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This paper aims to investigate auditor choice in those Italian non-listed firms adopting the “traditional” model of corporate governance. In Italy, non-listed firms can choose between two types of auditor: the Board of Statutory Auditors (BSA), that is the statutory auditors, or an “external” auditor. At the same time, a BSA conducts the administrative auditing for all companies with equity exceeding €120,000.

The paper estimates a logistic regression model of firm auditor choice between an external auditor and the BSA, which incorporates variables proxying for both agency conflict and organizational complexity effects.

The results show that of the potential agency factors, only board independence drives auditor choice, whereas organizational complexity and risk factors including firm size, investment in inventories, subsidiary status and complexity drive auditor choice. These results may be explained in the administrative audit role of the BSA, which monitors both day-by-day firm operations and the financial statements preparation “project”. Stakeholders as a result are reassured that, in general, their interests are protected. Finally, it was found that legal form and voluntary International Financial Reporting Standards compliance exert an impact on auditor choice.

The paper provides support for an internal yet independent auditing body such as the Italian BSA as a wider model for corporate governance in European non-listed firms (OECD, 2004 and 2015). The BSA as an administrative and financial auditing body made up solely of independent highly qualified professionals can work within the firm on an operational basis, and in so doing can increase stakeholder protection.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of independent directors in reducing firms’ information asymmetry. Moreover, the authors enrich this investigation by differentiating the effectiveness of independent directors in an intriguing comparative setting of family vs non-family firms. Family firms are used to represent an interesting environment where controlling insiders (i.e. firms’ founding families) have dominant control over corporate decisions. This study addresses the question of whether controlling-insiders dominate independent directors.

The authors manually collect firms’ founder information to identify family firm status in a sample of S&P 500 firms. Following a large literature in capital market research, the authors proxy information asymmetry by trading volume, bid-ask spread and price volatility. The authors employ multivariate regression with two-stage least square analysis, instrumental variable method, Heckman selection model and Hausman–Taylor model to address the issue of endogenous selection of board of director and family firm status.

The authors find a negative relation between the board independence and information asymmetry, suggesting independent directors are effective in reducing information asymmetry. Furthermore, the authors find this negative relation is stronger in family firms. These results are robust after controlling for the endogenous issues using various models.

Our results suggest that independent directors in family-controlled firms are more successful in reducing information asymmetry than their counterparts in non-family firms. The authors provide direct evidence to support the existing theoretical arguments from Rediker and Seth (1995) and Anderson and Reeb (2004) that founding families and independent boards might be a powerful combination for aligning the interest of insider and diffused shareholders. The findings ease a prevalent concern that the role of independent directors might be compromised in an environment with controlling shareholders, and advocate regulations promoting board independence for various business practices.

A number of studies concentrate on the practice of corporate disclosure of firm’s performance and governance and how corporate disclosure mitigates information asymmetry (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of independent directors in reducing information asymmetry. The research adds to understanding the incentives of board members and supports recent findings that different types of investors have heterogeneous incentives for corporate disclosure (Srinidhi et al., 2014).

This study aims to investigate the impact of board independence on the cash dividend payments of family firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) in balancing controlling families’ power to mitigate agency problems between family and minority shareholders in the post-2012 period. The authors focus on this period because Turkish authorities implemented mandatory regulations on the employment of independent directors on boards from fiscal year 2012.

The research model uses a panel dataset of 153 BIST-listed family firms over the period 2012–2017, employs alternative dependent variables and regression techniques and is applied to various sub-groups to improve robustness.

The empirical results show a strong positive effect of board independence on dividend decisions. The authors further detect that family directorship exhibits a negative effect, whereas both board size and audit committees have positive influences but chief executive officer (CEO)/duality has had no significant impact on the dividend policies of Turkish family firms since the new compulsory legal requirements in the Turkish market.

The findings suggest that independent directorship and dividend policy are complementary governance mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts between families and minority shareholders in Turkey, which is a civil law-based emerging country characterized by high family ownership concentration.

The authors present evidence that Turkish family firms’ corporate boards have evolved, to some extent, from being managerial rubber stamps to more independent boards that raise opposing voices in family decision-making. However, independent directors’ preference for dividend-induced capital market monitoring implies that their direct monitoring is less effective than it is supposed to be. This suggests a need to revise the Turkish Corporate Governance Principles to enhance independent directors’ monitoring and supervisory power.

This is thought to be the first study to provide insights on how board independence influences dividend policy in controlling agency problems in Turkish family firms since Turkish authorities introduced compulsory rules on the employment of independent directors on boards.

The purpose of this paper is to explore China’s labour dispute arbitration system reform through analysing the degree to which it has attained its stated objectives – notably, independence, justice, efficiency and professionalism – from the perspectives of the arbitrators, previously ignored in research on China.

This paper used a mixed research method using questionnaires and interviews. Questionnaires were sent to all full-time labour dispute arbitrators in Beijing, China with a useable response rate of 71 per cent. Additionally, qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with 24 key stakeholders involved in the arbitration process.

Instead of establishing an impartial platform, the arbitration system endeavours to promote the state’s capacity to rule over labour relations. Its recent reform excluded arbitrational independence owing to concerns about reducing the Chinese Communist Party’s arbitrary power. Arbitrational justice was perceived to improve through case resolution efficiency, which made arbitrators minimise arbitration time, partly because of high caseloads but largely because of their key performance indicators. Quality of arbitration was compromised. The arbitrators understood the spaces and boundaries of the reform, and focused on increasing professionalism to enable them to more fluidly manoeuvre between the different political economic interests, above safeguarding labour rights.

The questionnaire size was too small for regression analysis. Future research should expand the sample sizes and conduct cross-regional studies.

In 2008, China undertook an arbitrational system reform – probing its practical influence contributes to the authors understanding about the changing institutional environment of Chinese labour relations.

As a pilot study on labour dispute arbitrators, this research presents the dynamics of the Chinese labour dispute resolution mechanism.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of audit report lag in Sub-Saharan African Central Banks. In this case, the determinants were divided into two categories: independent variables and mediating variables. The independent variables, which were generated from board characteristics, included board size, board gender diversity, governor duality, audit committee size and audit committee meetings. The mediating variables were auditing characteristics and they comprised audit mandate, audit approach and audit quality.

The study used data from 192 observations from African Central Banks' financial reports for the period 2000–2016. The data collected were analyzed using path analysis, whereby four regression models were run and tested simultaneously. From the analysis, the study determined total effects and then decomposed the total effects into direct and indirect effects.

The study results indicate that in the case of board characteristics, governor duality and audit committee size were found to have a positive influence on audit report lag. In the case of audit quality, only audit mandate was found to have a negative influence on audit quality in the Central Banks. However, the introduction of mediating variables increased the positive effect of governor duality and audit committee size, while also making board size and board gender diversity have a significant negative effect on audit report lag.

The findings of this paper have implications for the practice and policy of the auditing and governance of Central Banks, which includes designing appropriate governance structures as well as proper auditing strategies.

This is the first study which has examined factors influencing audit report lag in Central Banks. Previous studies on Central Banks' governance have examined the independence and autonomy of the Central Banks, as well as their accounting. This paper extends prior studies by examining the effects of those factors. Another contribution is the study's application of auditing characteristics as mediating variables.

Taking advantage of a unique measure of corporate culture obtained from advanced machine learning algorithms, this study aims to explore how corporate culture strength is influenced by board independence, which is one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors. Because of their independence from the corporation, outside independent directors are more likely to be unbiased. As a result, board independence is commonly used as a proxy for board quality.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute a variety of additional tests, i.e. propensity score matching, an instrumental variable analysis, Lewbel’s (2012) heteroscedastic identification and Oster’s (2019) testing for coefficient stability.

The results show that stronger board independence, measured by a higher proportion of independent directors, is significantly associated with corporate culture. In particular, a rise in board independence by one standard deviation results in an improvement in corporate culture by 32.8%.

Conducting empirical research on corporate culture is incredibly difficult due to the inherent difficulties in recognizing and assessing corporate culture, resulting in a lack of empirical research on corporate culture in the literature. The authors fill this important void in the literature. Exploiting a novel measure of corporate culture based on textual analysis, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to link corporate culture to corporate governance with a specific focus on board independence.

This study examines companies that separated or integrated the tax and audit functions subsequent to the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SARBOX). While the provision of tax services is not currently prohibited by SARBOX, some companies have separated these two functions. An examination of the relationship between tax function separation (integration) and proxies for audit quality, tax advocacy and audit fee is performed for a matched sample of companies that made the decision to separate or integrate during the period following the passage of SARBOX. In addition, we survey CFOs of both types of companies to determine the motivations behind the separation/integration decision. Our results indicate separation firm CFOs perceive benefits associated with auditor independence as their main reason for separating, while integration firm CFOs perceive cost savings and knowledge spillover as benefits of integration. The matched‐pair analysis suggests that both cost‐savings and tax‐savings are present in the year the tax and audit function is integrated, a benefit not enjoyed by their separation firm peers.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss literature and empirical evidence on regulatory independence especially in telecommunications and to suggest reforms of this institution.

The paper comprises a survey of the literature plus new empirical evidence on de facto independence.

The study finds that independence has a positive and significant, but modest, impact on network penetration, once de facto issues and endogeneity are taken into account.

De facto independence can only be superficially approached with quantitative methods and the instruments used to correct for endogeneity are far from perfect.

Regulatory agencies may find ways to improve their effectiveness.

The paper provides ideas on how to solve the dilemma between expertise and accountability in the particular field of telecommunications regulation.

The paper provides data about the vulnerability of independent regulation in telecommunications in Latin America until 2010.