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1 – 10 of over 2000Fadi Shehab Shiyyab, Abdallah Bader Alzoubi and Leena Abdelsalam Almajaly
Corporate governance research suggests that board structure can impact organizational outcomes such as financial performance and executive remuneration. Agency theory posits that…
Abstract
Corporate governance research suggests that board structure can impact organizational outcomes such as financial performance and executive remuneration. Agency theory posits that a board composed of independent directors and chaired by an independent chairperson can provide effective control over agency costs, while stewardship theory suggests that effective decision-making is facilitated when the board is chaired by the CEO and majority of directors are from the executive team. Empirical research into the association between board structure and performance in Jordan has provided mixed results, with no consensus supporting either theory. This study takes a different approach to researching the assumed association between board structure and performance by surveying directors’ perspectives on such assumed relationship between financial performance and four of boards’ characteristics (i.e., board independence, CEO duality, board size, and female ratio on board). Findings of this research indicate that Jordanian directors perceive a medium to strong association between financial performance and each of board independence, independent chair of board, and female ratio on board. However, directors of Jordanian boards perceive no association between financial performance and board size.
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Agency theorists diagnosed the economic malaise of the 1970s as the result of executive obsession with corporate stability over profitability. Management swallowed many of the…
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Agency theorists diagnosed the economic malaise of the 1970s as the result of executive obsession with corporate stability over profitability. Management swallowed many of the pills agency theorists prescribed to increase entrepreneurialism and risk-taking; stock options, dediversification, debt financing, and outsider board members. Management did not swallow the pills prescribed to moderate risk: executive equity holding and independent boards. Thus, in practice, the remedy heightened corporate risk-taking without imposing constraints. Both recessions of the new millennium can be traced directly to these changes in strategy. To date, regulators have proposed nothing to undo the perverse incentives of the new “shareholder value” system.
Teerooven Soobaroyen and Jyoti Devi Mahadeo
Purpose of this paper – This study investigates compliance with the corporate governance code in an African developing economy (Mauritius).Methodology/approach – We examine the…
Abstract
Purpose of this paper – This study investigates compliance with the corporate governance code in an African developing economy (Mauritius).
Methodology/approach – We examine the annual reports of 41 listed companies to assess the extent of compliance with the code and to analyze the wording of compliance statements. We also carry out in-depth semi-structured interviews with selected company directors to understand the reasons for compliance (or non-compliance).
Findings – Initial findings indicate a reasonable level of compliance with the more visible requirements of the code but noteworthy non-compliance also emerges, particularly in relation to the low number of company boards being chaired by independent directors, to uncertainties on the actual operation of board committees, and to the widespread non-disclosure of directors’ remuneration. Furthermore, compliance statements were found to be vague, ambiguous, or even inconsistent with the extent of compliance disclosed in the reports. We believe these are indications that many of the companies are adhering selectively with the code to project an image of symbolic compliance. Our in-depth follow-up interviews with directors largely confirm this behaviour of selective compliance.
Research implications – We suggest that the pursuit of legitimacy as an operational resource – rather than efficiency-led rationales – emerges as a potential theoretical explanation for the adoption of the corporate governance code in Mauritius.
Originality /value of paper – We bring evidence on how the corporate governance code is being understood and rationalized in a developing economy. We rely on a combination of annual report disclosures, compliance statements, and interview data to investigate corporate governance compliance.
Michael Macaulay, Gary Hickey and Norjahan Begum
This chapter looks at the development of the concepts of ethical governance within the English local government structure. It examines this development by reference both to the…
Abstract
Purpose
This chapter looks at the development of the concepts of ethical governance within the English local government structure. It examines this development by reference both to the current crisis in funding and service provision, and also to the development of standards for good governance and integrity.
Design
The chapter draws upon a national survey that was conducted by the authors in 2012.
Findings
The chapter suggests that while there may have been a wish to create more opportunities for devolved decision-making in English local government through changes in legislation, those policy-makers surveyed thought that the structures and processes of decision-making might be weakened.
Implications
The chapter indicates not just the need for further studies but also a more holistic exploration of the relationships between the ideas of ‘good governance’ and whose different interests are met through such changes.
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David A. Holloway and Dianne van Rhyn
Spectacular corporate failures including One Tel, Ansett, HIH, Enron and Worldcom and the recent fiasco with National Australia Bank are evidence of a legitimacy crisis in current…
Abstract
Spectacular corporate failures including One Tel, Ansett, HIH, Enron and Worldcom and the recent fiasco with National Australia Bank are evidence of a legitimacy crisis in current corporate governance practices. This paper analyses the organisational impact of recent “best practice” guidelines and the recommendations for reform. We conclude that substantive concerns still exist and it is likely that companies will utilise a “tick the box” approach emphasising form over substance governance changes. We argue for a two-fold approach to embed effective ongoing reform. The first involves cultural change(s) at the boardroom level to develop a “real” team approach. This would embrace the use of constructive conflict in the decision-making process and also incorporate elements of trust and openness. Constructive conflict, we argue, leads to real and effective boardroom behavioural changes.
The second strand of reform proposes that such changes should be extended into the internal decision-making (enterprise governance) arena. Such a move towards organisational pluralism devolves decision-making and allows greater employee involvement in the “running” of organisations. It also entails a significant re-framing of organisational values, culture and followership. The leadership role becomes one of facilitation and support not the current dominant “command and control” mindset.
This chapter considers how far political devolution has enabled the government in Wales to develop a distinctive approach to student funding. It examines in particular claims that…
Abstract
This chapter considers how far political devolution has enabled the government in Wales to develop a distinctive approach to student funding. It examines in particular claims that policy choices in Wales on student funding reflect a commitment to ‘progressive universalism’, a term sometimes used by policy-makers in Wales and elsewhere to describe combining means-tested and non-means-tested benefits. The chapter also explores the growing use of income-contingent loans, arguing that such loans complicate debates about targeting and universalism.
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This chapter examines one of the most contested issues in Public Administration, namely political–administrative relationships. The first part of the chapter begins with a brief…
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This chapter examines one of the most contested issues in Public Administration, namely political–administrative relationships. The first part of the chapter begins with a brief overview of the features of an ideal-type bureaucracy. Next is a literature review of political–administrative relationships. This is followed by an analysis of typologies of political–administrative relationships, with particular reference to developing countries. The second part of the chapter analyses the evolution of political–administrative relationships since the dawn of South African democracy in 1994. It examines the growing politicisation of the public service, the weakening of the powers of public officials vis-a-vis Ministers and the emasculation of the PSC. Data indicate that the government is unable to fill posts at the Senior Management Service (SMS) level and that there are a high number of acting HoDs, an indicator of instability. Finally, it uses Dasandi and Esteve’s typology of political–administrative relationships in developing countries to interpret the South African case.
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True to form, it is no surprise that ‘public interest entity’ (which, by EC requirement, must include all listed companies but other entities only at the discretion of individual…
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True to form, it is no surprise that ‘public interest entity’ (which, by EC requirement, must include all listed companies but other entities only at the discretion of individual member states) has been defined in the United Kingdom in the minimal permissible way – it excludes large privately held companies, mutuals, large professional partnerships and so on – about all of which the public has a real interest – as the current financial crisis has clearly shown. Think, for instance, of the need to widen choice in the audit market.