Search results

Protection motivation theory (PMT) explains that the intention to cope with information security risks is based on informed threat and coping appraisals. However, people cannot always make appropriate assessments due to possible ignorance and cognitive biases. This study proposes a research model that introduces four antecedent factors from ignorance and bias perspectives into the PMT model and empirically tests this model with data from a survey of electronic waste (e-waste) handling.

The data collected from 356 Chinese samples are analyzed via structural equation modeling (SEM).

The results revealed that for threat appraisal, optimistic bias leads to a lower perception of risks. However, factual ignorance (lack of knowledge of risks) does not significantly affect the perceived threat. For coping appraisal, practical ignorance (lack of knowledge of coping with risks) leads to low response efficacy and self-efficacy and high perceptions of coping cost, but the illusion of control overestimates response efficacy and self-efficacy.

First, this study addresses a new type of information security problem in e-waste handling. Second, this study extends the PMT model by exploring the roles of ignorance and bias as antecedents. Finally, the authors reinvestigate the basic constructs of PMT to identify how rational threat and coping assessments affect user intentions to cope with data security risks.

The authors explore the under-researched area of post-decision evaluation in PPPs (public–private partnerships), focusing upon how and whether Post-decision Project Evaluation (PdPE) is considered and provided for in United Kingdom (UK) public infrastructure projects.

The authors’ research design sought insights from overviewing UK PPP planning and more focused exploration of PPP operational practice. The authors combine the extensive analysis of planning documents for operational UK PPP projects with interviews of different stakeholders in PPP projects in one city. Mobilising an open critical perspective, documents were analysed using ethnographic content analysis (ECA) and interviews were analysed using thematic analysis consistent therewith. The authors theorise the absence and ambiguities of PdPE drawing on the sociology of ignorance.

The authors find a long-standing absence and lack of PdPE in PPP projects throughout planning and operational practice, reflecting a dynamic, multi-faceted ignorance. Concerning planning practice, the authors’ documentary analysis evidences a trend in PdPE from its absence in the early years (which may indicate some natural or genuine ignorance) to different levels or forms of weak inclusion later. Regarding this inclusion, the authors find strategic ignorance played a substantive role, involving “deliberate engineering” by both public sector and private partners. Interview findings indicate lack of clarity over PdPE and its under-development in PPP practice, deficiencies again suggestive of natural and strategic ignorance.

The authors draw from the sociology of ignorance vis-à-vis accounting's absence and ambiguity in the context of PPP, contributing to an under-researched area.

The paper provides a detailed historical account of Douglass C. North's early intellectual contributions and analytical developments in pursuing a Grand Theory for why some countries are rich and others poor.

The author approaches the discussion using a theoretical and historical reconstruction based on published and unpublished materials.

The systematic, continuous and profound attempt to answer the Smithian social coordination problem shaped North's journey from being a young serious Marxist to becoming one of the founders of New Institutional Economics. In the process, he was converted in the early 1950s into a rigid neoclassical economist, being one of the leaders in promoting New Economic History. The success of the cliometric revolution exposed the frailties of the movement itself, namely, the limitations of neoclassical economic theory to explain economic growth and social change. Incorporating transaction costs, the institutional framework in which property rights and contracts are measured, defined and enforced assumes a prominent role in explaining economic performance.

In the early 1970s, North adopted a naive theory of institutions and property rights still grounded in neoclassical assumptions. Institutional and organizational analysis is modeled as a social maximizing efficient equilibrium outcome. However, the increasing tension between the neoclassical theoretical apparatus and its failure to account for contrasting political and institutional structures, diverging economic paths and social change propelled the modification of its assumptions and progressive conceptual innovation. In the later 1970s and early 1980s, North abandoned the efficiency view and gradually became more critical of the objective rationality postulate. In this intellectual movement, North's avant-garde research program contributed significantly to the creation of New Institutional Economics.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on how multinational company (MNC) headquarters (HQs) can manage the existing coopetition paradox to ensure innovation within the MNC. In contrast to the rather scarce previous research, the authors argue that HQ needs to solve the coopetition paradox under the sway of a parenting paradox. Hence, HQ faces a dual paradox.

Drawing on the literature on HQ’s role during MNCs’ innovation processes, this conceptual paper revisits the previously suggested HQ measures to enable coopetition among subsidiaries. By applying a sheer ignorance perspective, the authors contribute with a more nuanced understanding of the HQ’s role in innovation activities.

The article identifies four challenges as the HQ faces a parenting paradox that hinders its ability to solve the coopetition paradox: context specificity of subsidiaries’ innovation work, normative expectations of subsidiary managers, potential opportunistic behavior of HQ manager and HQ underestimation of needed resources. The article suggests that HQ needs to become more informed and preferably even embedded in the local innovation networks of its most important subsidiaries and that coopetition should not be managed solely on an HQ level.

Advocating a sheer ignorance perspective, the article pioneers in discussing the role that HQ plays in managing coopetition among subsidiaries in innovation activities.

This study examines the effect of stable institutional investors on firms' product quality failures. Furthermore, the authors investigate the channels through which institutional ownership stability enhances product quality management.

This study uses probit, ordered probit and negative binomial regression frameworks to investigate the research questions. In addition, the authors utilize the three-stage least-squares to address the endogeneity issues.

Using a sample of product recall incidents from 2012 to 2021, the authors find that firms with more stable institutional ownership have a lower probability, frequency and severity of recall incidents and adopt a proactive product recall strategy. Institutional investors with significant and persistent holdings improve quality management by reducing overinvestment and the use of option-linked and relative performance executive compensations. Furthermore, the influence of stable institutional owners on product quality failures is more pronounced in firms with low managerial ability and specialist CEOs. Lastly, the empirical evidence demonstrates that stable holdings by active investors have a more substantial impact on reducing product recalls than passive and other stable institutional holdings.

This study is the first to examine the impact of institutional ownership stability on firms' product recalls. The authors contribute to the literature on the benefits of stable institutional ownership on firm outcomes and the determinants of product quality failures.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical historical analysis of the business (mis)behaviors and influencing factors that discourage enduring cooperation between principals and agents, to introduce strategies that embrace the social values, economic motivation and institutional designs historically adopted to curtail dishonest acts in international business and to inform an improved principal–agent theory that reflects principal–agent reciprocity as shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, strategic and ideological forces

The critical historical research method is used to analyze Chinese compradors and the foreign companies they served in pre-1949 China.

Business practitioners can extend orthodox principal–agent theory by scrutinizing the complex interactions between local agents and foreign companies. Instead of agents pursuing their economic interests exclusively, as posited by principal–agent theory, they also may pursue principal-shared interests (as suggested by stewardship theory) because of social norms and cultural values that can affect business-related choices and the social bonds built between principals and agents.

The behaviors of compradors and foreign companies in pre-1949 China suggest international business practices for shaping social bonds between principals and agents and foreign principals’ creative efforts to enhance shared interests with local agents.

Understanding principal–agent theory’s limitations can help international management scholars and practitioners mitigate transaction partners’ dishonest acts.

A critical historical analysis of intermediary businesspeople’s (mis)behavior in pre-1949 (1840–1949) China can inform the generalizability of principal–agent theory and contemporary business strategies for minimizing agents’ dishonest acts.

Participation in global value chains (GVCs) is increasingly related to the economic growth of any country. The conceivable beneficial impact of GVCs on economic growth differs across countries and could be modified with the countries' domestic institutional arrangements. However, ignoring the complementarity between the components of institutional quality led to ignorance of the institutional imbalance present in the country. Hence, the primary purpose of this study is to examine the role of institutional imbalance as a moderating variable between GVC participation and economic growth from 2000 to 2018.

To address the issue of endogeneity among the variables in the model, the study employs the generalized methods of moments (GMM) as an econometric analysis method.

The study finds that well-functioning domestic institutions facilitate the positive impact of GVC participation on economic growth. Conversely, an increased institutional imbalance harms the relationship between GVC participation and economic growth. These findings emphasize a balanced portfolio of institutional components. It advocates the holistic development of each component to reap greater benefits for GVC participation for any country. The study highlights that the weakness in one of the components must be addressed rather than substituted by increasing the strength of another component.

The policies should be framed to improve the weakest component first, followed by other components of institutional quality. Simultaneous reforms involving all the dimensions of institutional quality would smoothen the path of transforming GVCs trade to the country's economic development. Additionally, the high institutional imbalance can provide a bird's eye view to policymakers to work on specific aspects of institutional quality more rigorously.

The existing literature has used a combined measure of institutional quality as a mediator variable while measuring the impact of GVC participation on economic growth. While using a combined measure, it ignores the complementarity among its components. Assuming substitutability among various components may lead to an incorrect estimation. Using the arguments proposed by Bolen and Sobel (2020), the present study considers the existence of complementarity among various components of institutional quality. It calculates the institutional imbalance used as a moderating variable while estimating the impact of GVC participation on economic growth.