Search results

In this paper content analysis is used to examine the lobbying positions of publicly listed companies making submissions on ED 49, Accounting for Identifiable Intangible Assets. A number of content analysis measures are used in an attempt to gain additional insights into the strength of lobbying positions held. The influence of debt contracting and political costs variables upon lobbying position on capitalisation and amortisation of identifiable intangible assets is investigated. Significant relationships are found with the explanatory variables interest coverage, company size, effective tax rate and membership of a politically sensitive industry. These relationships are most consistently observed when lobbying position is measured using more basic content analysis techniques, such as sentence counts and counting the number of supporting arguments presented in submissions. Use of apparently more sophisticated techniques of content analysis fail to perform as well, possibly due to the introduction of greater subjectivity to the process.

Intangible assets comprise goodwill and identifiable intangible assets with finite and indefinite lives. Current New Zealand GAAP amortizes intangible assets on a systematic basis over their useful lives, with the proviso that the amortization period for goodwill cannot exceed 20 years. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) do not permit the periodic amortization of goodwill and identifiable intangible assets with indefinite lives. Instead, these intangibles are subject to a periodic impairment test with any impairment recognised in profit or loss. In the absence of an impairment loss, the IFRS rule would increase earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and earnings (E), but this impact should not affect the value of the enterprise (EV) and the value of the firm’s equity (P). Hence, valuation heuristics for EV/EBIT (enterprise value to EBIT) and PE (price to earnings) multiples, which are commonly used for valuations and which have evolved under the amortization rule, need to be revised downward to adjust for the IFRS‐induced increase in EBIT and E. Our analysis of New Zealand companies with intangible assets indicates that the mean EV/EBIT and PE multiples with amortization of intangibles of 12.403 and 13.586, respectively, decrease to 10.971 and 12.346, respectively, without amortization of intangibles.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the value relevance of intangible assets, including goodwill and other types of intangibles in the pre- and post-adoption periods of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Most importantly, this paper investigates whether the value relevance of reported intangible assets is associated with their value reliability. Furthermore, this paper reports whether the adoption of IFRS improves the value relevance of intangible assets and alters the relationship between value relevance and reliability.

Both price and return models based on Ohlosn theory (1995) are employed to test the value relevance and value reliability of intangibles. Australian-listed firms with capitalised intangibles from 2001 to 2009 are selected in this study. The sample includes 6,650 firm-year observations.

The main result shows that capitalised intangible assets are value relevant in Australia, in both the pre- and post-adoption of IFRS periods. Value relevance is higher in firms with more reliable information on intangible assets. This study finds that the value relevance of intangibles has declined in the post-adoption period of IFRS. However, the positive relationship between the value relevance and the reliability of intangibles has remained unchanged in the post-adoption period.

The paper contributes a new measurement of value reliability of accounting information about intangibles. This paper is one of few studies on the relationship between value relevance and reliability of intangible assets. The results show that value relevance is positively associated with value reliability. This suggests that, when accounting standard setters assess whether the existing IFRS of intangibles should be improved in the future, they need to think not only in terms of whether the standard can provide more relevant information of intangibles to investors but also whether the standard can make the information of intangibles more reliable.

In 2009 and 2010, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) adopted new accounting standards for nonprofit mergers and acquisitions. The new accounting standards are an example of the constitutive role accounting can play in how people think about economic events, since the FASB defined a new concept (the “inherent contribution”) and required valuation of intangible assets that were often previously unrecognized.

The FASB’s stated goals included minimizing “pooling” accounting and maximizing transparency regarding fair value information, acquired identifiable intangible assets, and the relation between consideration paid and the fair values of identifiable assets acquired. The FASB expected many combinations would involve little or no consideration. It also expressed concern that some organizations would undervalue assets acquired, especially intangible assets.

For a sample of 2012–2017 nonprofit hospital combinations, we find general agreement with the FASB’s expectations. Almost all combinations were accounted for as acquisitions, not mergers, even though there was frequently no consideration paid. More acquirers recorded “inherent contributions” than goodwill, because the net fair value of the acquired hospital’s identifiable assets exceeded the consideration paid. Acquirers ascribed value to assets, such as intangible assets, that would have gone unreported under the prior accounting rules, although lower levels of intangible assets were recognized in nonprofit business combinations, relative to total non-goodwill assets acquired, than in public companies’ acquisitions.

In the context of possible future directions in the accounting regulatory arena, this paper considers what policy makers can learn from the experiences of Australian managers and investors in relation to capitalization of intangible assets. Focuses on features of the Australian institutional setting, the motivations behind Australian managers’ decisions to capitalize intangible assets, and capital market efficiency implications. Australian GAAP leaves corporate managers wide discretion to capitalize intangible assets irrespective of whether the assets are acquired or generated internally. One central element of this accounting discretion is the historically liberal attitude of Australian accounting regulators to deviations from the historic cost basis of measurement. Concerns about the availability, and abuses, of reliable measures in relation to intangible assets and revalued assets prompted the USA to proscribe these practices generally. Evidence from the Australian setting suggests these concerns could be overstated. Evidence to date suggests Australian equity markets are no less efficient than the USA markets. Existing evidence suggests uncertainty about intangible investment outcomes is a central property of intangible investment which could quasi‐regulate accounting capitalization practice in a discretionary accounting setting. Supports future regulatory deliberations and research focus on the economics of intangible investments, and information search behaviours of investors, as one way to move forward in the regulatory sphere.

This paper analyzes two types of potential intangible public-sector assets for consideration by public-sector accounting boards. Government investments in health and social programs can create two potential intangible assets: the intangible infrastructure used to deliver the health or social program and the enhanced human capital embodied in the recipients of program services. Because neither of these assets is currently recognized in a government's year-end financial statements or broader general-purpose financial reports (GPFR), these reports may underrepresent the government's true fiscal and service capacity.

The paper uses an international accounting standards framework to analyze: whether investments in health and social programs create intangible assets that meet the definition of an asset as set out by International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS), whether they are assets of the government and whether they are recognizable for the purpose of financial reporting.

The intangible infrastructure asset created to facilitate the delivery of health and social programs would often qualify as a recognizable asset of the government. However, the enhanced recipient human capital asset created through the delivery of health and social programs would, in most instances, not qualify as a recognizable asset of the government, though there likely would be benefits from reporting on it through GPFRs or other mechanisms.

This paper makes two contributions. First, it identifies a previously overlooked intangible asset – the infrastructure created to facilitate the delivery of health and social programs. Second, it presents an argument regarding why, even when it fails to generate a recognizable intangible asset to government, it would be valuable for government to report such investments in supplementary statements.

Aims to contribute to the understanding of the Australian standard‐setting due process. Analyses submissions made on Exposure Draft 49 Accounting for Identifiable Intangible Assets (ED49) as a case study of the strategies employed by lobbyists in their attempt to influence the accounting standard setters. Previous studies on respondents′ submissions have ignored the possibility that, in responding to exposure drafts, lobbyists are provided with a means of persuasion in excess of casting votes. Employs a form of content analysis to study the political process of standard setting. The results suggest that respondents on ED49 attempted to weight their lobby positions with the use of supporting arguments that utilized conceptual and/or economic consequences rationale and presented positions of differing strengths.

This paper aims to evaluate the relation between acquisition premiums and amounts recognised as identifiable intangible assets (IIAs) in business combination, in periods before and after transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

This is an empirical archival research using data from business acquisitions.

In the pre-IFRS period, there is evidence of firms recognising IIAs in business combinations having higher acquisition premiums. This association of acquisition premiums and IIAs ceased with transition to IFRS, notwithstanding the relative latitude provided in accounting standards for the recognition of IIAs.

This paper complements the study by Su and Wells (2015) which founds little association between IIAs and performance subsequent to business acquisitions prior to transition to IFRS. The results here suggest that it is attributable to overpayment. Problematically, the incentives for opportunism remain and an issue requiring address is whether alternative sources of accounting flexibility in relation to business combinations exist, such as goodwill which is no longer subject to mandatory amortisation.

The results are consistent with accounting opportunism and suggest “overpayment” and accounting flexibility having an economic consequence. This would be expected to result in asset impairments in subsequent periods; however, there is little evidence of this occurring.

These results have relevance for regulators concerned with the operation of regulation relating to business acquisitions (AASB 3) and intangible assets (AASB 138).

This paper complements a number of papers concerned with the recognition of IIAs in business combinations and confirms what many researchers in the area typically assume (triangulation).

This study examines how cash and stock bonus compensations influence top executives to allocate a firm's resources to fixed intangible assets investment and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on executives' ownership, firm growth, internal cash flow and leverage.

Using data from 213 non-financial and non-utility UK FTSE 350 firms for the period 2007–2015, generating a total of 1,748 firm-year observations, panel econometric methods are employed to test the authors’ model.

The authors observe that executives' cash bonus compensation positively impacts fixed intangible assets investment. However, executives' stock bonus compensation has a negative and significant influence on fixed intangible assets. The authors further observe that executives either cash bonus or stock bonus crucially invest more in fixed intangible assets when the firm has a growth potential. Also, both cash bonus and stock bonus executives in firms with lower internal cash flow spend less on fixed intangible assets. Similar results are also observed for those stock bonus-motivated executives with an increase in fixed intangible assets for low leverage firms but a decrease for high leverage ones.

A key limitation of this study is its concentration on a single country (United Kingdom). Thus, future studies can expand the focus of this study by looking at it from the perspective of multiple countries.

The practical relevance of the study results is that firms with high growth opportunity in fixed intangible assets activity can use more cash bonus compensation (risk-avoiding incentive) to induce corporate executives to invest more in such activity. This finding is particularly important given the increasing appetite of firms in this knowledge-based economy to create expansion through fixed intangible assets investment. That is, for firms to increase fixed intangible assets investment, this study suggests that executive cash bonus compensation cannot be ignored.

While this paper builds on the classic Q theory of investment literature, it is the first – to the best of the authors’ knowledge – to explore how cash and stock bonus compensations influence top executives to allocate a firm's resources to fixed intangible assets investment and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on executives' ownership, firm growth, internal cash flow and leverage.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the incidence of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) on stock market assessment of intangibles and voluntary disclosure about innovation.

The authors develop three regression models. The first model investigates the stock market valuation of intangible assets and disclosure about innovation. The second model desegregates earnings to assess the relevance of components related to intangibles. The third model investigates how intangible expenses and voluntary disclosure affect analysts forecast dispersion.

Results show that the value relevance of intangible assets and expenses improves with the adoption of IAS 38. Overall, results indicate a decrease in the value relevance of voluntary disclosure about innovation under IFRS. More specifically, results suggest some overlap in the information content of mandated and voluntary disclosure for stock market valuation of intangible assets under IFRS. Findings also suggest that voluntary disclosure moderates market's assessment of expensed intangibles under both Canadian GAAP and IFRS.

IAS 38 requires entities to recognize an intangible asset if certain criteria are met and to disclose specific information about it. In such a context, market participants may refer to a greater extent to financial reporting and to a lesser extent to voluntary disclosure when valuating intangibles.

Managers will have an incentive to better target their communications to ensure a degree of complementarity with financial reporting. In this sense, this study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the relationship between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure about intangibles and evaluate the impact of IFRS on this matter.