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Independent audit oversight is a prerequisite for restoring public confidence in financial reporting and auditing after the past accounting scandals and the financial crisis. By analysing and comparing the independence of the audit oversight boards of 27 European Member States and the USA, this study aims to provide insights into the question of how independent “independent” audit oversight boards are.

Independence is measured in terms of the organisational compositions and regulatory competences of the audit oversight authorities. The data were collected through an e-mail questionnaire that was sent to all European oversight authorities, and by analysing legal provisions of various regulators. The results are analysed and visualised by a Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Coordinates, which allows conclusions about the similarities of various systems and their relative levels of independence. Both measurements are then equally combined into one value of material independence, which is used to rank the oversight authorities.

Although all countries encounter similar pressures to establish profession-independent oversight systems, this study identifies how differently “independence” has been translated in regulatory outcomes. While all countries claim to possess formal independent oversight bodies, there is a visible gap between countries with comparatively strong independent oversight authorities and systems in which accounting bodies still maintain far-reaching regulatory influence. At the same time, the results question the role of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as the globally perceived benchmark of an entirely independent regulator.

This study focuses on formal independence rather than de-facto independence. Future research has, therefore, to address how these formal arrangements have evolved in regulatory practice.

Policy makers around the world perceive independent oversight as one of the essential elements of regulatory reforms aiming at restoring public confidence in the aftermath of past accounting scandals. This study enables the comparison and benchmarking of national specific regulatory designs with other forms of independent oversight.

Although the role of independent regulation is a recurring theme in accounting research, a systematic and encompassing comparison of the intertwining of audit oversight authorities and the accounting profession has not yet been provided. This study takes a first step towards providing a quantifiable measure of the formal independence of audit oversight authorities by mobilizing concepts, methods and prior findings from the field of public policy research.

The purpose of this paper is to extend research on contemporary forms of oversight surrounding professional work in an era characterized by increased skepticism regarding professional claims and the rise of independent regulatory authorities. The authors investigate the interplay between key actors as well as the shifting role boundaries in a distinct regulatory space, following the introduction of a new public oversight framework.

The analysis draws on the notions of regulatory space and boundary work to better understand the development of independent audit oversight in France. The authors adopted an interpretive approach to conduct a longitudinal case study based on 33 interviews and documentary data produced from 2003 to 2012.

The study provides a narrative of the boundary work carried out by the French audit profession as it tried to reinvent its role in the new regulatory order. In the case, boundary work engendered a hybrid regulatory pattern, named “co-regulation,” reflecting both the logic of independent regulation and the logic of self-regulation. The main consequence of this is that zones of mutual involvement were constructed – thereby suggesting that to become a reality, independent oversight of professional work needs to accept some operational dependence from professionals.

The study illustrates the elusiveness of boundaries surrounding actors’ role within contemporary forms of professional regulation. More generally, hybrid development suggests that professions are proactive and, to some extent, successful when it comes to developing alliances and manipulating changes within their regulatory space.

This paper analyses the establishment and evolution of a public oversight body (POB) – the Egyptian Audit Oversight Unit (AOU) – and its implications for local auditing firms and practices.

Primary data were gathered from 34 semi-structured interviews (including follow-up ones) between 2014 and 2020. Secondary data was obtained through publicly available documents and internal memos. Drawing on Debord's (1967) Society of the Spectacle, the insights focus on the POB's conception, materialisation and evolution in a context characterised by weak regulatory structures.

Through a series of acts, the findings reveal how the AOU first accepted the image of “international best practice” oversight (the “metaphorical”), followed by the construction of the local structure and décor replicating a United States (US) style POB archetype (the “transformational”) by primarily relying on visible processes/procedures. Yet, these mechanisms emphasised the spectacular nature of oversight, with little improvement for practice and limiting itself to “cracking down” on smaller local firms. A final stage (the “performative”) reveals how the AOU seeks to expand its activities beyond its original mandate without challenging the image-driven nature of its oversight.

The paper offers two key contributions. First, it reveals how actors, through a combination of symbolic and tangible measures, create a new performative reality of public oversight. Second, it advocates Debord's “spectacle” to complement other theoretical lenses, with a view to illuminating the materialisation stages that bridge the gap between proclaimed oversight policies and actual practices (including conscious and unconscious omissions) within a given political economy context.

This study aims to investigate the factors that enhance the credibility of and confidence in audit value.

Data were collected from 254 institutional investors through a questionnaire survey and were analyzed using partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM).

The findings reveal that the two influential predictors of enhanced credibility and confidence are perceived auditor independence and improved auditor communication. Factors related to auditor–client affiliation, such as restrictions on providing non-audit services, mandatory auditor rotation and the presence of effective audit committees, are identified as creating the perceived independence. Improved auditor communication is linked with improving the audit report and ensuring audit education, thus creating more sophisticated users who better understand the scope and purpose of an audit. Furthermore, independent audit oversight acts as a moderator in the relationship between perceived auditor independence, improved auditor communication and enhanced credibility. Enhanced credibility can lead to greater confidence in audit value.

In the wake of the global financial crisis and loss of confidence in the role of auditors, this study investigates the factors that can enhance the credibility of and confidence in audit value, especially in a non-Anglo-American setting. This study is unique in terms of methodological development, as it uses a higher-order Type II reflective–formative model using PLS-SEM.

This study aims to provide a better understanding of the role of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), as the unified regulator of the audit profession in the UK, in restoring public trust in audit profession in the UK. It further analyses the views of partners in the Big 4 audit firms on this role.

The research data were gathered by conducting 17 semi-structured interviews with the top management of FRC’s members and executive partners of the Big 4 firms in the UK. The interviews were complemented by analysing data available on the web pages of the Big 4 firms and published reports related to the FRC’s projects.

This study identified three main strategies followed by the FRC to promote the trust and enhance the choice of auditors in the UK audit market. These strategies are improving the audit quality, increasing the transparency of the big audit firms and reducing the barriers to compete in the big audit market.

An analysis of the FRC’s efforts may help auditors to identify what they are expected to do to improve the reliability of information provided in the capital market. Audit committees can get a better understanding of the criteria that they need to improve the process of auditors’ choice. Auditors will also better understand how and why current audit regulations have been issued. This may improve their satisfaction with regulations and standards, and their efficient implementation. Furthermore, it is believed that audit regulators need to get feedback additional to the formal feedback they receive to improve their performance and current regulations.

This paper contributes to the literature by discussing the auditors’ criticism to the Audit Inspection Unit’s inspectors and the way the inspectors defend themselves. The findings suggest that partners of the Big 4 believe that the FRC’s projects effectively participate in improving the audit quality, as well as providing wider information about the audit firms to the public. However, different actions need to be taken to enhance the choice of auditors and increase the number of big audit firms that compete in the market.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the transparency reports published by the Big-4 public accounting firms in the UK, Germany and Denmark to understand the determinants of their content within the networks of big accounting firms.

The study draws on a qualitative research approach, in which the content of transparency reports is analyzed and semi-structured interviews are conducted with key people from the Big-4 firms who are responsible for developing the transparency reports.

The findings show that the content of transparency reports is inconsistent and the transparency reporting practice is not uniform within the Big-4 networks. Differences were found in the way in which the transparency reporting practices are coordinated globally by the respective central governing bodies of the Big-4. The content of the transparency reports is particularly influenced by the national institutional environment in which the Big-4 member firms operate, thus leading them to introduce practice variation and resulting in cross-national differences.

The study results have important implications for standard setters, regulators and practitioners, as the research provides insights into the variation taking place within the common regulatory frame.

This is the first study to analyze how transparency reporting practices are developed within the networks of Big-4 firms, thereby influencing the content of transparency reports.

The purpose of this study is to examine the cost of the introduction of independent audit inspections in New Zealand.

The research is conducted using audit fee data from New Zealand and examines the overall impact of the reforms on the cost imposed on auditees.

The findings show that there was no general increase in audit fees but a significant increase in audit fees for small listed companies compared to audit fees for unlisted companies and large listed companies.

The practical implications of this study suggest that the introduction of independent inspections led to increased costs for some clients, particularly smaller listed companies, and that audit firms were able to pass on these costs to their clients. These results have important implications for policymakers and auditors alike.

This study provides new insights into the cost of the introduction of independent audit inspections, which have been the subject of ongoing criticisms and recommendations for improvement.

The authors examine how political players attempt to rationalise arguments for and against the expansion of auditing into governmental affairs, and how state audit authorities respond to politically motivated boundary work. This study is motivated by growing evidence of political involvement in attempts to both expand and undermine state audit oversight of government affairs.

The authors present an interpreted history (covering relevant events from 1995 to 2016) of political rationales and associated boundary work that led to the expansion of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario's (OAGO) mandate to audit government advertising campaigns for partisanship as well as attempts to modify this new audit remit over time.

The authors reveal substantive, formal and practical ways in which political players sought to rationalise/counter-rationalise expanding the OAGO's authority to the unfamiliar territory of advertising probity. The authors show how such justification claims ebb and flow in accordance with changeable political interests, and how state auditors react to the fraught nature of politically motivated boundary work.

The authors conceptualise important forms of rationalising rhetoric (which cannot be reduced to expressions of neoliberal government) that can be mobilised to deem state auditor authority legitimate in overseeing otherwise novel, unfamiliar and controversial government affairs. The authors also reveal a hitherto unrecognised resolve in state auditor responses to political intervention and shed further light on generalised forms of rationale that can underpin boundary work at the margins of accounting.

Although a number of studies suggest that big audit firms provide higher audit quality in strict legal environments, empirical evidence remains inconclusive. As little is known about the effect of auditor type on audit quality in less strictly legal environments, this study aims to investigate the impact of auditor type on audit quality in the Egyptian market.

Data of Egyptian-listed companies during the period 2011–2018 are used. To examine the impact of auditor type on audit quality, ordinary least square regression and robust standard errors clustered at year and industry level are used. This study uses discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality. Several additional analyzes are conducted to assess the robustness of the main results, including alternative measures of audit quality and auditor type.

The results show that audit firms tend to provide higher audit quality when they are affiliated with a foreign audit firm. However, Big 4 auditors do not provide higher audit quality compare to their counterparts. Additionally, the governmental agency, accountability state authority, that monopolize audit function in state-owned companies do not appear to be associated with higher audit quality. Finally, local audit firms have a negative association with audit quality. This may be their strategy to secure future clients that seek low-quality audits.

This study suggests that affiliation with foreign audit firms will help the Egyptian firms to develop their abilities by using advanced technology and techniques and transfer rare expertize to the Egyptian auditors. This study also shows that the strategy adopted by many Egyptian audit firms to affiliate with foreign auditors reflects the desire of these firms to be included in one tier alongside Big 4 audit firms to increase their market share under a claim of providing a higher audit quality.

This study adds to the rare but growing body of literature by investigating how auditor type affects audit quality in the context of less strictly legal environments. The results are important, as investors, standards-setters and regulators have growing concerns over audit quality since the Enron scandal. The findings suggest that audit quality depends on auditor type. These findings have important implications for investors, standards-setters and auditors interested in auditor oversight, audit quality and auditor choice.