist over time, and the persistence effect is stronger for firms with no rating changes, less frequent bond issuance, and higher information asymmetry. Our findings support the hypothesis of the “ride on past” behavior and confirm the value of information production accumulated from the past bond issuances for the pricing of newly issued bonds.

Describes the environment for making initial public offerings (IPOs) in India and the process itself; and discusses the applicability of various research explanations for underpricing to the Indian Market. Suggests that it will be greater for new firms and issues managed by reputable merchant bankers; and analyses 1992‐1994 data on 386 IPOs to assess their performance. Shows that issues with high risk and/or smaller offer prices are more underpriced; and that returns are strongly correlated with subscription levels. Discusses the underlying reasons for this and the implications for public policy.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive initial evaluation of the changing issuer objective and partial price adjustment hypotheses as applied to carve‐out parent initial and three‐year returns for the period 1988‐2006.

Using five primary variables: the percentage of the subsidiary retained by the parent, the ratio of offering size to parent market capitalization, filing range adjustments, the percentage of the offering used to retire subsidiary debt or to pay dividends, and the CBOE volatility index to predict initial and three‐year returns, the paper shows that ex ante variables can predict carve‐out parent initial and three‐year returns.

The paper shows that public information known prior to the offer date influences 7.52 percent of the variation in announcement, 5.57‐38.31 percent of the variation in ex‐date and 6 percent of the variation in three‐year market‐adjusted equity carve‐out parent returns.

This study makes several contributions to the literature. Although prior studies focus on ex post determinants of equity carve‐out returns, this study is the first to explore ex ante predictors of equity carve‐out parent returns. The implications of these results are that publicly available information known prior to the carve‐out offering date can influence market‐adjusted initial and three‐year parent carve‐out returns and can explain 6‐17 percent of the variation.

This study examines corporate equity initial public offerings (IPOs) underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries of commercial banks relative to those underwritten by non‐Section 20 underwriters (investment houses). Consistent with a ‘net certification effect’ for banks, corporate equity IPOs underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries have lower underpricing than those underwritten by investment houses. Secondly, commercial banks brought a relatively larger proportion of small equity IPO issues to market, during the period of this study. Contrary to the contention that universal banking restricts the availability of financing to small firms, bank underwriting appears to benefit small firms. Further, Section 20s do not increase underwriting fees to offset the effect on potential profits from lower underpricing. This study also finds that the focus of Section 20 on small IPOs results in higher quality for the IPOs they underwrite, as indicated by a lower standard deviation of underpricing.

This paper examines the pricing of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the secondary market on the first day of aftermarket trading. The focus of this study is on shifts in average returns over time, and does not necessarily address the cross‐sectional implications of a risk/return relation. The focus of the study is to examine the reasonableness of first day trading prices of IPOs. Initial returns of IPOs, issued during the period, January 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000, reached as much as 800 per cent, and the average initial return for the study sample was of 76 per cent. An important question is whether the high initial returns, observed during this time period, are appropriate for the level of risk associated with these new issues. Related to this question is the pricing of these securities by investment bankers (i.e. the offer price) and the pricing of the securities in aftermarket trading (i.e the secondary market). The results of this study indicate the presence of speculative excesses in the initial pricing of IPOs in aftermarket trading during 1999 and part of 2000. Further there is no indication that IPOs are excessively underpriced by investment bankers during the study period, January 1, 1997 through June 30, 2000. The results of this study may be useful to investors in making decisions about purchasing new public securities in the secondary market.

Summarizes the regulatory environment and practices for providing a property company with a public listing. Furthermore, reports evidence of the direct and implied costs of undertaking a property initial public offering. The results indicate that choice of issue method and timing are key decisions to be made by property company financial managers.

This paper aims to study the underpricing phenomenon of initial public offerings (IPOs) of 355 Indian companies issued from 2007 to 2019. The research question this paper empirically examines is whether Indian corporate executives deliberately underprice IPOs from its fair value to attract investors, thereby causing an abnormal spike in the prices on the listing day. The findings of this study challenge a commonly held notion of leaving money on the table by IPO issuing companies. Of the overall average listing day returns of 17%, the deliberate premarket underpricing component is found to be mere 5.3%, while the remaining price fluctuation is, inter alia, a result of market momentum along with the unmet demands of impatient investors.

Following Koop and Li (2001), this study uses Stochastic frontier model (SFM) to study a routine anomaly of disparity between the primary market price (i.e. IPO issue price) and the secondary market price (listing price). The jump in the issue price observed on a listing day is decomposed into deliberate premarket underpricing component that reflects the extent of managerial manipulation and the after-market misvaluation component attributable to information asymmetry and prevailing market volatility.

This paper uses SFM to bifurcate initial returns into deliberate underpricing by managers and after-market mispricing by noise traders. This study finds that a significant part of the initial return is explained through after-market mispricing. This study finds that average initial returns are 17%, deliberate premarket underpricing is 5.3% and after-market mispricing averages 11.9%.

This study can isolate underpricing done at the premarket by estimating a systematic one-sided error term that measures the maximum predicted issue price deviation from the offered price. Consequentially, the disaggregation of initial returns may be especially informative for retail investors in planning their exit strategy from an IPO by separating the strength of the firm's fundamentals and its causal relationship with the initial returns. Substantial proportion of after-market mispricing implies that future research should focus on factors causing after-market mispricing. As underlying causes are identified, tailor-made policy responses can be formulated to benefit investors.

This paper has empirically validated that initial return is a mix of both components, i.e. deliberate underpricing and aftermarket mispricing. This disaggregation of initial returns can prove helpful for investors in planning their exit strategy. This study can help investors to become more aware of the importance of the fundamentals of the firm and its causal relation with the initial returns. This information in turn can help reduce the information asymmetry amongst investors and help them lessen the costs of adverse selection.

A large number of research studies on IPO pricing find overwhelming evidence of underpricing in public issues. This research attempts to decompose the extent of underpricing into deliberate underpricing and after-market mispricing, thereby supplementing the existing literature on the IPO pricing puzzle. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first contribution to the literature on initial return decomposition for the Indian capital markets.