Search results

This study aims to investigate the effect of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms (board size, independent commissioner and ownership concentration) on green innovation (GI) in publicly traded companies of Indonesia as an emerging market.

Archival data relating to CG and GI were collected for five years (2016–2020). A total of 640 observations were obtained and analyzed using a random effect model.

The results indicate that effective governance mechanisms can encourage GI implementation to promote company sustainability. Respectively, the board size, independent commissioner and ownership concentration positively and significantly affect GI. These results imply that the optimal board size will result in effective coordination and cooperation in making GI decisions. Likewise, the proportional independent commissioners in the board structure will serve an effective oversight function. And concentrated ownership can influence executives to prefer innovation policies, such as GI.

First, only a few CG mechanisms were used in this investigation. Therefore, further research needs to consider other mechanisms such as the number of commissioners, internal and external commissioners. Second, this research focused solely on Indonesia as an emerging market. Future research can be expanded to include countries with other emerging market characteristics. Third, different GI measurements from this study should be considered in future studies.

Practically, the results of this study are expected to provide policy recommendations, including optimizing the CG mechanisms as a control tool to achieve organizational sustainability through GI according to stakeholder expectations. This can be achieved by optimizing the size of the board of directors. The low value of the board size coefficient implies that optimization of board size is needed to encourage GI. The company can gain directors’ competence, experience and skill to increase innovation performance. In addition, maximizing the role of independent commissioners in overseeing is required for continuous innovation activities. Finally, the control of large shareholders is also necessary to encourage the implementation of GI because they could influence management to make innovative decisions.

This study extends and contributes to the extant CG and GI literature. There is little evidence that reveals how CG mechanisms affect GI, particularly in emerging market settings. The findings offer some important evidence for improving CG in driving GI implementation.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

This study aims to analyze and explain the effect of financial architecture (with three dimensions: ownership structure, capital structure and corporate governance) and intangible assets on performance financial and corporate value in the Indonesian capital market.

This research was conducted on nonfinancial sector companies that were registered in the Indonesian capital market, namely Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2015. This study used quantitative data and used secondary data sources, meaning that data were obtained, collected and processed from other parties. In this study, the hypothesis testing of the effect of financial architecture (included the dimensions of ownership structure, capital structure and corporate governance) and intangible assets on financial performance and corporate value using path analysis was performed.

The results of this study have provided findings that follow the research model that has been built (1) This research has been able to provide a theoretical model of the influence of financial architecture (with dimensions of ownership structure, capital structure and corporate governance), intangible assets, board processes on financial performance and company value in the Indonesian capital market. (2) To develop a theoretical model about the effect of corporate governance on financial performance in accordance with the two-tier system adopted by Indonesia. (3) An empirical study of the concept of financial architecture put forward by Myers (1999).

This research update lies in the research variable, which determines one value of the financial architecture variable comprehensively, combines the financial architecture variable and intangible assets to then be tested for its effect on company value and the use of the financial process variable as a board process as an intervening variable.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how underpricing is associated with board structure and corporate ownership among firms conducting initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Indonesian equity market.

To capture the most recent development, the sample comprises 101 firms conducting IPOs in Indonesia's primary equity market in the period of 2003‐2011. The explanatory variables consist of board size, board independence, ownership concentration, and institutional ownership. In further analysis, the authors perform regressions considering three types of the controlling shareholder, namely families, foreign entities, and the government.

Providing some support for signaling theory, it is found that board independence is positively related to the level of underpricing. Further, this study provides evidence that the level of underpricing is negatively associated with both board size and institutional ownership, indicating that these two governance mechanisms play important roles in mitigating information asymmetry between the issuer and potential investors. Ownership concentration is insignificant in explaining the first‐day returns. When the type of corporate control is taken into account, it is revealed that government‐controlled companies tend to experience higher underpricing.

This paper contributes to the IPO underpricing literature since the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on initial returns is relatively under‐researched, particularly within the context of emerging markets.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the existing, yet limited, literature on the influence of ownership concentration and family control on the demands for high-quality audits. This study focusses on an emerging market, namely, Indonesia, where ownership concentration and family control are relatively higher than those in developed markets.

The sample consists of 787 firm-year observations of public firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Following prior studies, a firm is considered using a higher quality audit when its external auditor is one of the Big 4 audit firms. Logistic regressions are employed to test research hypotheses.

Empirical evidence obtained reveals that firms with higher ownership concentration are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor. Hence, in such firms, high-quality audits are employed to mitigate agency issues. However, when the controlling shareholder is a family, the association between ownership concentration and the demands for high-quality auditors turns negative, implying that family-controlled firms tend to sustain opaqueness gains by hiring lower quality auditors.

Previous empirical studies examining the influence of ownership concentration and family control on auditor choice are relatively limited in the literature and are heavily focussed on developed economies. In addition, the present study is one of the first to investigate the association between family control and auditor choice in the context of a developing economy.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of family control on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual report of Indonesian listed firms. Further, it seeks to investigate the role of corporate governance mechanisms in explaining the association between family control and voluntary disclosure. Governance mechanisms addressed here include board independence and institutional ownership.

This study employs a sample comprising non-financial firms on the Indonesia stock exchange that published the 2010 annual report. The voluntary disclosure index is computed for each sample firm, based on content analysis of the annual report. Cross-sectional regressions are performed to test research hypotheses.

Our evidence reveals that family control negatively and significantly influences the extent of information disclosure. This finding suggests that family-controlled firms have lower motivation to disclose additional voluntary information, which might unexpectedly expose private benefits maintained by the controlling family. We also find that the relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure is stronger in family firms. However, independent commissioners do not contribute to improving the extent of disclosure by family firms.

The present study contributes to the rare existing literature addressing the relation of family control to information disclosure. Further, the role of corporate governance mechanisms in promoting greater information transparency in family-controlled firms is still very rarely examined.

This study aims to determine the effect of bank ownership on the credit risk of Indonesian Islamic local banks (ILBs).

This study uses the system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique with a sample of 155 Islamic local banks in Indonesia from 2012 to 2019.

The results show that commissioner board (D.COW) ownership has a negative effect on credit risk. This indicates that an increase in the number of shares of Islamic local banks owned by the commissioner board reduces credit risk. On the other hand, government ownership (D.GOW), the Sharia supervisory board (D.SOW) and the director board (D.DOW) do not affect credit risk.

The government, Sharia supervisory board and director board need opportunities to easily own more Islamic local bank shares. Therefore, the provisions regarding the share ownership rights of the government, Sharia supervisory board and director board need to be improved to increase their role in reducing credit risk.

Previous researchers have not studied the effect of government ownership, the commissioner board, the Sharia supervisory board and the ownership of directors on credit risk at the ILB in Indonesia.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of managerial ability on informative earnings management (hereafter IEM) and to examine the moderating role of the chief executive officer and board of commissioner relationship (hereafter CEO-commissioner relationship) and board independence between managerial ability and IEM.

Sample consists of 864 firm-years listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Informative earnings management is measured by the relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings growth. Managerial ability is measured by data envelopment analysis. This research uses firm-effect logistic regression to perform the data analysis.

Based on firm-effect logistic regression, managerial ability increases IEM. It confirms the managers’ stewardship behavior where managers tend to engage in IEM and provide higher quality information for shareholders. The result also shows that the absence of a CEO-commissioner relationship and higher board independence leads higher ability managers to engage more in IEM. It confirms the role of corporate governance to reduce managers-shareholders conflict (in the context of agency theory) or to facilitate higher ability managers to act as both controlling and minority shareholders’ stewards (in the context of stewardship theory) by engaging more in IEM and providing higher-quality information.

This research contributes to filling the previous studies gap that provides conflicting results on managerial ability and earnings management by considering earnings management motivations, CEO-commissioner relationship and board independence. This research also contributes to providing new evidence of managerial ability, IEM, CEO-commissioner relationship and board independence, especially in Indonesia.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of stakeholder pressure and corporate governance on the quality of sustainability report. This study uses environment, employee, consumer and shareholder as stakeholders, while board of commissioner effectiveness and family ownership are used as corporate governance components.

This research uses multiple regression method with total observations of 123 sustainability reports of listed firms on Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2010-2014.

The result shows that companies which get pressure from environment and consumer have higher quality of sustainability report than other firms. Pressure from employee positively affects the quality of sustainability report. Meanwhile, pressure from shareholders has no effect on the quality of sustainability report. Board of commissioner effectiveness positively affects the quality of sustainability report, and family ownership has no effect on the quality of sustainability report.

This research reveals how various types of stakeholders and corporate governance in Indonesia react to corporate social responsibility and thus influence the quality of sustainability report, which has not been discussed by previous studies.

This chapter focuses on testing optimal capital structure theory: The role of intervening variable debt to equity ratio (DER) on the influence of the financial performance, Ownership Structure of Independent Board of Commissioners (IBCO), Audit Committee (ACO), and Institutional Ownership on Firm Value. The research design was explanatory research using path analysis. Using purposive sampling, 61 manufacturing companies, observation period from 2014 to 2018 with 286 N samples. The research novelty empirically can prove the role of intervening variable DER on the effect of return on assets (ROA) on firm value and shows the market response to the ROA is fully reflected by DER, indicating the existence of an optimal capital structure. The role of DER on the effect of ROE and IBCO on firm value is a partial mediation with the inverse direction. This phenomenon shows that the mechanism of forming a balance between the responses of investors and creditors relates to debt financing.