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How do organizations respond to negative feedback regarding their innovation activities? In this chapter, the authors reconcile contradictory predictions stemming from behavioral learning and from the escalation of commitment (EoC) perspectives regarding persistence under negative performance feedback. The authors core argument suggests that the seemingly contradictory psychological processes indicated by these two perspectives occur simultaneously in decision makers but that the design of organizational roles and reward systems affects their prevalence in decision-making tasks. Specifically, the authors argue that for decision makers responsible for an individual project, responses given to negative performance feedback regarding a project are dominated by self-justification and loss-avoidance mechanisms predicted by the EoC literature, while for decision makers responsible for a portfolio of projects, responses to negative performance regarding a project are dominated by an under-sampling of poorly performing alternatives that behavioral learning theory predicts. In addition to assigning decision-making authority to different organizational roles, organizational designers shape the strength of these mechanisms through the design of reward systems and specifically by setting more or less ambiguous goals, aspiration levels, time horizons of incentives provided, and levels of failure tolerance.

A quick search of the headlines of major newspapers reveals a treasure trove of technology procurement gone wrong. While the private sector seems to adopt and implement new technology seamlessly and quickly to deliver for customers, the government struggles to accomplish technology purchases and integrations with the same ease. As governments in the United States are looking to retain their current workforce and attract the next generation of workers, the technological capabilities and ethos of governments will be paramount. With nearly every industry being transformed by technology and Generation T being the first generation to have an ingrained “technology first” mindset, the ability of governments to attract these workers depends, in large part, on the ability to transform their government technology culture, policies, and practices.

In this chapter, the authors examine the administrative branch and observe two key components at the root of most technology failures: poor organizational structure in the bureaucracy and the lack of an empowered Chief Information/Technology Officer. Building upon case studies from Massachusetts and California, this chapter looks at the factors related to failure or success to understand the technology procurement culture. The chapter concludes by presenting four key “best practice” principles of public policy and administration that can be implemented by almost any governmental entity to improve their acquisition and implementation of technology.

A corporate entrepreneurship (CE) strategy implies that a firm’s strategic intent is to continuously leverage entrepreneurial opportunities for growth- and advantage-seeking purposes. CE has gained greater research attention with a focus on the factors that influence an organization’s willingness to initiate and sustain a CE strategy. In the current disruptive age, firms acknowledge the importance of CE (also referred to as corporate innovation) as the critical element for sustained competitive advantage in the global economy. Yet, so many organizations struggle with the actual implementation of an innovative strategy. There are key challenges that must be addressed by today’s corporate entrepreneurial leaders in this age of disruptive innovation. These include framing the innovation, developing the internal architecture, coordinating the managerial levels, integrating design thinking, recognizing the grief associated with project failure, and demanding ethical standards. As research on corporate innovative activity has evolved, numerous researchers have acknowledged the importance of these leadership activities to enhance the effectiveness of corporate entrepreneurial activity. In this chapter, the authors discuss these critical elements confronting corporate entrepreneurial leaders.

Using the case of a failed airport project in metropolitan Mexico City, this chapter explores the political and economic reasons for urban megaproject failure. It examines the nature of the oppositional alliances; the larger political, economic, institutional, and spatial conditions under which these alliances were forged; and how they forced project proponents to abandon a planned megaproject. In searching for the factors responsible for project failure, the study employs theories of political party competition, bureaucratic–institutional conflict, and social movements. It uses qualitative and historical analysis to focus attention on divisions within and between the political class and citizens driven by democratization, decentralization, and globalization. The case suggests that the historical and institutional legacies of urban and national development in Latin America have created bureaucratic ambiguities and tensions over who is most responsible for major infrastructure development in countries experiencing democratic transition. The failure to successfully build the Mexico City airport megaproject reflects a precarious transitional moment in the country's political and economic development as much as the validity of claims against the project itself. If planners can better situate megaproject development in the context of changing institutional relations between citizens and the state, they may be better able to find common ground.

This chapter compares and contrasts the diverse theoretical foundations of two paradigms in strategic project management. The first, older paradigm, draws on foundational ideas about nature (i.e., it is predictable) and human rationality (strategy and implementation are distinct) to conceptualize project management in terms of controlling predictable project processes and their inherent risks, so that project managers can optimize the trade-offs between timing, cost and quality. The second practice-based alternative paradigm conceptualizes people as sources of deterministic behavior in an otherwise often unpredictable world. Projects are key tools that are used to strategically create this predictable behavior, with project plans being used as scaffolding to help co-ordinate the distributed behavior of systemically connected people in space and time as the project proceeds. The chapter highlights how this second paradigm has a more robust scientific basis, shows how it informed the development of the Heathrow T5 project, and draws implications of for future theory and practice.

Project management has become the hip new trend in librarianship, appearing more and more in job listings, position descriptions, and professional development offerings. How did project management become the latest buzzword, and what does it have to offer our profession?

The answers to these can be explored through a look at the evolution of project management from the concept of Scientific Management to the certifiable skill set it is today, and how that evolution connects with librarianship’s own changes over time. This examination is done through a literature and historical analysis.

A deeper look at the basic concepts behind project management in light of this historical and practical connection with librarianship demonstrates how project management not only can be a useful skill for library workers to embrace today, but will also illuminate how our service-oriented structure may not mesh well with a concept rooted in business and computing. However, libraries that take a systems approach to implementing project management may see that they are better able to find success.

This study is largely theoretical and based on literature and historical analysis rather than practical implementation and testing. However, it does offer us a different way of looking at a trendy concept, one which helps ground the concept in theory and practice in a way that is seldom done. It also provides examples of tools to help libraries implement project management with a systems approach, which has not been addressed much in library literature.

In the mid-2000s, the operator of New York City’s mass transit network committed more than a half-billion dollars to military contractor Lockheed Martin for a security technology capable, in part, of inferring threats based on analysis of data streams, of developing response strategies, and taking automated action toward alerts and calamities in light of evolving circumstances. The project was a failure. This chapter explores the conceptualization and development of this technology – rooted in cybernetics – and compares its conceptual underpinnings with some situated problems of awareness, communication, coordination, and action in emergencies as they unfold in one of the busiest transport systems in the world, the New York subway. The author shows how the technology, with all the theatrical trappings of a “legitimate” security solution, was apparently conceived without a grounded understanding of actual use-cases, and the degree to which the complex interactions which give rise to subway emergency can be anticipated in – and therefore managed through – a technological system. As a case-study, the chapter illustrates the pitfalls of deploying technology against problems which are not well-defined in the first place, to the neglect of investments against much more fundamental problems – such as inadequate communication systems, and unstable relationships with emergency response agencies – which might offer guaranteed benefits, and indeed lay a firm groundwork for future deployment of more ambitious technology.

Prior escalation research (Harrison & Harrell, 1993; Harrell & Harrison, 1994) has supported the prediction that when a project manager has private information and an incentive to shirk (i.e. To protect his/her reputation) he/she will have a greater tendency to continue an unprofitable project than a manager who faces only one or neither of these conditions. Harrison et al. (1999) extended this line of research across cultures to Chinese nationals in Taiwan. The purpose of this paper is to extend the cross-national direction of this line of research by: (1) determining if Mexican nationals who have private information and an incentive to shirk have this same general propensity to continue an unprofitable project when compared to Mexican nationals who experience neither condition, and (2) comparing this general tendency with a sample of U.S. Subjects. The results of this study indicate that the Mexican subjects in the private information, incentive to shirk group also had a tendency to continue unprofitable projects at a rate similar to their U.S. Counterparts. The implications of these results are discussed.