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The present study investigates the role of fiscal illusion on income inequality in 46 selected countries in terms of income and development levels from 2002 to 2017.

The effect of fiscal illusion on income inequality is tested using the two-step system generalized method of moment (SYS-GMM) estimator.

The findings reveal the negative effect of fiscal illusion on income inequality, which means increasing fiscal illusion decreases income inequality in 46 selected countries. As in other countries, income inequality declines when fiscal illusion increases in high-income and developed countries, although the redistributive effect of fiscal illusion is more in high-income and developed countries than in other countries. In addition, the results demonstrate the positive effect of unemployment, urbanization and inflation as well as the negative effect of trade openness on income inequality in all three models.

Previous studies have examined the role of government in controlling income inequality from different perspectives; however, no study has detected the role of government in income distribution regarding fiscal illusion.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-05-2022-0311.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the counterfeiting process in Italy, at a subnational level.

The paper uses panel data estimators and mixture models regression.

The paper finds that homogeneous clusters of regions could be derived, as a result of economic and geographical reasons. Moreover, household and public administration expenditure, indirect taxation, foreigners/population ratio and the number of ports have a positive impact on the counterfeiting diffusion index.

The paper is practical as a source of reference in contrasting counterfeiting process.

The paper uses new data applying recent econometric techniques to find homogeneous groups of regions on counterfeiting index.

Preamble Taxation does not escape the effects of inflation. It too is distorted by the fall in value of the national currency. No problem would arise where a tax is applied to a simple base at a single rate, with no exemptions or allowances and without a significant time lag. This is however a rare case. Certainly so far as the British direct tax system is concerned there are usually multiple rates, thresholds and other allowances and, particularly in capital taxation, there may be significant gaps in time between the date of the imposition of the tax and the time when the tax becomes payable. For example the new rates of capital transfer tax announced on 26 October 1977 would apply to the estate of a person who dies in 1978, 1998 or in the next century or would do so but for the inevitable review which will be required mainly because of inflation arising between 1977 and the date of death. If this were not adjusted the heirs of the deceased would manifestly be required to pay more capital transfer tax than the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1977 intended them to pay. A simple example will illustrate this.

The creation and growth of economic integration as an area of economics is the result primarily of practical rather than academic interest. Although economic nationalism and antagonism still prevail as the basic form of world economic order, economic history presents us with specific examples and ambitious plans of economic co‐operation and integration. The example of the US is often cited as a classic case study in economic integration. Viner presented a detailed list of conventions, decrees, etc., concerning customs unions. The French Declaration of May 9, 1950, which led to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, manifested for the first time the willingness of a government to overcome old antagonisms and to adopt a programme for European integration. The Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the European Economic Community is another example of the trend towards economic integration among industrialised countries of the West, while COMECON is the primary integration attempt by various centrally planned economies of the Soviet bloc. With respect to less developed countries, the world has experienced a number of ambitious schemes such as the Latin America Free Trade Association, the Central American Common Market, the East African Community, the West African Association, the South African Customs Union, the Arab Common Market, the Southeast Asia Economic Treaty, the Andean Common Market, the Carribean Community and others.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the enduring, fundamental contributions of accounting practices in the pursuit of decentralization by governments, with an examination of Peter Leopold’s reform of the municipalities in the late eighteenth century in Italy.

An extensive textual analysis of the very comprehensive collection of primary sources of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany during the de’ Medici and Hapsburg-Lorraine’s rule identified the reasons for Peter Leopold’s decision to decentralize his government’s authority and responsibilities. A systemic comparison of the 1765–1766 and 1775–1776 financial reports of the Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole disclosed the importance of the micro-practices of accounting and reporting for the reform.

In the context of the eighteenth century enlightenment, Peter Leopold legitimized his reform by the introduction of a modern style of government based on the rationalization of the municipal administrative system and decentralization of central authority and responsibility. The reform was made feasible by the substitution of a birth right principle with an economic discourse which linked tax payments to property ownership. This had the unintended consequence of increased taxes, higher municipal expenditures and possible inequalities between municipalities.

The findings of the study are dependent on the resources which have survived and are now preserved in the official archives of Galeata and Florence. This work contributes to the extant literature on administrative reforms in a crucial period for the redefinition of sovereignty by the ruling classes, with the rise of the modern State. It extends historical understanding of the public sector with a focus on local government in the eighteenth century in a non-Anglo-Saxon context.

The examination of the reform of Peter Leopold contributes to an enhanced understanding of present-day decentralization by governments in the context of the new public management (NPM). It provides to NPM advocates a broader temporal and contextual understanding of the impact of current decentralization reforms.

Few accounting studies have considered the micro-aspects of decentralization reforms at the municipal level and tried to identify their impact on the wealth of the population. Moreover, Peter Leopold’s reform is considered one of the most innovative and enlightened of the eighteenth century, while the remainder of Europe was still overwhelmingly committed to the centralization of administrative apparatuses. Finally, this study relates to the multi-disciplinary debate about the recognition, qualification and accountization of the impact of decentralization of responsibility for the delivery of government services.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, British public debt, accumulated over the eighteenth century and during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815), had attained extremely high levels, at times even reaching 200% of the gross national product (GNP). This increase in debt paradoxically coexisted with the early progression of the industrial revolution.

In this chapter, we explain this concomitance by the effective policies of sovereign debt management put in place by the State and the Bank of England (BoE). First, the State put in place measures to lower its risk of default by funding its debt with tax revenue that would allow it to honour due payments. Second, following the suspension in 1797 of cash payments for pounds sterling, the BoE, in addition to its role in financing the State, followed an active policy of sovereign debt management, promoting both bank liquidity and market liquidity.

Explores tax structures in a two‐period, two‐good model, allowing for endogenous labour supplies. The model includes the specification of a joint distribution of wage rates facing individuals in the two periods. It also specifies a joint distribution of the various preference parameters used, allowing for the calibration such that the average proportion of expenditure on each good varies with (endogenous) income. This introduces distributional grounds for the use of a selective consumption tax, alongside an income tax, when maximizing a social welfare function displaying inequality aversion.