This paper focuses on Ṣukūk issuance determinants in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Given the dual characteristic of debt and equity of Ṣukūk as well as their…
This paper focuses on Ṣukūk issuance determinants in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Given the dual characteristic of debt and equity of Ṣukūk as well as their unique benefits of social responsibility, the author questions whether the theories of capital structure, the trade-off and the pecking order are able to well explain the Ṣukūk issuance.
First, the author verifies these theories using capital structure determinants and regresses the Ṣukūk change on these determinants. Second, the author tests the trade-off theory with the target debt model and third, verifies the pecking order theory using the fund flow deficit model.
The empirical results show that capital structure determinants fail to explain both theories. The author confirms that the Ṣukūk change is significatively linked to the deviation from a Ṣukūk target. So, issuing firms balance the marginal costs of Ṣukūk and their benefits of religiosity and social responsibility toward a target debt. The author finds no evidence of the pecking order theory.
This study contributes to corporate finance theory and corporate social responsibility. It verifies if capital structure theories proved in conventional financing can well explain Islamic bonds issuance given their social responsibility benefits.
Managers and investors would pay attention to the social factors explaining Ṣukūk issuance in their finance and investment decisions. They would be enhanced to use this financing tool knowing its social unique benefits. This also should encourage governments to enhance this socially responsible financing. Rating agencies would be motivated to evaluate Ṣukūk and firms would improve the quality and relevance of disclosure to get the best rating.
The author highlights the social factors explaining Ṣukūk issuance and enhances corporate social responsibility (CSR).
The author extends the few literature testing capital structure theories for Islamic bonds and highlights the specific social responsible features of Ṣukūk that would bridge their issuance to capital structure theories. So the author enhances the concept of Islamic CSR. Tying capital structure theories to CSR would also help developing Islamic finance theory as a unique social responsible framework.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the two components of market discipline, investment account holder (IAH) monitoring and the consequent reaction of the Islamic…
The purpose of this study is to investigate the two components of market discipline, investment account holder (IAH) monitoring and the consequent reaction of the Islamic banks in GCC countries for the 2004–2013 period, including the recent financial crisis of 2008.
We address the research question that Investment Account holders (IAH) in GCC countries suc as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (UAE) monitor their banks. Regression analysis was used to examine the dependence level of profit-sharing investment account (PSIA) growth rate on bank risk characteristics (CAMEL variables). Then, the reaction of banks by regression influencing CAMEL variables of one-lagged period on PSIA growth rate was verified.
The results provide evidence of the first component of market discipline, i.e. the IAH monitoring, in KSA, Bahrain and UAE. The common result to the three countries is that market actors are concerned with accounting information on capital adequacy. However, in UAE, they are also interested in assets performance, whereas they look more at earnings in Bahrain. The results show evidence of the second component in Bahrain; the bank reaction to IAH monitoring and subsequently IAH discipline in Bahrain. Finally, the results do not support any impact of the financial crisis.
The sample size is small although it is constituted by banks having a sufficient number of observations.
This study highlights the importance of IAH discipline, which would help prudential bank monitoring by regulators and wealth development for both investors and managers. It should increase the disclosure of relevant information as for the part of effective accountability of Islamic banks’ governance.
This study contributes to the literature on market discipline by dealing with Islamic banks. It is one of the very few studies to investigate IAH discipline in Islamic banks and the second component of market discipline, i.e. the influence of monitoring on banks.