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To explore the importance of the board of director nomination process (that is, who nominates a given director for a position on the firm’s board) for the voting outcomes, disciplining of management, and overall monitoring quality of the board of directors.

We exploit a recent regulation passed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requiring disclosure of the board nomination process. In particular, we focus on firms’ use of executive search firms versus allowing internal members (often simply the CEO) to nominate new directors to serve on the board of directors.

We show that companies that use search firms to find board members pay their CEOs significantly higher salaries and significantly higher total compensations. Further, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly less likely to fire their CEOs following negative performance. In addition, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and see abnormally low returns from this M&A activity. We instrument the endogenous choice of using an executive search through the varying geographic distance of companies to executive search firms. Using this instrumental variable framework, we show search firm-identified independent directors’ negative impact on firm performance, consistent with firm behavior and governance consequences we document.

Given the recent law passage, we are the first to directly analyze the nomination process, and show a surprisingly large predictive effect of seemingly arm’s-length nominations. This has clear implications for thinking carefully through how independence is defined in the director nomination process.

This paper is the main section on quantitative data analysis. It explains the concepts at a greater detail to help non-Math/Stat scholars to understand the basics easily. Proper data analysis is critical to any research. If data are not properly analyzed, then it may give results which either cannot be properly interpreted or wrongly interpreted. This section covers univariate, multivariate analysis and then, factor analysis, cluster analysis, conjoint analysis, and multidimensional scaling (MDS) techniques.

The beginning of the twenty-first century was plagued with extensive, evasive, and disheartening U.S. business and political leadership failures. Despite the accounting profession’s standards of professional ethics, accounting as a profession also was tainted with various ethical leadership indiscretions during this time. In response to these ethical leadership failings, renewed interest in developing accounting professionals with strong ethical principles and ethical leadership behaviors emerged. In many firms, training and development in ethical behavior is now at the forefront of communications and professional development efforts. The question remains, however, can the profession instill in its members the importance of ethical conduct? Can ethical leaders be developed who model ethical behavior? In response to the call for leaders who are ethical and moral, this research examined a model of ethical leadership and its impact on leader effectiveness for leaders within the accounting profession. The analysis shows that ethical and transformational leadership behaviors make independent and significant contributions to explaining leader effectiveness.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

Do social movement organizations increase the supply of a public good? We address this question by investigating the role of generalist social movement organizations and technology-focused organizations for the development of the electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure in California from 1995 until 2012. We find that increases in the membership of Electric Auto Association (EAA) chapters in the cities of California enhanced the number of EV charging stations set up in each city. Our analyses also show that the organizational diversity of the environmental movement spurred the growth of EAA membership but did not directly increase the establishment of charging stations.