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This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).

Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.

The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.

The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.

As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.

The purpose of this paper is to study whether auditor independence reforms introduced in 2004 led to an enhancement in earnings quality in the post-reform era.

This study predicts that as the cost of compliance will vary based on a firm's existing corporate governance regime and the level of external scrutiny (monitoring) it faces, we compare the earnings quality of a sample of “established” (S&P/ASX 100) to a sample of “emerging” (S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index) firms. The paper examines the reporting behaviour of the two groups of listed entities, covering the regulatory change period 2003-2006. The paper uses regression modelling to test the associations between increased audit independence, earnings quality and corporate governance mechanisms over the pre- and post-regulatory period.

The paper's results confirm that earnings quality for the established firms was enhanced in the post-reform period; while this was not the case for emerging firms. The evidence also suggests that corporate governance mechanisms of board independence and board financial skill are associated with higher earnings quality; while the higher the concentration of insider firm ownership is associated with lower earnings quality.

This study provides policy makers with evidence as to changes in reporting behaviour following law reform aimed at strengthening auditor independence.

The studies on earnings quality are informed by the US market practices. Australia provides a unique setting through its auditor independence reforms to examine the impact of reform choices. This study also investigates two specific subsets of the market: established firms and emerging firms.

This paper aims to examine the communicative value of assurance reports by investigating whether the impact on information asymmetries is contingent on the length of the contractual relationship between clients and assurance providers, which can compromise the provider’s independence.

Using a firm-level data set of publicly listed international firms from 2007 to 2016, the authors estimate several regression models for panel data by using the generalized method of moments estimator to address the endogeneity issue.

Results find that the greater the communicative value in assurance statements, the lower the information asymmetries. However, this effect is constrained when the assurance provider’s independence is compromised due to an excessively long-term contractual relationship. In other words, assurance statements with more informative value enhance the firm’s transparency and increase users’ confidence in the sustainability information provided. However, the loss of independence linked to longer tenure jeopardizes the communicative value of the assurance report and contributes to reducing information asymmetries.

The study makes at least three clear contributions to current literature. First, the authors contribute to the limited existing research about the communicative value attributed to assurance statements by stakeholders. Second, the authors indirectly contribute to the literature that analyses whether stakeholders understand the assurance report, a complex statement in a growing market. Addressing the communicative value of assurance is certainly a difficult task, as it is a novel and complex activity. Third, the main contribution is providing initial empirical evidence about the moderating effect that assurance provider tenure has in the relationship between the informational content of the assurance report and the level of information asymmetries. To date, there is no empirical evidence regarding the moderating effect of long assuror’s tenure as an important feature of the assurance market, and beyond that, regarding its impact on the communicative value assigned by stakeholders to assurance statements.

This paper aims to examine whether CEO/chair dual roles influence board monitoring-audit fees nexus. The impact of corporate governance on audit fees literature is lacking in the banking sector, which is subject to different regulations and reporting requirements to other sectors. The level and quality of external audit services are important not only to shareholders and customers but also for regulators’ reputations and public confidence.

Examining a sample of the US national commercial banks, this study fills the gap by empirically examining whether the attributes of internal corporate governance mechanisms, proxied by boards of directors and audit committee characteristics, are related to audit fees. We introduce two interaction variables to understand whether chief executive officer (CEO)/chair dual roles influence the relationships between board independence and audit fees on the one hand and between the audit committee and audit fees on the other hand.

We find that audit fees are positively associated with board independence, board size, CEO/chair dual role and audit committee financial experts. The results of the interaction variables indicate that boards with higher independence and more effective audit committees tend to demand higher audit quality, and consequently, pay higher audit fees to protect shareholders’ interests from potential power abuse by CEOs who also chair boards.

This study contributes to the literature by providing extensive understanding of the influence on audit fees of the independence of the board of directors and the effectiveness of the audit committees. The authors first examine the impact of each individual governance variable separately and then introduce two interaction variables. This study provides policymakers with insights into the existing relationships between audit fees and the banking sector governance structure.

This study aims to examine the significance of the non-linear relationship of board size and board independence on the financial performance of listed non-financial firms in India.

The study draws the sample of the listed non-financial firm in the Indian market from the year 2011–2018 and applied panel least squares regression with and without industry fixed effects on the model with quadratic equation. Quantile regression is also used to test the robustness of the results. The financial performance is measured through one accounting measure (i.e. return on assets [ROA]) and one market-based measure (i.e. Tobin’s Q). The empirical model also controls firm-specific variables which are expected to have an impact on financial performance.

The study found that the relationship of board size and board independence with the financial performance of a firm is in a non-linear inverted U-shape. The results are qualitatively similar for both ROA and Tobin’s Q after controlling industry fixed effects.

This is the first study in India which tests the non-linear relationship of board size and board independence with the financial performance of the firm. The study contributes to the limited literature on the implications of board characteristics on the performance of the firms in India.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on high growth firms’ corporate governance. Specially, the study examines whether there is a negative impact of SOX on the interactive effect of board independence and investment opportunity set on firm performance.

Sample firms were selected from the Investor Responsibility Research Center Directors’ database. Both accounting- and market-based firm performance measures are used. Regressions are run to test the hypothesis.

It was found that the impact of SOX on the interaction effect of board independence and investment opportunity set on firm performance is negative.

The results suggest that the impact of SOX in corporate governance and regulatory environment mitigates the effect of board independence on the relationship between investment opportunity set and firm performance, consistent with the notion that the enactment of SOX increases monitoring costs of board governance especially for high-growth firms.

This paper has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that over time, and in a number of professional and academic places, the concept of auditor independence has been contested; that is, there have been different concepts of auditor independence within different time periods, and even when there appears to have been consensus on the meaning of auditor independence, there have been significant debates about auditor independence. The second purpose of the paper is to advocate a complete reconsideration of the concept of auditor independence; one which would move us towards the idea that auditors should be prohibited from acting as advocates in any way on behalf of their clients, and that client management should have no ability whatsoever to determine the audit fee or the scope of audit engagement. These are controversial ideas. They are meant to be so.

The debate over an auditor's ability to remain independent while simultaneously providing nonaudit services to the audit client has a long history. In recent years, several factors have combined to heighten regulators’ concerns about this issue. This study uses a case methodology research design to analyze the testimonies given by financial statement users at the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e) Independence Hearings in relation to this debate. The analysis is framed by the principle of user primacy. Findings indicate that changes from the SEC's initial proposal to final rule on independence are more closely aligned with preparers’ than users’ preferences, despite claims to the contrary.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance, with particular reference to the role of independent directors on boards and audit committees, and media coverage on corporate transparency and disclosure. In addition, the paper also investigates the role of the media on independent directors’ behaviours towards corporate transparency and disclosure.

The paper uses the well-developed two-step system generalised method of moments approach on a sample of 99 Pakistan stock exchange (PSX) listed financial firms over the period 2007-2012.

The empirical analysis shows that media and independent directors on audit committees play a significant positive role in line with agenda setting and agency theories in promoting corporate transparency and disclosure. On the contrary, the boards’ independent directors are risk-averse and hold the information to protect their reputation. Nevertheless, the study does not find any significant influence of media coverage on independent directors’ behaviours in promoting corporate transparency and disclosure.

The findings provide some useful insight into cost benefits analysis of media coverage towards an understanding of independent directors’ behaviours for promoting transparency and disclosure in financial sector. Moreover, the study findings can be useful for both shareholders and stakeholders in taking decisions about firm activities.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that proposed and tested a multi-level framework for corporate transparency and disclosure practices. In addition, this study is also among the very few studies that use financial sectors as a sample, in particular, and media coverage, specifically, thus adding some value to the limited literature.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether client industry importance affects auditor independence.

This study analyzes audit firm merger data from China Stock Market and Accounting Research and uses a difference-in-difference model to find whether client industry importance is associated with auditor independence. This study uses discretionary accruals and propensity to issue modified audit opinions as proxies for auditor independence.

Results show that the greater the decline in client industry importance, the more significant the increase in auditor independence. In addition, the magnitude of decline in client overall importance is also positively associated with the extent of increase in auditor independence; however, this result disappears after controlling for client industry importance.

The authors acknowledge that this study has limitations. First, audit firm mergers provide a unique research setting. However, the findings of this study in such setting may not be generalizable to other situations. Second, this study has a limited sample size because of data availability, which could impact the robustness of the results.

Results from this study are important because investors and regulators have increasing concerns over auditor independence since the Enron scandal. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of client industry importance on auditor independence and in a unique setting of audit firm merger to separate auditor independence from auditor competence, and hence controlling for self-selection bias. Results of this study provide evidence that client industry importance has significant influence over auditor independence.