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Within the past few years, a new phenomenon has taken place among the world's leading microfinance institutions (MFIs) – entry into new capital markets through initial public offerings (IPOs). “Going public” launches MFIs into a new frontier, not only presenting challenges but also providing new opportunities for the institutions and the clients they serve.

To provide a selective review of most recent developments in experimental economics of banking and lending and to summarize and synthesize the experiment designs and results in banking under asymmetric information.

The review includes recently published or working papers (2006–2013) that exclusively employ experimental economics methodology, especially for studying the impact of formal or informal institutions on lending in credit markets.

The results of the reviewed experimental studies provide support for the important role of both informal (e.g., relationship banking and reputation) and formal (e.g., third-party enforcement; collateral) institutions and their impact on credit market performance, as well as the importance of studying the interaction of the two types of institutions.

The number of studies reviewed is fairly small but growing, indicating that this is the area of growing significance.

Controlled economic experiments are better able to address the questions regarding the direction of causality in empirical relationships. Economic experiments are particularly useful in studying complex markets like credit and capital and in eliciting specific effects of institutions on credit market performance. Such well-established empirical relationships will be able to provide guidance for policy making for financial market reform.

This is the first review of laboratory research in banking and lending under asymmetric information that aims to call attention to this area of research and serves as a starting point for an interested researcher and provide future direction.

Studies of Depression-era financial remediation have generally focused on federal deposit insurance and the provision of equity to banks by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). This paper broadens the concept of financial remediation to include other programs – RFC lending, federal guarantees of farm and home mortgages, and the elimination of interest on demand deposits – and other intermediaries – savings and loans, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies. The benefits of remediation or the amounts potentially at risk to the government in these programs are calculated annually and allocated to the various intermediaries. The slow remediation of real estate loans (two-thirds of these intermediaries' loans) needs further study with respect to the slow economic recovery. The paper compares Depression-era remediation with efforts during the 2008–2009 crisis. Today's remediation contrasts with the 1930s in its speed, magnitude relative to GDP or private sector nonfinancial debt, the share of remediation going to nonbanks, and emphasis on securities markets.

Probability of Default (PD) is a crucial credit risk parameter. International accords have motivated banks and credit institutions to adopt objective systems of evaluating and monitoring the PD. This study examines retail unsecured loans of a major Greek bank during the period of the financial crisis. It focusses on the stochastic behaviour of the financial states of the loans. It is tested whether a first-order Markov chain (MC) model describes sufficiently the transitions from one state to another. Moreover, Poisson regression models are estimated in order to calculate the limiting transition matrix, the limiting state probabilities and the PD. It is proved that the MC of the financial states of loans is non-homogeneous suggesting that the transition probabilities from one financial state to another are not constant across time. From the Poisson regression models, the transition probability matrix is estimated from one state to another in alternative time periods. From the limiting transition matrix, it is shown that if a loan is delayed then it is very likely to move towards the next worst case. The findings of this research could be useful for bank management.

This chapter analyses the causes and effects of the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, and it examines the dramatic government rescues and reforms. The outcomes of this, the most severe collapse to befall the United States and the global economy for three-quarters of a century, are still unfolding. Banks, homeowners and industries stood to benefit from government intervention, particularly the huge infusion of taxpayer funds, but their future is uncertain. Instead of extending vital credit, banks simply kept the capital to cover other firm needs (including bonuses for executives). Industry in the prevailing slack economy was not actively seeking investment opportunities and credit expansion. The property and job markets languished behind securities market recovery. It all has been disheartening and scary – rage against those in charge fuelled gloom and cynicism. Immense private debt was a precursor, but public debt is the legacy we must resolve in the future.

Purpose – This chapter compares the stability of the U.S. Dual Banking system's two bank groups, national and state banks, in light of the current financial crisis. The goal of the chapter is to answer three distinct questions: first, is there a difference in the (balance sheet) fragility between the two groups and, second, to what extent has the balance sheet fragility of both groups changed after the escalation of the financial crisis beginning in August 2007? Building on that, the third question asks to whether or not the respective regulatory agencies of both bank groups are responsible for these changes in balance sheet fragility in light of the financial crisis.

Methodology – To answer these questions the chapter uses U.S. Call Report data containing full quarterly balance sheets and P&Ls of all U.S. commercial banks over the period 2005–2008. Anecdotal evidence as well as univariate and multivariate difference-in-difference methodology focusing on the immediate pre-crisis period Q1/2005–Q3/2007 and the crisis period Q3/2007–Q4/2008 are applied.

Results – Highly significant and robust results show that, ceteris paribus, national banks reduced their potential balance sheet fragility after the escalation of the crisis in August 2007 by reducing lending and liquidity creation stronger than state banks. Anecdotal evidence supports the empirical findings. Although both FDIC and OCC did not anticipate the adverse effects of the crisis, the OCC publicly showed an earlier reaction to liquidity-related problems than the FDIC.

Originality – The chapter is the first of its kind to analyze bank fragility around the escalation of the financial crisis and the role of the regulatory agencies. The chapter holds especially interesting policy implications in the light of the current discussion about the future regulation of the banking markets.

In the economic literature, a crisis has been thematically defined around bank runs, failure of large financial corporations, and financial distress. Section 1 summarizes our learnings about international banking crisis, in terms of the origin and impact of such crises. This provides us an international benchmark before we delve deeper into India's banking distress, its size and trends. Section 2 focuses on the twin-balance-sheet crisis in India. On one side, corporate firms recklessly overleveraged, resulting in excess capacities and business diversification. On the other side, banks, both private and public, fell prey to excessive and procyclical credit lending and improper monitoring. Overall, too many projects were left too weakly monitored. Separately, we have focused on two subsections, first, how the financial institutions in India have overstretched their credit-disposal limit during market upturns. Second, we found absence of any theoretically grounded approaches to determine the capital-adequacy ratios (CARs) for the banks. In Section 3, we have identified the steps taken so far by the Banking regulator and the Government to resolve the crisis. Further, we critically examine the role of Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) towards a successful non-performing assets (NPAs) resolution in South Korea. Few key takeaways include, (1) establishing a public asset-management company (AMC) focused on maximization of recoveries and resolution of stressed assets, (2) well-defined governance structure for the AMC ensuring it works on market principles, shielded from political interferences, and (3) realistic asset valuation and transfer price that ensures limited downside risks for the public AMC.

The role of money and monetary policy of the central bank in pursuing macroeconomic stability has significantly changed over the period since the end of World War II. Globalization, liberalization, integration, and transition processes generally shaped the crucial milestones of the macroeconomic development and substantial features of economic policy and its framework in Europe. Policy-driven changes together with variety of exogenous shocks significantly affected the key features of macroeconomic environment on the European continent that fashioned the framework and design of monetary policies.

This chapter examines the key basis of the central bank’s monetary policy on its way to pursue and preserve the internal and external stability of the purchasing power of money. Substantial elements of the monetary policy like objectives and strategies are not only generally introduced but also critically discussed according to their accuracy, suitability, and reliability in the changing macroeconomic conditions. Brief overview of the Eurozone common monetary policy milestones and the past Eastern bloc countries’ experience with a variety of exchange rate regimes provides interesting empirical evidence on origins and implications of vital changes in the monetary policy conduction in Europe and the Eurozone.

We investigate the nature of mid-loan relationships between bank-lenders and borrowers, to test whether firms borrow from banks to signal quality. Using the LPC DealScan, CRSP, and Wall Street Journal databases, we test whether borrower abnormal returns are related to bank, borrower, deal, and/or event characteristics during the duration of the loan. We demonstrate that borrower abnormal returns are related to mid-loan bank events, defined as an event resulting in bank abnormal returns beyond a specified threshold. The results suggest that borrowers are affected by bank events mid-loan, even when the event is not directly related to bank default.