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This study aims to assess the extent of the mandatory and voluntary Shariah compliance disclosure in the Shariah Committee Report of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) in Malaysia. The study highlights the accountability and transparency of the Shariah Committee members to provide full disclosure of relevant Shariah compliance information to the stakeholders.

The study adopts content analysis to quantify and code the number of sentences in the Shariah Committee Report disclosed in the 2016 annual report of 47 IFIs in Malaysia. The extent of Shariah compliance disclosure in the Shariah Committee Report is measured based on the Standard (S) and Guidance (G) items outlined in the Shariah Governance Framework (SGF) as well as the Financial Reporting for Islamic Banking Institutions and takaful operators guidelines issued by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) as the reference.

The findings indicate that majority of IFIs complied with the minimum mandatory disclosure requirement based on the Standard (S) items in the Shariah Committee Report as required by the SGF. Highest information on the purpose of Shariah Committee engagement and scope of work performed is disclosed to the stakeholders in almost all IFIs. Only two prominent full-fledged Islamic bank and Islamic banking business in development financial institutions have shown highest accountability to go beyond the minimum disclosure requirement. This includes disclosing higher voluntary information on Shariah governance processes in the Shariah Committee Report of these two IFIs.

This study adopts the SGF (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010), Financial Reporting for Islamic Banking Institutions (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2016) and Financial Reporting for Takaful Operators (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2015) as the reference to develop the measurement of Shariah compliance disclosure in the Shariah Committee Report. These guidelines issued by BNM are still effective during the period of study, i.e. the year 2016.

The findings contribute towards the relevance for BNM as the regulator to enhance the current disclosure requirement in the Shariah Committee Report as stated in the SGF especially in Islamic windows and takaful operators. The main argument of this paper is that the more information being disclosed in the Shariah Committee Report will lead to better Shariah assurances. The issuance of Shariah Governance Policy Document in 2019 is expected to enhance the credibility, accountability and transparency of the Shariah Committee members concerning their oversight responsibility towards Shariah matters in IFIs’ business operations.

After five years since the issuance of the SGF in 2010, further study on the extent of mandatory and voluntary Shariah compliance disclosure is important to highlight the accountability and transparency on the implementation of the Shariah governance across various types of IFIs in Malaysia.

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

The authors examine how the major board reforms recently implemented by countries around the world affect firms' choice of debt.

Using a quasi-experimental setting of major board reforms around the world that aim to improve board-related governance practices in various areas, this study investigates the impact of effective board monitoring on corporate debt choice. The authors employ difference-in-differences-type quasi-natural experiment method and path analysis for hypotheses testing.

The authors find that the implementation of board reforms is positively associated with firms' preference for public debt financing over bank debt. However, this effect tends to weaken after the fourth year following the implementation of board reforms. In additional analyses, the authors find that “rule-based” reforms have a more pronounced effect on firms' choice of debt than do “comply-or-explain” reforms. Both (1) strengthened firm-level internal governance practices that address concerns about the agency cost of debt and (2) reduced information asymmetries play important roles in facilitating firms' debt choice, but the evidence suggests that the former is the economic mechanism through which country-level reforms affect corporate debt choice.

The study extends the literature examining the heterogeneity of corporate debt choices in a global setting and the literature on the consequences of corporate governance reforms.

The findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the corporate board reforms implemented in countries around the world, addressing concerns from critics about their potential harm or ineffectiveness.

The results indicate that country-level board reforms reduce the extent to which shareholder–creditor conflicts harm shareholders.