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The paper aims to build the connections between game theory and the resource allocation problem with general uncertainty. It proposes modeling the distributed resource allocation problem by Bayesian game. During this paper, three basic kinds of uncertainties are discussed. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to build the connections between game theory and the resource allocation problem with general uncertainty.

In this paper, the Bayesian game is proposed for modeling the resource allocation problem with uncertainty. The basic game theoretical model contains three parts: agents, utility function, and decision-making process. Therefore, the probabilistic weighted Shapley value (WSV) is applied to design the utility function of the agents. For achieving the Bayesian Nash equilibrium point, the rational learning method is introduced for optimizing the decision-making process of the agents.

The paper provides empirical insights about how the game theoretical model deals with the resource allocation problem uncertainty. A probabilistic WSV function was proposed to design the utility function of agents. Moreover, the rational learning was used to optimize the decision-making process of agents for achieving Bayesian Nash equilibrium point. By comparing with the models with full information, the simulation results illustrated the effectiveness of the Bayesian game theoretical methods for the resource allocation problem under uncertainty.

This paper designs a Bayesian theoretical model for the resource allocation problem under uncertainty. The relationships between the Bayesian game and the resource allocation problem are discussed.

We develop an extension of the Traditional Deterrence Game to examine the interaction between international and domestic sources of uncertainty as these sources influence the behavior of Challengers and Defenders. The extension involves incorporating a third and a fourth domestic player, named Assassin ♯1 and Assassin ♯2. Assassin ♯1 reacts to Challenger's decision to capitulate to Defender, and Assassin ♯2 reacts to Defender's decision to capitulate to Challenger. From the perspective of Challenger and Defender, Assassin ♯1 and Assassin ♯2 are lotteries that involve a probability of being punished, and a complementary probability of not being punished, for the decisions to capitulate to the adversary, respectively, in the international game. We employ the two-sided incomplete information version of the game wherein Challenger is uncertain about Defender's type and the behavior of Assassin ♯1, and Defender is uncertain about Challenger's type and the behavior of Assassin ♯2.

The model provides an account of the trade-off between domestic and international conflicts generally, and specifies the conditions under which Challenger and/or Defender is advantaged in the international game with the presence of a domestic constraint in the form of Assassin ♯1 or Assassin ♯2. The model generates two striking results in particular. First, Assassin ♯1 can influence the behavior of some Challengers, whereas Assassin ♯2 can determine the behavior of some Defenders. Second, the Challengers who ultimately capitulate are more prone to initiate conflict, in the first place, than are the Challengers who will not capitulate.

The purpose of this paper is to design a game theory based model that not only provide theoretical basis to control brand counterfeiting, but it also provide a mechanism to enhance brand revenue.

This study used the dynamic game theory of incomplete information to understand and encounter the brand counterfeiting issues. The study analyzed the economic relationship of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and consumers using mixed strategy of the dynamic game theory of incomplete information.

The results have indicated that brands those take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting earn maximum revenue, even when the legitimate brands and consumers are unaware from the actions of counterfeiting firms, the legitimate brands should take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting to earn maximum revenue, and there exists optimal anti-counterfeiting cost for the legitimate brand. Further, this study provides theoretical basis where brand managers can decide to adopt or not to adopt anti-counterfeiting strategy, and also indicate the consequences of each decision.

Based upon the findings, the study put forward valuable managerial implications. The study revealed that the legitimate brand must emphasize on the significance of taking countermeasures against counterfeiter and also, brand managers should focus on making product traceable, empowering the consumer and ensuring coordination with government officials to control the counterfeiting issues.

This paper incorporates the role of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and a consumer to establish the dynamic game theory model using mixed strategy to understand and address the counterfeiting issues in the global market.

Social dilemmas take many forms but all share the property that individual benefits, at least in the short run, conflict with group benefits. This chapter examines how information about the characteristics of group members and the parameters of the dilemma affect decision-making. Particular attention is paid to transformative crises, sudden changes in the dilemma setting that for a short period of time lead to incomplete information. It is posited that these crises cause relatively dramatic shifts in the importance of information.

Most pricing studies assume that firms have complete information about demand. In practice, managers must make decisions, given incomplete information about the demand for their own products as well as those of their rivals. This paper develops a duopoly pricing model in which firms market differentiated products in a world of uncertainty. Results show that the predictions of standard strategic pricing models may not hold when firms face parameter uncertainty and are risk‐averse. Under well‐defined conditions, there may be a “first‐mover” disadvantage to the firm that attempts to be the Stackelberg price leader in the market, especially in a market where demand is highly uncertain. Interestingly, if parameter uncertainty is sufficiently high, it may even be necessary for the price leader to share market information with its rival. When firms are risk‐averse, uncertainty generally decreases equilibrium prices and the variabilities of profits.

A hypothesis developed in this paper models the relationship between the borrower and the bank as a dynamic game based on incomplete information (business game) and seeks an equilibrium point at which the facilitated applicant can act according to the terms of the loan agreement once the contract is signed and meet the requirements of the contract.

The primary assumption in the formation of the Islamic bank in Islamic society is that the members of the society are Muslims and act according to religious orders. However, the non-fulfillment of divine principles and orders is always possible. In partnership agreements, the risk of infringement is reduced and corrupt contracts are prevented in some circumstances. Our basic model was constructed using the Beer-Quiche classic game, which has been modified dynamically along with a generalization of complexity terms. The information asymmetry led us to use a heterogeneous belief system to evaluate the probability of the customer transmitting a low credit risk signal to the bank and the probability of the customer transmitting a high credit risk signal to the bank. There are several assumptions of the basic model that are released in the extended model by the presence of a social inspector, by exploring credit risk signals in the generalized model and by considering various commitment levels in the comprehensive model.

As a result, it is observed that there is no Nash equilibrium in cases where the customer applies separation strategies. But if the pulling strategies are applied, the Nash equilibrium can be achieved under certain conditions, including inspection bodies in the banking system, the creation of necessary transparency and the proper treatment of criminals by government and regulatory bodies. So, by using alternative belief systems, applying different filters and paying attention to all sectors of the economy, new Nash equilibrium points can be achieved. Moreover, multi-stage facilities payment reduces the risk of corrupt contracts.

This paper sets out to analyze Nash Equilibrium and its possible encounter in Islamic Banking for the first time, utilizing a Bayesian Game-Theoretic framework. A major aspect of the research is the contribution to a better understanding of the role of transparency and government oversight in the implementation of Islamic banking regulatory standards.

The purpose of this study is to establish a comprehensive service recovery mechanism by analyzing different behaviors of customers with different personality traits after service failures and by proposing different service recovery measures that service providers could adopt based on diverse customer personality traits.

This paper constructs a service recovery mechanism based on a signaling game theory by considering customers and service providers as two players in the game and analyzing possible outcomes under both separating and pooling equilibria to achieve an optimized strategy and set of actions that allow the highest payoffs for both service providers and customers.

This study successfully simulated the separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium between service providers and customers in a signaling game with incomplete information. It also provides a reference for service providers to design service recovery strategies after service failures. By using this model, when facing problems related to service failures and service recovery, service providers will have a better chance of increasing the service recovery success rate, improving customer satisfaction and achieving optimal payoffs for both themselves and their customers.

Based on concepts of service science, this study designed a service recovery mechanism by applying the signaling game from game theory and introducing personality traits theory to the service recovery scenario so that service providers are able to execute service recovery after service failures more effectively. This study proposed a service recovery mechanism based on the perspectives of both service providers and customers, considering the mutual influence of key variables related to both of them, as well as the context of service failures, customers’ personality traits and service providers’ available resources. Many studies have applied personality traits to different fields; however, to the best of authors’ knowledge, few studies have applied this concept to service-related subjects, and only the influence of employees’ personality traits on service providers has been discussed.

Lays out a framework for analysing ethics in organizations. Relying on methodological individualism, introduces five building blocks for the framework: self‐interest, individual rationality, sequential rationality, incentive compatibility, and reputation. Uncritical use of the self‐interest model may induce framing effects, blinding less cautious users to important ethical dimensions. Illustrates the richness and “ethical flavour” of an appropriately considered self‐interest model through focusing one of the individual agent’s real interests in a broad sense, through the use of the time factor in the building blocks, and through suggesting how the individual agent can interpret the value systems in her surroundings.

This chapter explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives, both generally and specifically. First, a causal explanation of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 is developed within the confines of a game-theoretic model of asymmetric or unilateral deterrence. Then some methodological obstacles that may arise in more complex cases are discussed and suggestions for overcoming them are offered. Finally, the advantages of using game models to more fully understand real world events are highlighted.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on resource allocation and information disclosure policy for defending multiple targets against intentional attacks. The intentional attacks, like terrorism events, probably cause great losses and fatalities. Attackers and defenders usually make decisions based on incomplete information. Adaptive attacking and defending strategies are considered, to study how both sides make more effective decisions according to previous fights.

A stochastic game‐theoretic approach is proposed for modeling attacker‐defender conflicts. Attackers and defenders are supposed both to be strategic decision makers and partially aware of adversary's information. Adaptive strategies are compared with different inflexible strategies in a fortification‐patrol problem, where the fortification affects the security vulnerability of targets and the patrol indicates the defensive signal.

The result shows that the intentional risk would be elevated by adaptive attack strategies. An inflexible defending strategy probably fails when facing uncertainties of adversary. It is shown that the optimal response of defenders is to adjust defending strategies by learning from previous games and assessing behaviors of adversaries to minimize the expected loss.

This paper explores how adaptive strategies affect attacker‐defender conflicts. The key issue is defense allocation and information disclosure policy for mitigation of intentional threats. Attackers and defenders can adjust their strategies by learning from previous fights, and the strategic adjustment of both sides may be asynchronous.