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A growing body of research finds that gig economy platforms use gamification to enhance managerial control. Focusing on technologically mediated forms of gamification, this literature reveals how platforms mobilize gig workers’ work effort by making the labour process resemble a game. This chapter contends that this tech-centric scholarship fails to fully capture the historical continuities between contemporary and much older occurrences of game-playing at work. Informed by interviews and participatory observations at two food delivery platforms in Amsterdam, I document how these platforms’ piece wage system gives rise to a workplace dynamic in which severely underpaid delivery couriers continuously employ game strategies to maximize their gig income. Reminiscent of observations from the early shop floor ethnographies of the manufacturing industry, I show that the game of gig income maximization operates as an indirect modality of control by (re)aligning the interests of couriers with the interests of capital and by individualizing and depoliticizing couriers’ overall low wage level. I argue that the new, algorithmic technologies expand and intensify the much older forms of gamified control by infusing the organizational activities of shift and task allocation with the logic of the piece wage game and by increasing the possibilities for interaction, direct feedback and immersion. My study contributes to the literature on gamification in the gig economy by interweaving it with the classic observations derived from the manufacturing industry and by developing a conceptualization of gamification in which both capital and labour exercise agency.

The purpose of this paper is to understand whether managerial behavior in impairing goodwill arising from M & As has changed after the adoption of IAS/IFRS, searching for evidences of earnings management (EM) practices. Thus, our goal is to provide a response to the following research questions. Are goodwill impairments used by listed firms’ managers to manipulate earnings? If so, what kind of EM practice is mostly used?

In this paper the authors tested the following hypothesis: H1. In the year of the deal’s closure and in the following four years, the management detects impairment of goodwill in difformity with the previous Italian regulations and related accounting practices. Moreover, the authors tried to determine, for each considered firms, potential symptoms of typical DEM practices widely debated in the financial accounting literature (income smoothing, income minimization, income minimization, or big bath accounting).

Our analysis does not prove evidence of certain EM practices, but it highlights very clearly that, after the adoption of IAS/IFRS, managers’ behavior has deeply changed. Moreover, the analysis shows that there is no univocal choice in favor of a specific EM practice and that every firm pursues its own “strategy.”

Considering the importance of the topic from both the perspectives of managerial (with regard to M & As valuation processes) and financial accounting (with regard to intangibles valuation fulfilled by applying the impairment test instead of the amortization), this work aims to provide a multi-dimensional contribution to the current debate.

The paper aims to provide an analysis of the principle‐agent relationship between owner (principal) and manager (agent) of investment properties by: developing an optimization model for the net profit scenario that any third party manager of properties in multiple locations faces; and describing the principal's (or owner's) problem and likewise developing an income optimization model. The model allows illustrating the misalignment of incentives and compensation arrangements common to the business of managing small investment properties.

The paper provides an in depth review of literature on the agency problem, both in general as well as in real estate research and compares the qualitative findings with analytical results provided by the model. The latter is developed by applying a transaction cost framework to the context of income structures in investment properties and their management.

The optimization model shows that profit maximization for the manger (agent) depends on an optimum number of properties to be managed. It is further shown that the compensation methods customary in small real estate management contracts are inappropriate for the manager to control and cover the transaction costs, which result from the fact that more than one location is managed. The result is a kind of impossibility theorem, stating that management of small investment properties based on customary compensation structures is unprofitable as the number of properties and their distance rises.

The analysis shows that industry practice for the compensation of management of small investment properties does not address the inherent principle‐agent problem. Consequently, additional compensation and incentive mechanisms as well as control structures need to be employed by the owner. The paper, therefore, provides a starting point to review and improve industry practice.

The paper expands the existing literature of the agency problem in real estate by providing an optimization model for management of investment properties. The model and findings are of interest to academics for its analytical treatment of agency relationships; as well as to practitioners, as the analysis reveals inefficiencies in industry practice.

Accounts manipulation has been the subject of research, discussion and even controversy in several countries including the USA, Canada, the U.K., Australia, Finland and France. The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature and propose a conceptual framework for accounts manipulation. This framework is based on the possibility of wealth transfer between the different stake‐holders, and in practice, the target of the manipulation appears generally to be the earnings per share and the debt/equity ratio. The paper also describes the different actors involved and their potential gains and losses. We review the literature on the various techniques of accounts manipulation: earnings management, income smoothing, big bath accounting, creative accounting, and window‐dressing. The various definitions of all these, the main motivations behind their application and the research methodologies used are all examined. This study reveals that all the above techniques have common elements, but there are also important differences between them.

This paper aims to investigate how transfer pricing (TP) and earnings management affect tax avoidance of firms in Ghana.

The authors use a panel data set from 2008 to 2015 to further shed light on transfer pricing-tax avoidance nexus by examining the complex interaction of three key variables: transfer pricing, earnings management and tax avoidance.

The results show that almost all the sample firms have engaged in some form of transfer pricing strategies and the manipulation of earnings to avoid tax during 2008-2015. There is evidence to suggest that non-financial multinational corporations manipulate more earnings than the financial firms while financial firms also use more TP than non-financial firms. The overall results suggest that the sensitivity of tax avoidance to transfer pricing decreases as firms increase their earnings management. By extension, these results have important policy implication for policymakers in assessing the effectiveness of tax laws relating to transfer pricing.

The authors investigate how transfer pricing and earnings management affect the avoidance of firms operating in Ghana.

The main objective of this paper is to present a holistic approach for measuring overall bank efficiency and its decomposition in intermediation and profitability efficiencies.

Two-stage network data envelopment analysis (NDEA) model has been used for obtaining intermediation and profitability efficiencies along with overall bank efficiency. Additionally, bootstrap truncated regression has also been adopted to explore the influential predictors of two stages.

A comparative analysis between Indian private-sector and public-sector banks showed that the former is efficient than the latter in profitability efficiency stage. Another interesting finding is that none of the banks is efficient in overall study tenure. Finally, outcomes of bootstrap truncated regression show that differences in intermediation efficiency are explained by firm size, return on asset, market share and ownership while profitability stage is determined by diverse, gross domestic product and ownership.

This study will guide the Indian banking sector to act on which they are lagging, for the betterment of their overall performances. Finally, parameters like loan waives and disposal income of non-performing assets (NPAs) are not considered because of the unavailability of information in the output measures of NDEA model.

This paper not only provides a detailed performance assessment of Indian banks but also examines banks’ internal efficiency by deposits as an intermediary measure.

The purpose of this article is to summarize the relationship between the research of Jaroslav Vanek on labor-managed firms (LMFs) and the research of Gregory K. Dow on the same topic.

The article reviews the research of Jaroslav Vanek in the 1970s and explains how this influenced the publications of Gregory K. Dow extending from the 1980s to the present. A particular focus involves Dow's book “The Labor-Managed Firm: Theoretical Foundations” published by Cambridge University Press in 2018. The methodology is to present an intellectual history in narrative form. The scope of the paper is the economic theory of the LMF.

The article finds that Dow's interest in LMFs was stimulated by Vanek's publications from the early 1970s. However, Dow's publications in the 1980s were motivated to a large degree by efforts to overcome the limitations of Vanek's theory of the LMF, a goal that shaped much of Dow's later research in the field.

The paper illuminates the strong intellectual influence Jaroslav Vanek exerted on the economic theory of the LMF. Readers who want information about the influences on Dow's work may also find it useful.

A discipline is bound by some combination of a shared subject matter, shared theory, and shared technique. Yet modern economics is seemingly without limit to its domain. As a discipline without a shared subject matter, what is the binding force of economics today? The authors combine topic modeling and text analysis to analyze different approaches to inquiry within the discipline of economics. The authors find that the importance of theory has declined as economics has increasingly become defined by its empirical techniques. The authors question whether this trajectory is stable in the long run as the binding force of the discipline.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the direct influence of the mechanism of good corporate governance (GCG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) on financial performance as well as through earnings management as a mediating variable.

The data used in this research are secondary data involving 102 companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the period 2014. The data used in this study were analyzed using partial least square and carried out with the help of software WarpPLS 5.0.

The results show that the mechanism of GCG and CSR has a positive effect on financial performance as well as the CSR on financial performance.

The results also show partial mediation of earnings management on impact of GCG mechanisms on financial performance and full mediation of earnings management on impact of CSR on financial performance.