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This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011.

The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions.

The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation.

The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.).

This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.

Retention of medical doctors and nurses in remote and rural areas is a key issue in India. The purpose of this paper is to assess the relevant policies and provisions with respect to health care professionals, aiming to develop feasible retention strategies in rural areas of Odisha state of India.

The study employed documentary review and key informant interviews with policy elites (health planners, policy maker, researchers, etc.). The document review included published and unpublished reports, policy notifications and articles on human resources for health (HRH) in Odisha and similar settings. Throughout the study, the authors adapted World Health Organization’s framework to study policies relevant to HRH retention in rural areas. The adapted framework comprised of the four policy domains, education, regulation, financial incentives, professional and personal support, and 16 recommendations.

In Odisha, the district quota system for admission is not practiced; however, students from special tribal and caste (Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste) communities, Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of citizens, and Persons with Disabilities have some allocated quota to study medicine and nursing. Medical education has a provision of community placement in rural hospitals. In government jobs, the newly recruited medical doctors serve a minimum of three years in rural areas. Doctors are given with location-based incentives to work in remote and difficult areas. The government has career development, deployment, and promotion avenues for doctors and nurses; however, these provisions are not implemented effectively.

The government could address the rural retention problems, as illustrated in the study and put in place the most effective policies and provisions toward recruitment, deployment and attraction of HRH in remote and rural areas. At the same time, implementation HRH strategies and activities must be rigorously monitored and evaluated effectively.

This paper examines whether or not one of the export incentives, i.e. export insurance, provided by the Korean government has promoted the export supply of Korea. The role of transaction cost in administering the export insurance system is considered in the current analysis. The small sample cointegration tests show that the concerned variables are not cointegrated. The empirical evidence using the first differenced data shows that the provision of export incentives in terms of export insurance by the government does not have a significant effect on increasing the export supply of Korea.

To provide low-cost housing, the Myanmar Government is attempting to use public–private partnership (PPP) to attract private investors. However, there is little information concerning the influencing factors for implementing PPP low-cost housing projects in Myanmar. This paper, therefore, aims to identify and analyse these factors.

A total of 51 in-depth interviews were conducted with interviewees involved in various kinds of housing projects implemented through the adoption of PPP or other approaches. The methods of data collection and the analysis are based on grounded theory (GT) methodology.

Using the GT method to analyse the interviews, five categories emerged from 50 influencing factors regarding the establishment and implementation of the PPP model for low-cost housing in Myanmar: provision of incentives; obstacles in implementing PPP for all stakeholders; barriers to private sector participation; public sector responsibilities and challenges; and attraction factors and challenges for financial institutions. Among 12 newly found factors, the three most important for PPP low-cost housing in Myanmar are the availability of project funding, the resolution of land-acquisition issues and the development of a sound financing system.

Our findings strengthen previous studies by identifying factors affecting PPP low-cost housing either specific to Myanmar or common among other countries. Of the 50 factors identified, 38 factors were found in previous studies, but 12 are likely specific to Myanmar.

Our findings can be used by governments, particularly the Myanmar Government, and financial agencies to understand the low attractiveness of PPP low-cost housing for investors and to develop/improve policies to stimulate PPP low-cost housing, especially in Myanmar.

Many previous studies have been undertaken to identify factors that influence the implementation of PPP for low-cost housing. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no prior studies specific to Myanmar in this context.

Based on an empirical study, proposes requirements for and measures of the formation of internal incentive systems as instruments for internal innovation management. Uses the knowledge of experience of individuals taking an active part in innovation for the formulation of such proposals. The necessity for the implementation of integrated incentive systems, which allow for material fundamental demands beyond those peculiar to individual career expectations, becomes obvious.

This paper aims to explore the design of management teams when the critical task facing individual managers is monitoring the performance of worker teams and producing performance measures under uncertain information environments.

The authors use a multi-agent LEN framework – linear contract, exponential utility and normal density – to model the incentive provision and organizational design.

The main lesson is that the use of performance measures under uncertainty is greatly affected by the potential for free-riding in the very monitoring activities which generate the measures to begin with. Accordingly, the value of having a management team, that is the incremental benefit of having a second manager, depends on the monitoring technology. Of particular importance are the potential free-riding in monitoring effort among multiple managers and synergies gained from having more than one manager, such as correlation among the performance measures produced or improvement due to splitting workers pool into separate groups for each manager to monitor separately.

The paper pushes this line of research further by explicitly modeling the endogenous process of signal generation within a rich economic environment. In this environment, number of workers being evaluated and number of managers who produce the signals are both endogenous. Furthermore, both workers and managers are subject to moral hazard problem. In particular, the managers suffer from potential free-riding problems but may benefit from synergistic forces due to team monitoring.

Fiscal policy is one of the weighty instruments of state regulation and is intended to ensure the creation of an institutional environment to reach the strategic objectives of sustainable development. This chapter is devoted to the study of the implementation of tax reform in Belarus. It analyzes the place of tax instruments in economic growth and investigates the strategic direction of tax reforms. The actual tax policy in Belarus is determined by the requirements of the national strategy of sustainable development which aims to ensure a stable financial basis for the development of society, economy, and environmental management. The historical and economic conditions of Belarus require an assessment of the local peculiarities of the use of tax instruments, which are now in force in leading countries. Therefore the study of foreign experience is complemented by an analysis of local conditions. Tax policy must ensure and support changes in national economies related to globalization, informatization and digitalization of the modern world, while maintaining the ideas of social justice. As a theoretical and practical tool for improving the quality of the tax system through the modernization of the incentives system, the concept of tax expenditures as a part of the budget process was investigated.

This chapter provides further evidence on the role of uncertainty and job complexity in pay-for-performance and autonomy decisions. It proposes an encompassing econometric approach in order to explain the differences in previous outcomes that may be due to differing methodological approaches. The main stylized fact is that autonomy and pay-for-performance are positively associated. Additionally, autonomy is positively related to job complexity and uncertainty suggesting that the relationship between these latter variables and pay-for-performance could be through autonomy. After controlling for autonomy, the positive relationship between pay-for-performance and job complexity disappears, while that between pay-for-performance and uncertainty becomes more negative.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between state economic development incentives programs and entrepreneurial activity.

The authors use panel data and a fixed-effects model to examine the determinants of five measures of entrepreneurial activity. To measure state economic development incentives programs, they use a new and substantially improved data set from Bartik (2017). They also include a measure for economic freedom, the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of North America index.

The authors find a robustly negative relationship between development incentives and patent activity. They find some evidence that incentives are negatively associated with small business establishments (<10 employees) as a percentage of total establishments but positively associated with the large business establishment (>500 employees) share. They also find evidence of a positive relationship between economic freedom and both patent activity and net business formation.

The results imply that economic development incentive programs are unlikely to increase entrepreneurial activity and may decrease it. They also imply increased economic freedom (lower taxes, lower spending, and lower governmental restrictions on labor markets) may increase entrepreneurial activity.

To the authors’ knowledge, this paper provides the first examination of the relationship between development incentives and entrepreneurial activity that utilizes Bartik (2017), a new vastly improved data set of state economic development incentive programs. The paper also contributes to the literature on the relationship between economic freedom and entrepreneurial activity.

Incentives are mechanisms used to create genuine opportunity for contracting parties to work together to achieve good results, rational returns and bear appropriate risks. The question of how to motivate the construction workforce rightly so as to achieve best performance has remained paramount to project owners. This paper aims to investigate on how to model for incentive payoffs in the Nigerian construction industry to effectively use the benefits of incentive mechanisms.

The collected data are analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics, such as frequency counts, charts and principal component analysis.

The findings reveal the metrics for measuring organisational incentive payoff and the scaling factor for each metric. The study further develops the employee incentive payoff models for both operational workers and management staff in the construction sector.

This study provides a practical solution to the application of incentive mechanisms in construction projects. The paper recommends the need for restructuring of incentive mechanisms to significantly impact on other performance criteria, therefore contributing to best performance in project delivery.