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The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of major non-economic events, such as the announcement of Greek national parliamentary elections during the period 2000-2009, and search for stock manipulation and methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets. The Financial Sector in Greece is one of the most important and fast growing sectors during recent years and accounts to about 16.17-17.74 per cent of gross domestic product. The ten largest Greek banks listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, accounted to 38.34 per cent of the whole capitalisation of the Athens Stock Exchange during year end 2009.

By using event study methodology and Market Model and analyzing data of all Greek bank stocks prices listed in Athens Stock Exchange, before and after the announcement of four Greek national parliamentary elections during period 2000-2009, we find interesting results about stock market manipulation.

Using daily data from the Athens Stock Exchange, the results of this paper claim that the four Greek national parliamentary elections during the period 2000-2009, had no statistically significant effect on the Greek banks stocks. The results show that Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) were slightly positive or negative for Greek banks’ stocks, but not statistically significant in 5 and 10 per cent confidence levels. Results show no manipulation effect in banks’ stocks even if single-party governments in Greece caused elections early, sudden or even opportunistic timing, having an incentive to attempt to manipulate stocks to increase their chances of re-election.

Results show that CAARs were slightly positive or negative for Greek banks stocks, but not statistically significant in 5 and 10 per cent confidence levels, but when illicit funds or assets have been acquired from stock manipulation, as small as can be, then one fact remains constant. Proceeds from illicit activities must be disguised in some way to avoid being discovered and then being recovered. Especially, during current the financial crisis, debt crisis and the extraordinary liquidity support measures taken by the European Central Bank (ECB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Commission to support Greek economy, using methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets are extremely important. Indirect methods such as net worth analysis, bank deposit analysis, expenditure method or sources and application of funds analysis, to detect ill gotten assets, and then when ill gotten income and assets from bank stock manipulation are found, a restraining order or court order will help to recovery assets by freezing and finally confiscating them by two types of forfeiture – criminal and civil forfeitures. Establishing a code of conduct informing employees of the risks and consequences of insider trading, creating a culture of honesty and high ethics and implementing Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation to cope with off-shore companies trading, can help to recover ill gotten assets.

The paper examines if there is banks stocks manipulation around announcement of Greek national parliamentary elections during the period 2000-2009; suggesting methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets and improving the current position of the Greek economy. Findings offer important positive implications for investors, political analysts and society as a whole, as Greek banks stocks show that they are not subject to political risk and manipulation and that there are methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets. A stable bank sector is prerequisite for economy growth.

The purpose of this paper is to examine politically exposed persons and major Greek political parties' funding sources as well as the anti-money laundering regulatory framework for political parties' funding sources.

This paper aimed at investigating data about Greek political parties' funding by identifying new problems and developing solutions.

The main findings are that Greek political parties' major sources of revenues are public subsidies and bank loans. Also, data show that two major Greek political parties cannot easily repay their bank loans (especially PASOK) and must renegotiate terms with banks and must agree for a new, long-term and lower payment schedule at a lower interest rate. Extending the period of repayment is necessary for viability of debts, and banks will protect themselves against default and total losses of about 253.1 million euros from the two major political parties. Public subsidies are the only collateral that Greek political parties offer to banks.

As a result of research, structural changes are necessary to immediately be made in order to cope with politically exposed persons and political parties' corruption and funding in Greece, especially during the current fiscal crises. Greek political parties need to raise funds from other sources than only public subsidies. Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework have to stop conduit contributions and force banks to apply Know Your Client Principle for donors. Also, to include on Suspicious Activity Report a checkbox of “Political Finance Violations”. Establishing a code of conduct informing employees of the risks and subsequences of political corruption, creating a culture of honesty and high ethics and implementing Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation to cope with corruption in political parties' funding can help to recover ill-gotten assets. Finally, implementing Business Principles for Countering Bribery and UK Bribery Act will increase transparency in funding of Greek political parties.

The paper examines corruption and funding sources of Greek political parties, especially during the period 2009-2011, suggesting policy measures to deter and detect money laundering and illegal funding to politically exposed persons and political parties. Findings offer important measures for political analysts, government and society as a whole. A stable political system is prerequisite for a healthy society and for economic growth.

The purpose of this article is only to whet the appetite for discussing the relationship between globalisation of crime and civil liberties and privacy. The topic is too complicated to be thoroughly discussed in a short article at a time which is witnessing diversified economic activities emanating from the adoption of policies of deregulation and steps to facilitate the movement of capital across international boundaries. Needless to say, the process of the globalisation of economic activity has been, to a great extent, enhanced by the computer revolution which in turn has reached unprecedent electronic dimensions coupled with a parallel increase in inventions and new complicated industries, all of which are creations of human beings in the drive to meet new changes and challenges. However, not all men are good citizens adhering to ideal principles and norms to maintain social integration, prosperity and public tranquillity. Instead, some people are inclined by their very nature to dismantle the social system by resorting to any means for improving their economic conditions at the expense of other members of society by committing illegal acts, especially in the economic sector. The situation is worse when the system creates a shield against combating economic crime under the pretext of the protection of civil liberties and right of privacy of the offender who takes advantage of the instruments which enshrine such civil liberties and rights.

Asset recovery proceedings increasingly target corrupt foreign officials who acquire lavish assets as a result of capital gained through criminal acts. One extremely difficult issue arising in asset recovery proceedings is whether the capital used to acquire the assets can be traced to a criminal act. The purpose of this paper is to critique US tracing procedure through comparative analysis.

A prominent series of cases brought by the USA and France against assets owned by Teodoro “Teodorín” Nguema Obiang, second Vice President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, produced mixed results on the tracing element. This paper utilizes a qualitative comparative case analysis to examine the US and French cases.

The US results reflect serious weaknesses in the US law as compared to more effective French asset recovery procedure.

Though this paper is certainly a comparative case study analysis, nearly identical facts and two different jurisdictions reaching separate conclusions bring us in the legal community as close as we can realistically come to quasi-experimental research. Comparative research in this area is severely lacking and sorely needed. The mechanisms identified in the French system clearly show flaws that are present in the US system.

A measure of how much money is laundered is required to determine the effectiveness of any anti-money laundering regime and the reduction of money laundering in targeted areas. In the absence of useful estimates, authorities need to look at the best quality data available to arrive at a meaningful estimate and a consequent target for reduction of money laundering. Since tax crimes are viewed as one of the top three sources of laundered money, an understanding of the underlying predicate offence – tax evasion – may be indicative of the values or volumes involved in order to facilitate a target setting process. It is suggested that a “whole of government approach”, as is advanced by the OECD, is applied between the tax administration and the financial intelligence centre in South Africa. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

By reviewing tax gap and money laundering estimation models and results from South Africa's first tax amnesty, it is proposed that micro analysis methodologies are applied to arrive at an estimate of the size and impact of money laundering which results from tax evasion practices.

By making basic inferences from the results of the 2003 voluntary disclosure programme, it is estimated that a potential revenue gap of between ZAR4 billion and ZAR12 billion exists for personal income tax alone and that the value of personal assets acquired from the proceeds of crime can, at any time, be as high as ZAR1.4 trillion.

In the absence of empirical and statistical data, it is necessary for authorities in developing countries to identify and make use of the most relevant and detailed data to assess its effectiveness in identifying, quantifying and reducing money laundering.

This paper aims to determine the types of legal mechanisms that authorities can use to recover stolen assets for and from China.

Newspaper articles and books are examined as are relevant reports by various regulatory authorities and academic institutions.

The effectiveness of legal mechanisms in the recovery of stolen assets may be affected by issues such as the difficulties in tracing illicit funds, the ambiguous nature of “value” as well as the rise in technology.

There are limited data available in relation to the prevalence of corrupt officials along the Belt and Road Initiative and the statistical success in the recovery of stolen assets. Any discussions within this paper are based on the impressionistic observations of this author, which may not reflect the true state of affairs of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Those who are interested in examining how authorities could recover stolen assets from and for China will have an interest in this topic.

The value of the paper is to demonstrate the difficulties in recovering stolen assets for and from China.

To evaluate the global anti-money laundering regulation of digital assets and cryptocurrencies.

This article provides an analysis of macro trends in digital asset money laundering regulation and explores the regulatory frameworks in some of the leading international crypto markets.

As the popularity and public adoption of digital assets have grown, global regulators have turned their attention to the risks of anti-money laundering. Monitoring the evolving international regulatory landscape is essential for organizations looking to successfully take advantage of digital asset-related investment opportunities.

Market participants should understand all applicable laws and procedures before they decide to enter the digital asset market. These considerations can become even more complex as businesses interact with multiple international regulators.

This article is designed to help investors understand the global anti-money laundering regulatory landscape regarding digital assets, particularly for those institutions interested in diversifying with crypto-related investment opportunities.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the current state and future pressures of money laundering on Jamaica and the financial crime connections between the UK and Jamaica.

The paper focuses on the primary data collected from a series of semi-structured interviews with members from the law enforcement and financial services sectors of Jamaica. The main objective of the interviews was to secure a range of opinions concerning the problem of money laundering in the country. Interviewees were selected from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Financial Investigation Division of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, the British High Commission and the Financial Services Commission. The names of all subjects shall remain anonymous to protect the privacy of those who were interviewed.

Through the analysis of primary data it will be shown that Jamaica remains vulnerable to money laundering – particularly the proceeds of crime laundered through the remittance sector – despite a legislative overhaul in 2007 to adopt the UK’s Proceeds of Crime Act. Ineffective legislation is most certainly due to generic weaknesses and flaws which are applicable to many Caribbean states, for example, a lack of political will to enforce anti-money laundering regulations, corruption, inadequate police training, lack of resources, a strong remittance sector and geographical positioning along a drug-trafficking route.

This paper is the first of its kind to comprehensively analyze the money laundering situation in Jamaica, using detailed first accounts from members of the law enforcement and financial sectors.

Tax amnesty (TA) schemes are typical in developing countries. Governments’ claims and suppositions are continually heightened; however, this may differ in actuality. This study aims to present an overview of the effectiveness of TA schemes and the problems they raise in implementing anti-money laundering regulations.

This study used a qualitative research design. Content analysis was used to analyse research articles, reports, legal documents and news articles.

Every amnesty offered in Pakistan from 1956 to 2018 failed to meet government expectations. Instead, the continuity resulted in an irrepressible black economy. The black economy’s uncontrollability undermines tax collection and hinders a robust anti-money laundering regime. Significantly, tax holidays with discrepant legislation strengthen evaders, plunderers and launderers. These policies severely impede the implementation of anti-money laundering policies in the financial institutions of Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan's geopolitical location, circumstance and war against terror cannot afford any policy that provides monetary relaxation to offenders.

There is no concrete evidence to support long-term economic progress through the implementation of amnesty schemes as a revenue collection policy. This study evaluates previous studies and findings to understand the effect of tax amnesties on the financial industry of Pakistan. The findings have practical implications for tax collection authorities, policymakers and international financial bodies.

Previous studies have discussed the advantages and disadvantages of Pakistan’s regular tax amnesties. However, this study discusses the implementation of TA schemes concerning anti-money laundering regulations and customer due diligence by financial institutes and provides suggestions to minimise its negative implications.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the role of anti-money-laundering mechanisms in combating bribery. In particular, it shows how parties receiving bribes can circumvent the mechanisms currently in place to launder the money they receive for their services.

Through analysis of 25 formal expert interviews with prevention experts and 25 informal expert interviews with money launderers from Europe, concrete ways of laundering bribes were found. Consequently, it is suggested that alternative mechanisms are necessary to successfully fight corruption.

A combination of more severe punishments and anti-bribery incentives could help to eliminate corruption.

This study’s findings are limited to the perspectives of 50 interviewees. Hence, a study with a larger sample conducted in different countries or at a different time could yield different results.

By identifying gaps in existing anti-money-laundering mechanisms, this paper aims to provide compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights into why the current prevention schemes are ineffective and how corruption could be more effectively tackled.

The findings demonstrate that current anti-money-laundering mechanisms are unhelpful in fighting bribery. Hence, alternative anti-bribery mechanisms are needed.