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This study examines the role of industry competition, market capitalization, and debt levels in the relationship between profitability and firm value (FV). The sample included companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in the manufacturing sector in 2017–2019. This study provides empirical evidence that the high level of industrial competition (IC), low level of market capitalization (market value of equity, MVE), and high levels of debt (debt-to-assets ratio, DAR) weaken the effect of profitability as measured by return on assets (ROA) on FV as measured by Tobin’s Q. Profitability is not even related to FV for firms facing high industry competition. In addition, profitability only has a marginal positive relationship with FV for firms with relatively small market capitalizations. These findings suggest that the relationship between profitability and FV is not monotonous but is influenced by the level of industry competence, market capitalization, and debt.

This paper aims to explore the impact of product market competition (PMC) on companies’ investment in external auditing.

This paper applies a conceptual framework derived from demand–supply analysis and a panel data set of 2,263 listed manufacturing companies in China covering the period 2012–2019. In the assessment of PMC, this study measures industry-level competition intensity and company-specific market power separately.

Industries appear to engage in a lower average level of external auditing if industrial competition intensity is either too high or too low. Similarly, companies spend less on external auditing if their market power is either too strong or too weak, and the company-level inverted U-shaped relationship is much more evident in industries with weak PMC.

This paper shows that a company’s external audit strategy is affected by the level of competition it faces in its market. The findings of this paper can improve the current linear PMC–auditing theoretical framework and provide insights into the strategic auditing of listed companies in China. The findings also have significant implications for policy recommendations regarding corporate governance and market scrutiny regulations.

Product market competition may have various impacts on audit fees. On the one hand, according to the agency theory, product market competition can mitigate agency problems between management and shareholders. For clients with higher product market competition, auditors will lower the level of engagement risk assessment and reduce the required level of audit evidence, and hence audit fees will be lower. On the other hand, according to the audit risk model, product market competition will increase client business risk and audit engagement risk. Moreover, for clients with competition advantage, client business risk and audit engagement risk will be lower, and hence a lower audit fee. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

In this paper, the authors collect financial accounting data and audit fee data from CSMAR database. Our sample selection starts with all available observations on the Chinese listed companies during 2006–2011. Since there is a big difference in accounting practices between financial companies and other industries, the authors delete observations on financial companies. The authors further remove observations with missing data, yielding 6,709 observations for the final analysis. To define the industry, the authors use the first two digits of standard industry classification code set by China Securities Regulatory Commission. In order to reduce the effect of extreme observations, the authors also truncate the data at 1 and 99 percent. The authors use the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) and the natural logarithm of the number of listed companies within the industry to measure product market competition intensity. HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of revenues of the client firm among the total revenues of all public companies, i.e. HHI = ∑ i = 1 N ( s i / S ) 2 . N is the number of listed companies in the industry, S_i is the revenues for an individual firm and S is the total revenues of all public companies within the same industry. A higher HHI score indicates fewer companies dominate the industry and hence lower intensity of competition in the product market. The second measure of industry competition intensity is LNN, the natural logarithm of the total number of public companies in the same industry of a client firm. A larger value of LNN indicates a larger number of competitors in the industry, and a higher level of competition intensity. Following the literature (Kale and Loon, 2011), the authors use Lerner index (or price-cost margin (PCM)) to measure the listed company’s competitive advantage. It is actually a measure of a firm’s power to influence product prices in the industry. The authors adopt the Peress (2010) method to estimate Lerner index as net operating income, divided by sales, i.e. PCM=(Sales–COGS–Selling expenses–Administrative expenses)/Sales. A higher value of PCM indicates more product pricing power and a higher competitive advantage of a company. The authors also use Lerner index ranking (R_PCM) to measure the competitive advantage of a company in the industry. The authors sort PCM values in ascending order in each industry and divide into ten groups. Then, the authors assign a value from one to ten to each listed company within each group in each industry. A higher R_PCM value represents higher market power and higher competitive advantage of a company. Based on Simunic (1980) framework, the authors develop the following model to test the relationship between product market competition, competition advantage and audit fees: LNAF_it=β₀+β₁ PMC_it+β₂ SIZE_it+β₃ INV_it+β₄ REC_it+β₅ GROWTH_it+β₆ PRELOSS_it+β₇ LEV_it+β₈ QUICK_it+β₉ OPIN_it+β₁₀ IBIG4_it+β₁₁ DBIG10_it+β₁₂ SWITCH_it+β₁₃ LOCATE_it+β₁₄ STATE_it+∑β YearDummies+ε_it.

Using a sample of 6,709 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2007–2011, the authors find that the product market competition intensity has a negative impact on audit fees, which means that agency cost effect is dominant in audit pricing at industry level. In addition, a company’s competitive advantage in the industry has a significant and negative impact on audit fees, which means that business risk effect also plays a critical role in audit pricing of individual engagement. The findings indicate that, in determining audit fees, auditors in the emerging market of China consider both the competition intensity of their clients’ product market at the industry level and the competitive advantage of the specific clients within the industry.

The findings indicate that, in determining audit fees, auditors in the emerging market of China consider both the competition intensity of their clients’ product market at the industry level and the competitive advantage of the specific clients within the industry.

This paper aims to examine the effect of product market competition on firms’ unethical behavior (FUB) in the Chinese insurance industry and to further explore the boundary conditions of the main effects. On the basis of China’s commercial foundation, the study constructs a conceptual framework of FUB by drawing from the perspective of horizontal competition.

Data were collected from 52 property insurance firms at the branch level observed over the six-year period, 2011-2016. Within this framework, market power and market concentration were used to describe product market competition at firm and industry levels, respectively. The moderating effect of market munificence was analyzed to reveal the theoretical boundaries of the main effect. By drawing upon cost–benefit analysis and social network theory, the study used negative binomial model and Poisson model to quantitatively examine the relationship.

The relationship between product market competition and FUB is curvilinear. Especially at the firm level, market power exhibits a U-shape relationship with FUB; at the industry level, market concentration exhibits a U-shape relationship with FUB. In addition, market munificence positively moderates the impact of firm’s market power on FUB, whereas, market munificence negatively moderates the impact of industrial market concentration on FUB.

This paper explored a new type of unethical behavior that concerns consumers or the third party by emphasizing horizontal competitive contexts; it also provides a better understanding of the FUB–financial performance relationship from the perspective of competition. The moderating effects suggest that when the cause of FUB is different (market power vs market concentration), firms may make opposite ethical choice. However, the sample is from a single industry; it will be fruitful to further verify these findings in other industries such as the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the definition of FUB is confined to explicit forms such as participation or collusion but there is no way to measure the implicit forms of FUB.

First, the governance of FUB should not only focus on the firms themselves, but also take into account the industrial market structure. Second, proper use of governance measures for FUB can increase firms’ benefits from “compliance with the law”, enticing firms to decrease FUB. The third, firms with weak market positions, facing fierce competition, should not be involved in FUB for short-term benefit; indeed, a low-cost strategy can be adopted as the dominant competitive strategy. While, in cases of highly concentrated market structure, firms should strive to avoid involvement in FUB through collusion with other rivals.

As it is a very common phenomenon that firms in competitive relationships may adopt FUB toward third parties or consumers, this trend has become a hot topic in the economic and social development in China. The study’s conclusions reveal that a more proactive and ambitious ethical decision is desirable for all kinds of firms; moreover, firms should make a rational choice between “short-term interest” and “long-term survival”. When firms identify the compliance of business ethics as an opportunity to differentiate themselves and perceive the benefits of decreasing FUB as outweighing the costs, the level of FUB will be inhibited, and social welfare will increase.

The primary contribution of this research resides in identifying product market competition as a previously unexplored predictor of FUB, thus revealing the dark side of product market competition. In addition, nonlinear relationships between product market competition and FUB indicate that situations of competition exert an important influence on FUB both at the firm and industry level. This paper’s conclusion provides a more meticulous theoretical explanation for FUB. This research demonstrates that the traditional ethical framework is not sufficient to explain FUB in a horizontal competitive context. Indeed, resource constraints and competitive pressures should also be considered.

The impact of competition on innovation has been extensively studied, but with ambiguous findings. We study the impact of import competition on U.S. corporate innovation and present some new perspectives. We conjecture that U.S. firms view import competition from high-wage countries (HWCs) as “neck-and-neck” competition and will respond by intensifying innovation. In contrast, U.S. firms will reduce innovation in response to import competition from low-wage countries (LWCs), because such competition does not always increase the potential benefits from innovation. Our empirical results are supportive. We find that, when confronting HWC import competition, U.S. firms increase R&D spending while intensifying and improving innovation output (file more patents, receive more citations to their patents, and produce more breakthrough patents). Moreover, U.S. firms closest to the technological frontier – largest firms, firms with the largest stocks of knowledge, and most profitable firms – increase and improve their innovation the most in response to HWC competition. These results shed light on the relationship between product market competition and innovation, and point to the origin of import competition as a determinant of innovation decisions made by different U.S. companies.

This research addresses the question of whether market competition influences a firm's implicit tax burden. Implicit taxes are defined as the pretax rate of return disadvantage earned on an investment that is taxed preferentially. The Scholes and Wolfson (1992) model predicts that implicit taxes will fully offset any benefit from preferential tax treatment leading to no benefit from lower explicit taxes; however, their theory assumes perfect market competition. This chapter relaxes the assumption of perfect market competition and finds that firms in industries with lower competition bear lower implicit taxes and firms in industries with higher competition bear higher implicit taxes. These findings are consistent with monopoly and oligopoly behavior predictions where firms in less competitive industries have greater price setting power and can retain more of their tax savings while market forces in competitive industries force companies to pass along any savings to customers (Mason, 1939). Furthermore, these findings answer the call in the literature for more research on determinants of cross-sectional variation in implicit taxes (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001).

Currently, the bulk of research on marketing innovation focuses on various firm-level dimensions using relationships from the technological (product and process) innovation literature. Research on industry-level differences in marketing innovation is lacking. Testing relationships form the technological paradigm in the context of the marketing innovation paradigm is also lacking. This paper aims to present empirical evidence on both aspects using a large-scale data set.

This study uses two large-scale datasets, each consisting of approximately 4,000 Canadian enterprises in 18 industries. The data was collected by Statistics Canada in 2009 and 2012 through its nationwide Survey of Innovation and Business Strategies program. Two widely used theoretical frameworks, resource-based view of the firm and the competitive perspective, are used to generate constructs and hypotheses in relation to marketing innovation. The data was analyzed using multi-level logistic regression.

The findings show that industry-level competition is a much more important driver of marketing innovation than firm-level competition. The authors also show that marketing constructs that are significant in the context of technological innovation are also significant for marketing innovation.

This study extends the firm-level literature by providing evidence of how industry-level dynamics enhances marketing innovation. The study also provides empirical evidence from Canadian enterprises that complement those from other countries.

A deeper understanding of the drivers of marketing innovation can enable managers to enact innovation strategies that can enhance organizational performance, differentiate themselves and enhance customer engagement and brand image.

As one of the few studies to examine industry-level differences in marketing innovation, the authors show that disaggregating competition into industry-level and firm-level provides a clearer picture of how competition advances marketing innovation. Additionally, this study is the first of its kind to provide empirical evidence on Canadian enterprises, thereby complementing evidence on marketing innovation from other countries. Thus, this study makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to the emerging marketing innovation literature.

This study examines whether dividend payout, an internal corporate governance mechanism, is a substitute for or an outcome of product market competition, an external corporate governance mechanism. The sample includes firms in six of the world’s most prominent economies. We find that firms in more competitive industries pay less in the way of dividends to their shareholders, which is consistent with the notion that dividends and competition are substitutes. We also determine that the above negative relationship is weaker in countries with stronger regulation protecting minority shareholders against corporate self-dealing. Furthermore, the relationship has attenuated following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that increased regulation and enhanced governance standards. Collectively, our findings provide consistent evidence across countries that the two corporate governance mechanisms examined in the study are substitutes, and greater regulation weakens the substitution effect. Our empirical findings are robust to alternative measures of dividend payout, industry definition, and shareholder protection.

The purpose of this paper is, from a resource accumulation and resource allocation perspective, to examine the variant effects of government subsidies among firms with varying levels of market power and to test how industry competition moderates the relationship between market power and allocative efficiency of government subsidies.

This study explores the relationship between government subsidies and firm performance from a resource-based view. The authors study the moderating role of market power and three-way interaction between subsidy, market power and industry competition on firm performance. The authors test their hypotheses using a sample of Chinese A-share manufacturing firms from 2006–2019. The authors apply firm-level panel data regressions and conduct a series of robustness tests. The marginal effect of market power and industry competition is explored via three-way moderator effect models.

This study finds that government subsidies are negatively related to firm performance. Market power, on average, strengthens the negative effect of government subsidies on performance, but such a reinforcement effect is neutralized when industry competition is intense. Government subsidies are least efficiently used when firms have market power and industry competition is low. In addition, the authors use different forms of firm performance and a various of robustness tests to verify their assumptions.

This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, the authors look into subsidy–performance problem from the perspective of the resource-based view and contribute to explaining and mitigating the divergence of current findings on the subsidy–performance relationship. Second, the authors introduce market power and industry competition as moderators to study how resource allocative efficiency affects the subsidy–performance relationship. Third, the authors propose that managerial incentives have played an important role in the allocation of government subsidies, which enriches management practices.

This paper investigates the relationship between product market competition and firms’ water information disclosure and how firms’ ownership type can affect this relationship in China, offering new insights into corporate water management.

The authors investigated 303 Chinese listed companies in highly water-sensitive industries to examine how product market competition influences corporate water information disclosure by subdividing the product market competition into market competition at the firm level and the industry competition intensity at the industry level.

The results show that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between industry competition and water information disclosure; enterprises with the highest market power in a mildly competitive industry are more willing to voluntarily disclose water information and play an industry benchmarking role. Further tests demonstrate that the relationship between industry competition intensity and water information disclosure is stronger for state-owned enterprises than for private enterprises.

The current water resources regulations in China are relatively lax and the water risk awareness of firms is weak, which may affect the applicability of the results. In addition, water information disclosure research is a relatively new field and a quantitative index system for water information disclosure is still in the exploratory stage. Further developments, including the selection, definition and measuring methods of a water index are required.

The authors developed a new direction of enterprise water management activities from the perspective of market competition. Based on the market conditions in China, the authors also investigated the impact of the ownership type of the enterprises on the relationship between market competition and water information disclosure.

The authors suggested that the government should improve laws and regulations and adopt incentive mechanisms to encourage enterprises to implement water resource management. In addition, the government should encourage high market status enterprises to actively fulfill their environmental responsibilities so that the entire industry is encouraged to follow suit.

This study represents an important development in the field of environmental accounting and is the first research on corporate water information disclosure; it also extends the research on the influence mechanisms of market competition on the environmental management practices of enterprises.