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A green innovation strategy is an important step for enterprises to balance economic and environmental. As the executors of strategic decisions, the attitude and capabilities of senior managers determine the effectiveness of implementing green innovation. Therefore, this paper aims to explore the relationship between executive compensation incentives and green innovation.

Based on the data of heavily polluting enterprises listed in China's A-share market from 2015 to 2020, this study constructs an OLS model with fixed effects of time and industry, and uses the mediation three-step method to verify the correlation between executive compensation incentives, innovation openness and green innovation. Meanwhile, the grouping regression was used to test the moderating effect of environmental regulation on executive compensation incentives.

The empirical results show that executive salary incentives promote green innovation and equity incentives inhibit green innovation; the openness breadth partially mediates the relationship between salary incentives, equity incentives and green innovation, while the openness depth only partially mediates the relationship between equity incentives and green innovation; and environmental regulation positively moderates executive incentives.

Due to sample selection and variable measurement, the study lacks certain generality. Therefore, future research needs to further analyze the internal factors affecting green innovation from multiple dimensions.

This study provides a new evidence for analyzing how executive compensation measures affect green innovation, and further enhances the mediating mechanism of open innovation.

This study has significant theoretical implications for examining the intra-firm factors that affect green innovation.

This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it examines if option and stock compensations raise creditor's risk, and which one is more important than the other. Second, it explores if CEO's compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence to raise creditor's risk. Third, it investigates how banks use different loan terms to alleviate their credit risk.

This study used advanced regression analysis and use of generalized methods of moment methodology.

The results show that option compensation is more important than stock compensation in raising credit risk; option compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence, giving rise to a much higher credit risk; and covenant usage is more important than other loan contract terms in mitigating credit risk given that covenant use could not be substituted away by using other loan contract terms such as increasing interest rate, reducing principal or shortening loan duration. This paper has practical implications for credit markets.

The main implication is that hand-collect data are available up to 2010.

It informs creditors the potential sources of loan risk emanating from option rather than stock incentives; it informs creditors that option incentive interacts with CEO overconfidence rendering the credit risk bigger than expected, and it informs creditors the importance of using covenants vis-à-vis other loan contract terms for mitigating compensation and overconfidence risk.

Banks are alerted to the risk due to the interaction between overconfidence and compensations, implying that overconfident managers remunerated with options compensations are more risky than overconfident managers who are not remunerated as such.

This paper is original: (1) The authors show that option compensation is more risky than stock compensation from viewpoint of creditors. This has not been assessed. (2) Interaction between managerial compensation and managerial overconfidence has not been assessed before. (3) Use of different loan contract terms to alleviate risk from overconfident managers (who are prone to over investment but who are innovative according to the literature) has not been evaluated.

In this study, the authors demonstrate the inherent connections between bank risk-taking, performance and executive compensation in the banking sector of China by developing a theoretical model and performing empirical tests with simultaneous equation models.

The authors construct a multi-task principal-agent model to capture agency problems in China, and the model can be extended to various cases. In empirical tests, simultaneous equation models are used to examine the theoretical predictions by eliminating endogenous concerns efficiently compared with the methods in the existing literature.

The results indicate that the regulator fails to provide bank managers with positive incentives to control risk, whereas the compensation guidance policy (2010) proposed by the CBRC alleviates this problem in China. Additionally, the authors established that shareholders reward bank managers for better and more stable performance. The authors propose the introduction of restricted stock options into the compensation design, as the existing compensation design fails to balance the performance and risk-taking of banks.

First, the executive compensation structure and details in China are not available. In addition, the equity-based incentive compensation is forbidden. Therefore, this paper cannot provide more details about how the compensation structure affects bank manager behaviours. Secondly, the database consists only 25 listed commercial banks. Luckily, the assets of these banks could account for the vast majority of China's banking assets. The authors also expect that new methodologies such as machine learning and deep learning will be adopted in the research on bank risk management.

First, the regulator should optimise the compositions and payment rule of bank executive compensations. Secondly, it is advisable to adopt restricted deferred share reward or stock option compensation in due course. Thirdly, the regulator can require the banks that undertake excessive risks and troubled by moral hazard to increase the independent director proportion on the bank board according to the authors' empirical tests that higher independent proportion prevents the risk accumulations effectively. Fourthly, except for absolute compensation, the gap between executives' salary and average employee's income should be taken account.

This study provides a theoretical framework that incorporates the manager behaviours, executive compensation and bank regulations, and it provides empirical tests by solving endogenous concerns. Additionally, this study examines the effects of China's compensation guidelines issued in 2010. The authors believe that this study adds value to the existing literature by illustrating the compensation mechanism in China.

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

This paper aims to investigate how a US firm’s political landscape affects the integration of environmental, social and governance (hereafter ESG) measures in CEO compensation contracts, thereby affecting the firm’s ESG performance and credit rating.

Based on the results of state senatorial and presidential elections and the location of a US firm’s headquarters, the authors categorize whether a firm has a political environment that is predominantly Democratic (blue) or Republican (red). The empirical analyses are based on a sample of US firms in the period 2014–2021.

The authors find that firms in blue states are more likely to link CEO compensation to ESG performance measures. Further, the results show that firms in blue states with ESG-linked compensation contracts have better ESG performance. Lastly, the authors find evidence that a firm’s ESG performance has a positive impact on its credit rating, but the impact is weakened if firms in red states link ESG performance to executive compensation.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research that explores how a firm’s political environment affects the use of ESG performance measures in CEO compensation contracts. Furthermore, the authors contribute to the literature by showing evidence that the political environment interacts with the impact of ESG-linked compensation incentives on the firm’s ESG performance and, thus, its credit rating.

This paper aims to investigate whether executive compensation, corporate social responsibility (CSR)-based incentives, environmental social and governance (ESG) performance and firm performance are the significant predictors of CSR committees, in addition to CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics, from the tenet of stakeholder and managerial power theories.

Switzerland is an exemplary country from the perspective of corporate governance and executive compensation. This empirical study includes a panel data set of listed Swiss companies, so fixed-effect logistic regression has been used.

It has been found that the companies that offer CSR-based incentives and higher compensation to their CEOs and have better ESG performance are more likely to have CSR committees.

This empirical paper fills the gap in the literature, guides practitioners about the factors that influence the creation and efficiency of CSR committees, and inspires regulatory bodies to ponder on a mandatory CSR committee to form resilient and sustainable organizations worldwide.

COVID-19 has re-emphasized the prominence of sustainability and the stakeholder approach. Thus, this paper indicates that CSR committees require the adaption and implementation of a holistic sustainability policy that integrates both external and internal factors and thereby provides a whole process for sustainability issues.

The impact of CSR committees on corporate social performance (CSP) has already been investigated. However, the predictors of CSR committees have been less scrutinized in the literature.

This paper aims to examine the effect of contractual factors and noncontractual factors on tax avoidance (TA).

The sample comprises 400 firm-year observations of 67 companies listed on the HDAX during the period 2008–2017. The generalized least square panel regression is applied.

The study results confirm a significant effect of long-term chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives and CEO attributes on TA. Findings exhibit a significant impact of foreign CEO on TA, whereas an insider CEO mitigates TA. The results hold for several robustness tests, with lag effective tax rate as dependent variable and with splitting foreign CEO into European and non-European origin.

First, the sample is limited to 400 firm-year observations and to the German context. For shareholders, the study provides first evidence on relationships between the geographical and internal versus external labor market for CEOs and TA. For researchers, the findings underline the importance of integrating behavioral approaches like place attachment theory and the rooting theory in the theory of TA.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of both contractual determinants and behavioral determinants on TA in the German context as an emerged economy with a dualistic corporate governance. This study contributes to the existing literature regarding the scientific debates about the impact of CEOs and CEO attributes on TA. It also analyses the balance between the place attachment theory and the rooting theory in the face of the compensation outcomes of agency theory.

This study investigates the current trends in CEO compensation by applying a bibliometric technique from the Scopus database.

The bibliometric analysis examines CEO compensation trends through the Scopus database. Frequency analysis is conducted using Microsoft Excel, while data visualisation is performed using VOSviewer. Finally, citation metrics are carried out using Harzing's Publish or Perish.

The results reveal that research into CEO compensation has been consistently increasing since 1976. This study identifies the most popular publication trends, the most active institutions, the top funding institutions, annual publication growth, document and source type, publishers, subject area, author co-citations, highly cited articles, top publishing countries, and keyword co-occurrences. Notably, Arizona State University in the United States (US) is the leading institution with the most prominent publications on CEO compensation. The US is the most active country involved in CEO compensation research.

The current research only derived articles from the Scopus database. Nonetheless, the findings provide an in-depth comprehension of the meaning of “CEO compensation” and present the outline of the research trends on the concept, thus significantly facilitating further studies.

The findings can assist researchers in comprehending and classifying the drivers of CEO compensation previously identified and proven in past studies. Additionally, the findings also create opportunities for new researchers to study CEO compensation.

This study is among the pioneering research investigating CEO compensation-related publications and utilising the Scopus database from an international perspective. This study also offers a historical view of CEO remuneration, a summary of the most significant nations, journals, and writers on the topic, and an outline of how CEO remuneration studies have changed over time. These contributions will enable other researchers to focus on this subject.

The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

This study aims to examine the impact of board characteristics on firm performance while also exploring the influential mechanisms that help Chinese listed companies establish effective boards of directors and strengthen their corporate governance mechanisms.

This paper uses machine learning methods to investigate the predictive ability of the board of directors' characteristics on firm performance based on the data from Chinese A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China during 2008–2021. This study further analyzes board characteristics with relatively strong predictive ability and their predictive models on firm performance.

The results show that nonlinear machine learning methods are more effective than traditional linear models in analyzing the impact of board characteristics on Chinese firm performance. Among the series characteristics of the board of directors, the contribution ratio in prediction from directors compensation, director shareholding ratio, the average age of directors and directors' educational level are significant, and these characteristics have a roughly nonlinear correlation to the prediction of firm performance; the improvement of the predictive ability of board characteristics on firm performance in state-owned enterprises in China performs better than that in private enterprises.

The findings of this study provide valuable suggestions for enriching the theory of board governance, strengthening board construction and optimizing the effectiveness of board governance. Furthermore, these impacts can serve as a valuable reference for board construction and selection, aiding in the rational selection of boards to establish an efficient and high-performing board of directors.

The study findings unequivocally demonstrate the superiority of nonlinear machine learning approaches over traditional linear models in examining the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in China. Within the suite of board characteristics, director compensation, shareholding ratio, average age and educational level are particularly noteworthy, consistently demonstrating strong, nonlinear associations with firm performance. Within the suite of board characteristics, director compensation, shareholding ratio, average age and educational level are particularly noteworthy, consistently demonstrating strong, nonlinear associations with firm performance. The study reveals that the predictive performance of board attributes is generally more robust for state-owned enterprises in China in comparison to their counterparts in the private sector.