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The purpose of this paper is to highlight how the basic binomial option pricing model (BOPM) might be used by regulators to help formulate rules, prior to financial crisis, that help prevent loan overstatement by banks in emerging market economies undergoing financial crises.

The paper draws on the theory of soft budget constraints (SBC) to construct a simple model in which banks overstate loans to minimize losses. The model is used to illustrate how guarantees of bailout assistance (BA) (to banks) by crisis stricken countries’ financial authorities may encourage banks to overstate loans and delay the implementation of IFRS for loan valuation. However, the model also illustrates how promises of BA may be depicted as binomial put options which provide banks with the option of either: reporting loan values on poor projects accurately and receiving the loans’ liquidation values; or, overstating loans and receiving the guaranteed BA. An illustration is also provided of how authorities may use this representation to help minimize bank loan overstatement in periods of financial crisis. In order to provide an illustration of how the option value of binomial assistance may evolve during a financial crisis, the model is generalized to the Mexican financial crisis of the late 1990s. During this period, Mexican authorities’ guarantees of BA to the nation’s largest banks encouraged those institutions to overstate loans and delay the implementation of (previously adopted) international “best practices” based loan valuation standards.

Application of the model to the Mexican financial crisis provides evidence that, in spite of Mexico’s “official” 1997 adoption of international “best accounting practices” for banks, “iron clad” guarantees of BA by the country’s financial authorities to Mexico’s largest banks provided those institutions with an incentive to knowingly overstate loans in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The model is compared against only one country in which the BA was directly infused into banks’ loan portfolios. Thus, as conceived, it is directly applicable to crisis countries in which the bailout took this form. However, the many quantitative variations of SBC models as well as recent studies which have applied the binomial model to other forms of bailout (e.g. direct purchases of bank shares by authorities) suggest that the model could be modified to accommodate different bailout scenarios.

The model and application show that guaranteed BA can be viewed as a put option and that ex-ante regulatory policies based on the correct valuation of the BA as a binomial option might prevent banks from overstating loans.

Use of the binomial or similar approaches to valuing BA may help regulators to determine the level of BA that will not encourage banks to overstate the value of their loans.

Recent research has used the BOPM to value, on an ex-post basis, the BA which appears on the balance sheet of institutions which have been rescued. However, little research has advocated the use of this type of model to help prevent, on an ex-ante basis, the overstatement of loans on poor projects.

The paper aims to explore the optimal strategies of inventory financing when the risk-averse retailer has different objectives, in the presence of multi-risk, i.e. demand risk, non-operational risk and retailer's strategic default risk.

This paper develops an inventory financing model consisting of a bank and a risk-averse retailer with strategic default. This paper considers two scenarios, i.e. the capital-constrained retailer cares about its profit or firm value. In the first scenario, the bank acts as a Stackelberg leader determining its interest rate, and the retailer acts as a follower determining its pledged quantity. In the second one, the bank capital market is perfectly competitive. Lagrange multiplier method is adopted to solve the optimization.

The optimal strategies in inventory financing scheme in two scenarios are derived. Only when the initial stock is relatively high, the retailer pledges part of the initial stock. Retailer's risk aversion reduces its pledged quantity and performance. The strategic default reduces its profit. When it is relatively high, the bank refuses to offer the loan.

Analytical inventory and financing strategies are specified to help retailers and banks to better understand the interaction of finance and operations management and to better respond to multi-risk.

New results and managerial insights are derived by incorporating partially endogenous strategic default and risk aversion into inventory financing, which enriches the interfaces of operations management and finance.

More and more attention has been paid to the financing of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and environmental protection. Many literatures have done detailed research on them; yet, few of them studied the interaction between corporate financing behaviors and environmental concerns. This study aims to incorporate the impact of the role of data collection into the mathematical model to explore the optimal financial and ordering strategies when considering environmental protection.

A Stackelberg game modeling and backward induction methods are used to derive the optimal equilibrium solutions, using numerical experiments to further explore the influences of various financing strategies on the green degree of product and ordering policies.

No matter which financing modes the capital-constrained retailer chooses, both the loan interest rate and order quantity considering environmental protection are larger than that without environmental protection concerns. As the retailer's initial capital increases, the optimal loan interest rates under various financing modes are all decreasing. The application of big data technology would promote the environmental protection of enterprises and increase the accuracy of financing decisions.

This paper studies financing activities of a supply chain considering data collection and environmental protection behaviors, which provides meaningful guidance for the financing and environmental decision-making of enterprises.

To provide a selective review of most recent developments in experimental economics of banking and lending and to summarize and synthesize the experiment designs and results in banking under asymmetric information.

The review includes recently published or working papers (2006–2013) that exclusively employ experimental economics methodology, especially for studying the impact of formal or informal institutions on lending in credit markets.

The results of the reviewed experimental studies provide support for the important role of both informal (e.g., relationship banking and reputation) and formal (e.g., third-party enforcement; collateral) institutions and their impact on credit market performance, as well as the importance of studying the interaction of the two types of institutions.

The number of studies reviewed is fairly small but growing, indicating that this is the area of growing significance.

Controlled economic experiments are better able to address the questions regarding the direction of causality in empirical relationships. Economic experiments are particularly useful in studying complex markets like credit and capital and in eliciting specific effects of institutions on credit market performance. Such well-established empirical relationships will be able to provide guidance for policy making for financial market reform.

This is the first review of laboratory research in banking and lending under asymmetric information that aims to call attention to this area of research and serves as a starting point for an interested researcher and provide future direction.

The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extent and in what forms loan applications from small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in a risk averse banking environment can be assessed defensively by lending officers (LOs). The paper also identifies triggering mechanisms behind defensive SME loan assessment behaviour and its' possible effects on the bank and the LOs.

The paper relies on a case study of a major Swedish commercial bank undergoing strategy and control system change during the recent financial crisis. The empirical evidence was collected through interviews with 76 LOs in three branch offices and a focus group interview session.

In a risk averse banking environment, LOs can be prone to assessing SME loan applications defensively to a noteworthy extent. Such defensiveness comes in different forms: denial of loan applications, granting of loans with collateral or high interest rates, or granting of loans only to clients with most of their financial affairs in the bank. External and internal mechanisms jointly trigger defensive loan assessment behaviour. The possible effects include fewer Type II errors and more Type I errors for the bank, while LOs avoid change and blame.

Overall, this study contributes to the literature by revealing triggering mechanisms, forms and effects related to the multifaceted construct of defensive loan assessment behaviour among LOs in a commercial bank, who handle applications from SMEs.

The main objective of this paper is to propose a model that allows the detection of the competitive pattern of the Spanish loans market between 1992 and 1996.

In order to achieve this objective, the paper estimates, following the New Empirical Industrial Organization paradigm, a conjectural variation model for the strategic marketing dimension of price. The model proposed allows the measurement of strategic group‐level rivalry while simultaneously considering demand, costs, and profit specifications for each bank.

The findings evidence a high degree of competition between the firms within the same strategic group. Further, the demand for loans of a firm has a positive (negative) relationship with the rivals' price (own price), with the own branch network (rivals' branch network), and with the economic activity in the regions where firm operates.

The major limitation of this research could become from the necessity to operate with detailed information that the authors try to overcome using proxies of several non‐available variables.

The model proposed herein represents a contribution to previous works and also provides more information about banking competition in the sense that it estimates price competition between firms within three strategic groups.

Studies of Depression-era financial remediation have generally focused on federal deposit insurance and the provision of equity to banks by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). This paper broadens the concept of financial remediation to include other programs – RFC lending, federal guarantees of farm and home mortgages, and the elimination of interest on demand deposits – and other intermediaries – savings and loans, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies. The benefits of remediation or the amounts potentially at risk to the government in these programs are calculated annually and allocated to the various intermediaries. The slow remediation of real estate loans (two-thirds of these intermediaries' loans) needs further study with respect to the slow economic recovery. The paper compares Depression-era remediation with efforts during the 2008–2009 crisis. Today's remediation contrasts with the 1930s in its speed, magnitude relative to GDP or private sector nonfinancial debt, the share of remediation going to nonbanks, and emphasis on securities markets.

This case study shows how methods of lean philosophy can be successfully taught to undergraduate students and applied to improving a real-world loan process. Students were instructed to use newly acquired classroom skills to analyse and improve a bank loan process in Kuwait.

This study involved an initial gemba walk through the bank. A case study format with direct observation and semi-structured interviews was adopted by 27 undergraduate students to identify waste, analyse the loan process and develop an efficiency plan.

The results revealed that undergraduate students could quickly learn basic lean principles and techniques and utilize them in a real-world situation to significantly improve a bank loan process. Areas of waste included over-production, over-processing, defects in procedure, under-utilized skills, wasted motions and poor time management. Suggested corrective measures were expected to reduce loan processing time by 30%.

Increasing costs and competition in the business environment make efficiency improvements imperative, and it was shown that students can play a major role in applying lean principles to a bank loan process while gaining knowledge and skills highly valued in industry. Universities have the opportunity to create a valuable learning experience for undergraduate students in applying classroom skills to solving a real-life problem.

This is the first study of a novel classroom technique for teaching undergraduate students to apply lean techniques in a Kuwaiti bank.

An updated version of the original (1985) text, the book covers all aspects of marketing and selling bank services: the role of marketing; behaviour of customers; intelligence, planning and organisation; product decisions; promotion decisions; place decisions; price decisions; achieving sales. Application questions help to focus the readers' minds on key issues affecting practice.

Probability of Default (PD) is a crucial credit risk parameter. International accords have motivated banks and credit institutions to adopt objective systems of evaluating and monitoring the PD. This study examines retail unsecured loans of a major Greek bank during the period of the financial crisis. It focusses on the stochastic behaviour of the financial states of the loans. It is tested whether a first-order Markov chain (MC) model describes sufficiently the transitions from one state to another. Moreover, Poisson regression models are estimated in order to calculate the limiting transition matrix, the limiting state probabilities and the PD. It is proved that the MC of the financial states of loans is non-homogeneous suggesting that the transition probabilities from one financial state to another are not constant across time. From the Poisson regression models, the transition probability matrix is estimated from one state to another in alternative time periods. From the limiting transition matrix, it is shown that if a loan is delayed then it is very likely to move towards the next worst case. The findings of this research could be useful for bank management.