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This paper presents a model and evidence regarding the incidence of independent contractors and the self-employed. It focuses on the rights to control the work routine as an important issue distinguishing employee and non-employee workers. The conditions under which it is optimal for the buyer of labor services to control the work routine (and use employees) and when is it desirable for the seller to have control are considered. The model emphasizes the costs of measuring worker output vs. monitoring worker effort, worker expertise, and worker investment and is tested with Current Population Survey data merged with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The empirical findings are broadly consistent with the approach. Independent contractors tend to be in jobs that are harder to monitor and having more worker expertise such as jobs involving more intellectual skills, having a greater variety of duties, and requiring more worker expertise and training. This is even more true of the other self-employed. We also review existing empirical research on self-employment, discussing how it fits into our baseline model and evaluating the arguments to explain independent contractors and self-employment. These include a desire to reduce fringe benefits, demand and staffing uncertainty, wanting to avoid lawsuits for wrongful termination, a desire to protect a reputation for not laying-off employees, credit constraints, and worker desire for flexibility. There is strong evidence that credit constraints have a substantial influence on self-employment status and likewise for worker desire for job flexibility. The literature suggests that the desire to avoid payment of fringe benefits, demand and staffing variability, and avoidance of potential wrongful dismissal lawsuits induces firms to use more temporary agency workers but does not seem to affect the use of independent contractors.

Although firm growth through the acquisition of independent players is at a record high, market reports reveal a parallel increase in independent firms that enjoy noticeable consumer support across industries and threaten MNC-owned brands in several countries. Despite this evident contrast, no research has investigated how independent firms stack up against their non-independent counterparts from a consumer perspective. This study examines this standoff and proposes that independent firms outperform their non-independent contenders in fostering perceptions of product craftmanship and warmth in specific product categories and cultures.

Three experimental studies were conducted across five countries (Study 1: N = 360; USA and China – Study 2: N = 487; UK and India – Study 3: N = 323; Italy). Data were analysed using experimental techniques (Analysis of Variance) and conditional process analyses (Moderated Mediation) using PROCESS.

The findings suggest that (1) firm independence fosters perceptions of product craftmanship and warmth in individualistic cultures, (2) consumers view products sold by independent firms as warmer and more authentic than products sold by non-independent firms in hedonic but not in utilitarian product categories, (3) the positive effects of firm independence on product craftmanship and warmth are neutralized for vertically collectivist cultures (India) and reversed in horizontally collectivist cultures (China), (4) loss of firm independence leads to higher drops in perceived craftmanship and product preference when it is caused by a takeover from a foreign multinational (compared to a domestic corporation).

This research provides a first account of how perceptions of firm independence drive assessments of product craftmanship and authenticity, elicit feelings of warmth and build product preference. The findings inform decisions of multinational corporations regarding (1) how to communicate the acquisition of independent firms in local markets, (2) how to balance an international brand portfolio in culturally diverging markets and different product industries, (3) how to optimize brand architecture through the relative exposure of the corporate brand image vis-à-vis the image of standalone brands owned by the corporation and (4) offer smaller independent players an alternative positioning strategy to differentiate from global competitors enjoying the resources or support of bigger corporations.

In this study, we examine how ownership structure affects the use of independent directors in Vietnam – an emerging stock market.

We develop logit and tobit regression models to investigate the effects of ownership structure on the propensity to use independent directors and the number of independent directors on the board, respectively. Insider ownership and the use of independent directors are proposed to have a non-linear relationship.

With a sample of 1,318 observations collected from 192 listed firms over the period from 2008 to 2017, we find that insider ownership and independent director appointment have a U-shaped relationship. It is positive when insiders hold a small proportion of shares, and turns out to be negative when insiders hold a large percentage of shares. In addition, both state ownership and foreign ownership are negatively related to firm decisions of appointing independent directors.

Our findings imply that minority shareholders should have appropriate actions to reduce agency costs and protect their own interests. In addition, policymakers should improve the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation to increase the presence of independent directors in order to protect minority shareholders. Moreover, government agencies also need to increase the number of independent directors in state-controlled firms as a means to improve their corporate governance. Foreign investors may be a substitute for independent directors; therefore, firms without independent directors are able to improve their corporate governance by attracting foreign investors.

While the extant literature shows that independent directors can help firms decrease agency costs of equity in financial decisions and performance, there are relatively few studies investigating corporate decisions to use independent directors. This paper contributes to the literature of corporate governance mechanisms through independent directors in emerging markets.

The confidence in the qualifications and independence of the audit activities and professionals has been lost due to the financial scandals that have arisen over time. These scandals in the accounting and auditing fields caused both enterprises and investors to suffer from large amounts of losses and thus the need for reliable financial statements and corporate governance increased.

Both investors and decision-makers need independent assurance to achieve transparent, reliable, and impartial financial information. The fulfillment of this requirement is possible through independent auditing activity and independent audit firms. Business management shall carry out the selection of independent auditors based on various criteria (fee, reputation, audit team, relations, etc.). In addition, it may also be necessary to periodically change an independent audit firm due to rotation or other reasons (fee, disputes, relationships, etc.).

In this study, a ranking of the importance level of the evaluation criteria, for the selection and change of the independent audit firm in an enterprise in Borsa İstanbul (BIST) 100 in Turkey, was conducted. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which is one of the multicriteria decision-making techniques, was used for ranking. In the hierarchy established for the selection of the independent audit firm, the main criteria of the “audit fee” and the “reputation and qualifications of the audit firm” have been established. According to the findings obtained as a result of binary comparisons, the first four ranks among sub-criteria are “provision of international service,” “quality of technical expertise of audit firm,” “industry expertise of audit firm,” and “suitability of fee offered by audit firm.”

For the change of audit firm, four main criteria “audit fee,” “disputes arising during the audit process,” “relations with the audit firm,” and “rotation” are taken into consideration. For sub-criteria, first four criteria were “rotation of independent audit firm,” “rotation of independent auditor,” “audit firm’s inability to adequately practice proactive audit approaches,” and “inadequate communication.”

This study aims to examine the ability of independent directors to discipline related-party transactions (RPTs) among listed companies in Malaysia. Firms typically appoint independent directors individually, not as a group. However, board members are commonly viewed collectively as a group, and evidence of the abilities of individual directors is scarce.

The attributes of individual independent directors include accounting literacy, length of service, audit committee membership and active participation in board and audit committee meetings. The unit of analysis is the individual independent director. The final sample consists of 1,552 observations in 2017, and RPTs are categorized as either efficient or conflicting.

The study finds that the tenure of individual independent directors and active participation in board meetings affect the firm’s engagement in RPTs. However, the financial literacy, audit committee membership and attendance of independent directors at audit committee meetings do not affect the firm’s engagement in RPTs, either efficient or conflicting. Overall, this result offers limited support for the upper-echelon theory concerning the attributes of individual independent directors and RPTs.

This study uses cross-sectional observations for 2017, which predates the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, this study ignores the impact of restrictions in community mobility during the pandemic on the independent director’s ability to monitor the corporation. This circumstance may have implications for practice and merit further research.

The findings provide information for board nominating committees, regulators and policymakers that the capability of individual independent directors to fulfill their responsibilities is limited. The firm’s nominating committee must be very selective in nominating and appointing independent directors with appropriate competencies. Investors should choose companies that have reappointed the same independent directors for an extended period, as they may benefit from the experience in protecting investors’ interests.

This paper contributes novel evidence to upper-echelon theory literature on the association between independent directors and RPT types from the perspective of individual independent directors.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how and why disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) information was influenced by independent directors in Japan and the USA.

The author used a pooled cross-sectional data set of 498 Fortune Japanese and American firms between 2006 and 2011 and fixed effects estimation method. The author analysed the results by employing a comparative approach between the two national contexts.

This study found that independent directors in Japanese firms had a significant positive effect on CSR disclosure whilst no evidence was found in the US firms, although the proportion of independent directors on American boards traditionally and largely outnumbers that of the Japanese counterparts.

The study results offer an insight that independent directors could be evaluated in terms of effectiveness and efficiency in CSR disclosure. The findings support the stakeholder theory in Japanese globalised companies while challenging the theory in the US context, thereby calling for further research into the stakeholder engagement models, particularly in the USA.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether independent directors reduce corporate overinvestment and improve investment efficiency in an emerging market.

First, the author developed a research model in which corporate investment is a function of Tobin’s Q, the proportion of independent directors in the board and an interaction between them. Second, the author divided the full sample into groups of firms with a low- and high-financial constraint to compare the effects of independent directors between financially unconstrained and constrained firms.

With a full sample of 1,281 observations collected from 193 firms listed in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange during the period from 2009 to 2017, the author find that the proportion of independent directors is negatively related to firm investment but its interactive term with Tobin’s Q is positively related to corporate investment. These findings imply that independent directors can help firms reduce overinvestment and improve investment efficiency. Moreover, the research findings indicate that these effects of independent directors are stronger for financially constrained firms.

The extant literature shows that independent directors are an effective mechanism to reduce agency problems in firm decisions and operating performance. However, there has been no research on the role of independent directors in corporate investment policy.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between independent director military service and monitoring effectiveness, focusing on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation.

The authors identify independent directors with military experience using BoardEx data. The authors focus on the level of CEO compensation. The methods used include panel data estimation, propensity score matching analysis and instrumental variable analysis.

The authors find more powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint independent directors with past military service to the board. Boards with a larger proportion of independent directors with military experience tend to award higher levels of CEO compensation. Moreover, the positive relationship between independent directors with military experience and executive compensation is stronger when the CEO is more powerful.

This paper examines a relatively unexplored director background, directors with military experience, and finds this type of independent director is associated with weak monitoring. The authors contribute to the literature examining the effect of executive and board member military experience on corporations. The authors identify weak monitoring of powerful CEOs as a potential weakness of directors with military experience. This drawback should be considered before appointing a director with military experience to the board.

This study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.

This research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.

While directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.

This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.

This paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.

The results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

To explore the importance of the board of director nomination process (that is, who nominates a given director for a position on the firm’s board) for the voting outcomes, disciplining of management, and overall monitoring quality of the board of directors.

We exploit a recent regulation passed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requiring disclosure of the board nomination process. In particular, we focus on firms’ use of executive search firms versus allowing internal members (often simply the CEO) to nominate new directors to serve on the board of directors.

We show that companies that use search firms to find board members pay their CEOs significantly higher salaries and significantly higher total compensations. Further, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly less likely to fire their CEOs following negative performance. In addition, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and see abnormally low returns from this M&A activity. We instrument the endogenous choice of using an executive search through the varying geographic distance of companies to executive search firms. Using this instrumental variable framework, we show search firm-identified independent directors’ negative impact on firm performance, consistent with firm behavior and governance consequences we document.

Given the recent law passage, we are the first to directly analyze the nomination process, and show a surprisingly large predictive effect of seemingly arm’s-length nominations. This has clear implications for thinking carefully through how independence is defined in the director nomination process.