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This study aims to investigate whether integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices mediates the relationship between executive incentive compensation and the financial performance of Islamic and conventional banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

This study used multiple regression models to analyze the effectiveness of ESG practices as a mediating variable in explaining the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance between 2015 and 2021. The sample consisted of 57 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the MENA region, and the data were collected from the Thomson Reuters database (Data Stream).

This research paper showed the positive and significant mediating effect of the ESG practice on Banks’ financial performance. Thus, banks’ financial and stock market profitability is influenced by ESG information disclosure. This finding shows that taking ESG into account improves the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance.

The results may interest academic researchers, regulators and policymakers and would support stakeholders and decision-makers who wish to discover how executive incentive compensation affects financial performance in banks.

This study contributes to previous literature by studying the mediating effect of ESG practices on the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance. Indeed, the originality of this research paper is justified by the scarcity of studies and, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, constitutes one of the first attempts to examine this relationship via a mediating variable, i.e. ESG.

This paper aims to investigate whether executive compensation, corporate social responsibility (CSR)-based incentives, environmental social and governance (ESG) performance and firm performance are the significant predictors of CSR committees, in addition to CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics, from the tenet of stakeholder and managerial power theories.

Switzerland is an exemplary country from the perspective of corporate governance and executive compensation. This empirical study includes a panel data set of listed Swiss companies, so fixed-effect logistic regression has been used.

It has been found that the companies that offer CSR-based incentives and higher compensation to their CEOs and have better ESG performance are more likely to have CSR committees.

This empirical paper fills the gap in the literature, guides practitioners about the factors that influence the creation and efficiency of CSR committees, and inspires regulatory bodies to ponder on a mandatory CSR committee to form resilient and sustainable organizations worldwide.

COVID-19 has re-emphasized the prominence of sustainability and the stakeholder approach. Thus, this paper indicates that CSR committees require the adaption and implementation of a holistic sustainability policy that integrates both external and internal factors and thereby provides a whole process for sustainability issues.

The impact of CSR committees on corporate social performance (CSP) has already been investigated. However, the predictors of CSR committees have been less scrutinized in the literature.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

Much prior work involving director incentives and corporate behaviour has been focussing on their absolute dollar value or the intrinsic value and generated mixed findings. Comparison theories, however, suggest that the relative value of an incentive may be the main drive for individual performance. This study attempts to investigate the role of director relative pay in promoting the board’s intervention with unrelated diversification decisions.

The analysis uses data from firms operating in more than one segment during the period from 1999 to 2019. Data were obtained from WRDS databases. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis and the two-stage system generalized method of moments (GMM) were run to test the hypotheses. To test the robustness of the findings, alternative proxies for the key independent variables were used in separate analyses.

The results support the hypothesis that unrelated diversification negatively impact firm performance, while higher director relative pay will help reduce unrelated business diversification. The absolute director pay, however, has no significant impact on corporate strategic choices. The results also highlight the moderating effect of director overcompensation. Director overcompensation will cancel out the impact of relative director pay on unrelated diversification.

This study takes a fresh theoretical perspective by framing the investigation using the dimensional comparison theory to address the single untended comparison framework in the director pay structure – the intra-individual framework. It is the first to investigate the role of director relative pay in corporate strategic choices. The findings support the contention that the relative value of the incentive is an important indicator of the effectiveness of the pay.

The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

This study aims to examine the impact of board characteristics on firm performance while also exploring the influential mechanisms that help Chinese listed companies establish effective boards of directors and strengthen their corporate governance mechanisms.

This paper uses machine learning methods to investigate the predictive ability of the board of directors' characteristics on firm performance based on the data from Chinese A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China during 2008–2021. This study further analyzes board characteristics with relatively strong predictive ability and their predictive models on firm performance.

The results show that nonlinear machine learning methods are more effective than traditional linear models in analyzing the impact of board characteristics on Chinese firm performance. Among the series characteristics of the board of directors, the contribution ratio in prediction from directors compensation, director shareholding ratio, the average age of directors and directors' educational level are significant, and these characteristics have a roughly nonlinear correlation to the prediction of firm performance; the improvement of the predictive ability of board characteristics on firm performance in state-owned enterprises in China performs better than that in private enterprises.

The findings of this study provide valuable suggestions for enriching the theory of board governance, strengthening board construction and optimizing the effectiveness of board governance. Furthermore, these impacts can serve as a valuable reference for board construction and selection, aiding in the rational selection of boards to establish an efficient and high-performing board of directors.

The study findings unequivocally demonstrate the superiority of nonlinear machine learning approaches over traditional linear models in examining the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in China. Within the suite of board characteristics, director compensation, shareholding ratio, average age and educational level are particularly noteworthy, consistently demonstrating strong, nonlinear associations with firm performance. Within the suite of board characteristics, director compensation, shareholding ratio, average age and educational level are particularly noteworthy, consistently demonstrating strong, nonlinear associations with firm performance. The study reveals that the predictive performance of board attributes is generally more robust for state-owned enterprises in China in comparison to their counterparts in the private sector.

This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).

Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.

The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.

The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.

As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.

The authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees.

The authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories.

The authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay.

This study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive.

Companies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation.

This is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.

This article investigated whether the executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes are aligned with stakeholders' demands for higher corporate voluntary disclosures. Moreover, the study also examined the moderating role of the auditor's reputation in the direction of association among executive compensation, corporate governance attributes, and voluntary disclosures.

The study used a sample of S&P BSE index constituents' 90 Indian firms for 2017–2019. The voluntary disclosure scores were fetched from the India Disclosure Index Report published by FTI Consulting. This analysis was carried out in two parts by applying four panel-data regression models in the agency and signalling theories framework. First, the study examined the association between executive compensation, board strength, composition, gender diversity, and voluntary disclosures. Second, the article investigated the moderating role of the “Big 4” in the direction of association among executive compensation, corporate governance attributes, and voluntary disclosures.

The willingness of executives to share private information with stakeholders depends on the compensation they receive from their employer. The higher compensation paid to executives leads to a higher “tone from the top,” which is better aligned with stakeholder interests. Further, the research also found that bigger board sizes, a higher proportion of independent and woman directors (indicators of good governance), and an auditor's reputation are associated with increased voluntary disclosure.

The findings showed that the executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes are aligned with stakeholders' demand for higher voluntary information from firms. Moreover, the study also found that the “Big 4” play a moderating role in this direction. The choice of a reputed auditor indicates the firms' long-term positive future perspectives, which strengthens investor confidence in the financial market.

The study suggests that fair executive compensation can address the agency problem.

This research furnishes managers and different stakeholders with significant implications of executives' compensation, corporate governance, and auditor's reputation in the best interests of a firm through reducing potential risks of information asymmetry.

This study aims to examine the mediating effects of corporate governance mechanisms like the board of directors on the association between disruptive technology adoption by audit clients and the risk of material misstatements, including inherent risk and control risk. In particular, the authors study the mediating effects of board characteristics such as board size, independence and gender diversity.

Based on a sample of 100 audit clients listed on the FTSE 100 from 2015 to 2021, this study uses structural equation modelling to test the research objectives.

The findings indicate a significant and negative association between disruptive technology adoption by audit clients and inherent risk. However, there is no significant evidence observed for control risk. The utilisation of disruptive technology by the audit client has a significant impact on the board characteristics, resulting in an increase in board size, greater independence and gender diversity. The authors also find strong evidence that board independence mediates the association between disruptive technology usage and both inherent risk and control risk. In addition, board size and gender exhibit distinct and differential mediating effects on the association and across the two types of risks.

The study reveals that the significant role of using disruptive technology by audit clients in reducing the risk of material misstatements is closely associated with the board of directors, which makes audit clients place greater emphasis on the construction of effective corporate governance.

This study offers essential primary evidence that can assist policymakers and standard setters in formulating guidance and recommendations for board size, independence and gender quotas, ensuring the enhancement of effective governance and supporting the future of audit within the next generation of digital services.

With respect to relevant stakeholders, it is imperative for audit clients to recognise that corporate governance represents a fundamental means of addressing the ramifications of applying disruptive technology, particularly as they pertain to inherent and control risks within the audit client.

This study contributes to the existing literature by investigating the joint impact of corporate governance and the utilisation of disruptive technology by audit clients on inherent risk and control risk, which has not been investigated by previous research.