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The chapter evaluates trust-based and emotional intelligence (EI) approaches in Tanzania’s informal sector entrepreneurs, from mali kwa mali (barter trade), mali kauli (trust-based credit) to collective or technology-based upatu (revolving credit). It analyses both vertical and horizontal trust, and the depth of linkage to growth and sustainability of entrepreneurship in the informal sector.

The chapter invokes experiences of informal sector entrepreneurs including itinerant hawkers (machinga), food vendors (mama lishe or mama ntilie) and motorcycle drivers (bodaboda). The unique trust-based approaches mali kwa mali and mali kauli in entrepreneurial undertakings extends from colonial times to post economic liberalisation and contemporary Tanzania. Mali kauli, a creative traditional credit practice, is a unique approach that facilitates and sustains micro-retail sub-sector and livelihoods in urban and rural Tanzania. Although the objective remains business profitability, sustainability of entrepreneurial ventures does not depend on it alone. Trust and EI are well invested in these approaches.

The chapter draws from past work on managing in the informal economy to derive theoretical and practical implications, and how trust and EI plays a role in the Tanzanian informal entrepreneurial circles.

Informal associations are typical features of farm and non-farm ventures especially within rural communities. Owing to the informality of these associations, members of the groups usually evolve strategies to cope with different kinds of economic and social shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic or unexpected economic recessions. Accordingly, entrepreneurship and non-farm business development in rural areas require massive finance input, which this group largely lacks owing to agrarian activities which is the main source of revenue. Therefore, to inform rural development policies, this chapter draws on the interrelationships that exist between finance options (including formal, informal and social networks) and small business development. Using the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA), the analytics identifies informal financing and social networks as leading alternatives to formal financing option in rural businesses. Therefore, we suggest that the government institutions recognise and formalise informal finance systems. This will not only aid access to government interventions and programmes, but foster collaborations with existing formal institutions and investors for sustainable rural business financing.

In this chapter we study internal and external, formal and informal, financing sources of Chinese firms during the period 1997–2006, by analyzing balance sheet data from the Chinese Industrial Surveys of Medium-sized and Large Firms for 2000–2006 and survey data from the Large-Scale Survey of Private Enterprises in China conducted in 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006.

The following stylized facts emerge from our analysis: (1) State-owned firms continue to enjoy more generous external finances than other types of Chinese firms. (2) Chinese private firms have resorted to various ways of overcoming financial constraints, including reliance on the increasingly more mature informal financial markets, cost savings through lower inventory and other working capital requirements, and greater reliance on retained earnings. (3) Substantial variations exist in financial access among private firms, with small private firms facing more financial constraints whereas more established firms having financial access more equal to their SOE counterparts. (4) Although not as accessible as for SOEs, the Chinese formal financial sector does provide Chinese private firms with substantial financial resources, especially for their short-term needs during daily operations. (5) The most pressing financial constraint facing Chinese private firms is their limited ability to secure long-term funds to invest for growth, and resolving this issue should be one of the top goals of financial reforms in China.

To provide a selective review of most recent developments in experimental economics of banking and lending and to summarize and synthesize the experiment designs and results in banking under asymmetric information.

The review includes recently published or working papers (2006–2013) that exclusively employ experimental economics methodology, especially for studying the impact of formal or informal institutions on lending in credit markets.

The results of the reviewed experimental studies provide support for the important role of both informal (e.g., relationship banking and reputation) and formal (e.g., third-party enforcement; collateral) institutions and their impact on credit market performance, as well as the importance of studying the interaction of the two types of institutions.

The number of studies reviewed is fairly small but growing, indicating that this is the area of growing significance.

Controlled economic experiments are better able to address the questions regarding the direction of causality in empirical relationships. Economic experiments are particularly useful in studying complex markets like credit and capital and in eliciting specific effects of institutions on credit market performance. Such well-established empirical relationships will be able to provide guidance for policy making for financial market reform.

This is the first review of laboratory research in banking and lending under asymmetric information that aims to call attention to this area of research and serves as a starting point for an interested researcher and provide future direction.

Traditional savings and credit associations, also known as ‘Osusu’ in Sierra Leone, are unions of individuals with common economic goals aimed at reducing poverty and economic vulnerability. The chapter examined the ecosystem of traditional indigenous savings and credit associations, their role as an emerging financial inclusion strategy, and contributions to the socio-economic transformation of business processes in the ecosystem of business operations in Sierra Leone. The chapter adopted the case study method to discuss the Tawoponneh model of ROSCAs in Sierra Leone. The institutional theory provided insight into why individuals join ROSCAs, as well as the resulting outcomes and benefits. Additionally, this chapter discusses the challenges associated with indigenous financial sustainability practices and provides actionable recommendations for joint private and government policy collaboration in supporting traditional entrepreneurial businesses.

The literature of ethnic ownership economies descends from middleman minority theory, a subject it continues to include. However, ethnic economy literature now more broadly addresses the economic independence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in general, not just of middleman minorities (Light & Bonacich, 1991, pp. xii–xiii).¹ This expansion releases the subject from narrow concentration upon historical trading minorities, and opens discussion of the entire range of immigrant and ethnic minority strategies for economic self-help and self-defense. Partial or full economic independence represents a ubiquitous self-defense of immigrants and ethnic minorities who confront exclusion or disadvantage in labor markets. Ethnic economies permit immigrants and ethnic minorities to reduce disadvantage and exclusion, negotiating the terms of their participation in the general labor market from a position of greater strength. Unable to find work in the general labor market, or unwilling to accept the work that the general labor market offers, or just reluctant to mix with foreigners, immigrants and ethnic minorities have the option of employment or self-employment in the ethnic economy of their group. Although ethnic and immigrant groups differ in how well and how much they avail themselves of this defense (Collins, 2003; Light & Gold, 2000, p. 34; Logan & Alba, 1999, p. 179), none lacks an ethnic economy.²

This study examines the way the government of Kazakhstan confronted informal (squatter) settlements and their property in Almaty in 2006. It argues that the way the state handled the issue as part of a broader state economic strategy was neither appropriate for the aim of creating a functioning property market nor for advancing social justice and welfare. The analysis focuses on the attempted demolition of two informal settlements, Bakay and Shanyrak, and subsequent events, including (a) militant and political responses among the residents and their supporters, (b) the legalization campaign, and (c) the effects of the global credit crunch on construction and property market in Almaty. The goal here is to refine the claim to a connection between formal economy, state practice, and squatters' experiences.