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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role and responsibility of credit rating agencies in promoting soundness and integrity, especially in the course of their business activities.

The paper describes, and uses, the framework for the activities of credit rating agencies introduced by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), in order to give effect to this investigation.

Credit rating agencies have implemented the provisions of the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies of the IOSCO on the quality and integrity of the rating process, to the extent of the resources available to them.

The main source of data is the information collected by the IOSCO from nine credit rating agencies, including the main three, on the quality and integrity of their rating processes. The absence of triangulation of research methods limits the robustness of the findings.

The paper addresses a specific aspect of the credit ratings story since the financial crisis on which there is currently little in the literature. It also focuses upon the actions of credit rating agencies, rather than on how these organisations are, or should be, regulated.

This paper investigates the factors influencing the future of the IASB, using as the point of departure, a review of its historical progression towards becoming the global accounting standard‐setting authority. It concludes that the IASB is an organisation vulnerable to (1) political lobbying of influential institutions, (2) US accounting authorities decision makers, (3) potential accounting scandals, and (4) cultural differences resulting in the misapplication of its standards around the world. Such factors should be borne in mind when charting the next steps for the IASB and in evaluating the comparability and quality of accounts produced under IFRSs around the world.

In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted a landmark resolution proclaiming the establishment of a New International Economic Order. One of the basic aims of this declaration was to enhance the voice and participation of developing countries in the international economic decision-making process based on norms of equitable governance. More than four decades have passed since its adoption. This paper aims to reflect on the past 43 years of the global financial regulatory system in light of the notion of equitable governance as envisioned by the “New International Economic Order”.

This paper surveys the global financial regulatory system from the vantage point of equitable economic governance. This discussion covers the period that comes after the 1974 UN landmark resolutions that declare the establishment of a “New International Economic Order”. The authors use qualitative and quantitative approach in this study. They use descriptive statistics and intuitive discussions of certain cases to carry the objective of the paper forward.

First, part of the development in global financial regulation manifests the establishment of informal networks that embark on global regulatory issues, while being very exclusive in their membership policies. Second, the lack of full and effective participation of developing countries in the decision-making and norm setting remains unsolved in the global financial regulatory system. Third, the shadow role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was of great significance in assisting the implementation of non-binding regulatory rules of international finance in developing countries despite the concerns of legitimacy and equity in the making of international standards. In sum, the global financial regulatory system that emerged in the past four decades is quite different from that aspired by the NIEO.

The declaration of NIEO coincides with the collapse of the Bretton Wood’s fixed exchange rate which in turn leads to the emergence of a new financial system and regulatory development. This period marked the proliferation of informal networks that make policy recommendations or non-binding rules with global implications. As far as the literature review goes far, this paper is the first to survey the post Bretton Wood’s period of the global financial regulatory architecture based on the tenets of the “New International Economic Order”.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the progress and future prospects of two relatively “new” institutions in this field: the European Commission (EC), together with the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation.

This paper reflexively analyses the recent events that characterise the European Union (EU) regulatory standard-setting landscape in the sustainability field. It is mainly based on publicly available documents.

After analysing the different routes followed to enter the field, this paper shows how the EC/EFRAG takes a wider view than the IFRS Foundation on certain key reporting aspects, that is, target audience, materiality and reporting boundary. As for the reporting scope, although it seems that the IFRS Foundation has a more restrictive vision, it is working to broaden it.

This paper provides some ideas about the potential cooperation between the two institutions. This paper also highlights some potential problems stemming not only from their intrinsic characteristics but also from the routes they have taken to enter the field.

By envisioning how the EU sustainability reporting standard-setting landscape might evolve, this paper sheds light on how companies might need to approach sustainability reporting to adapt to the new institutional demands. Suggestions for collaboration between the two institutions could help them reach common ground and, thus, prevent misunderstandings for companies and stakeholders.

The reflections and takeaways benefit from the authors’ first-hand information, as both are involved in the EU process. The authors could, therefore, feed into further discussions on the developments and challenges facing the EU in this domain.

The trend towards substituted compliance has accelerated post the 2008 credit crisis and is now being pursued with an enthusiasm that is sidelining the prior trend towards multilateral rule convergence. This paper addressed the question of what to do about other regulatory regimes, such as those in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The author argues that thought leaders, particularly the G20 and IOSCO, should ask whether financial supervisory convergence should be extended beyond its current UK-EU-US axis. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Open policy review and discussion.

In conclusion, the current system of financial supervisory convergence has evolved by default. A process of substituted compliance has become the de facto modus operandi between the UK, Europe and the USA since the 2008 credit crisis. It has been widely accepted that competition in regulation is not as efficient as co-operation, provided the same similar risks are addressed by similar rules. The author believes that it makes sense to widen this current uncharted process of supervisory convergence to other international jurisdictions. The challenge, as illustrated, is how to do this. It requires a major gap analysis whereby a global regulatory body like IOSCO compares regulatory oversight and outcomes to expected standards as determined in Europe and the USA under the current status quo. Now that financial stability has been addressed by the regulatory bodies, it is argued that the time is now right to go one step further. That said, to make this happen in a disciplined, efficient and transparent way will require direction. It is pointed out that the G20 is this body that is best mandated to draw up such a roadmap towards financial supervisory convergence.

Policy debate.

Regulatory reform.

Market efficiency.

Thought piece that will provoke debate.

This paper is intended as a brief introduction to the topic of financial market manipulation. Although market manipulation is as old as markets themselves, the subject is presently generating a great of interest and discussion. While initially any efforts to prevent and control market manipulation were nationally focused, the advent of global and interconnected financial markets has required a reappraisal of such parochial approaches. In addition, the task has been made all the more difficult as the opportunities for market manipulation (and for disguising it) have increased exponentially with the development of new technologies for communication and trading and of ever more ingenious and sophisticated market practices, often using novel and esoteric financial instruments.

This study investigates Asia Pacific banks' annual report disclosures on derivatives using the Basel Committee and IOSCO joint recommendations as the derivative and risk management disclosure benchmark. Based on our constructed disclosure index, the mean score is 35%, suggesting that many of the disclosure recommendations are not being adopted by the banks in our sample. Cross‐country and regional variation exists in the disclosure practices, with the variation associated with the extent to which accounting regulations for derivative instruments are operational. Hong Kong banks have the highest mean disclosure scores while the Philippines banks have the lowest mean disclosure scores. Australasian banks generally provide more disclosures than East Asian and South East Asian banks, and banks in developed countries generally have a higher level of disclosure relative to developing countries. The transparency of derivative activities by the banks is expected to improve as Asia Pacific countries promulgate accounting regulations congruent with international accounting standards.

As evidenced by the international consensus on the prevention of money laundering, it is becoming clear that it is well supervised and regulated financial centres that will prove successful in tomorrow's increasingly global marketplace for financial services. For all concerned — customers, government, institutions, supervisors/regulators and stakeholders — it makes sense that financial services should be provided by solid institutions in a reputable environment and that both should be of the utmost probity.

As the world stands perplexed at the recent spate of corporate governance and financial reporting problems that have rocked the US capital markets, it is hard to imagine anything good currently pervading the world financial community. But there is some good news coming from the world of international commerce; indeed, some may even describe it as revolutionary. This silver lining peeking through these dark clouds of corporate corruption is the tremendous progress that is now being made towards achieving one global financial reporting language. As early as a decade ago, some people noted that if we cannot get the world to agree about on what side of the street to drive, what chances do they have of harmonizing international accounting standards – an area where too many nations have vested interests in maintaining their own standards and practices? This paper examines the role of the major players in bringing the world closer to a universal accounting language and also argues that, perhaps, this historic accomplishment, is only about five years away.

This study provides significant empirical data and analysis on the international standard‐setting process as conducted by the forerunner of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). It reveals the influences from four key stakeholder groups (users, preparers, accountants, and regulators) in order to ascertain why International Accounting Standards (IAS) turn out the way they do.

In‐depth interviews with board representatives and content analysis of documents were used to provide triangulating perspectives. The concept of power from the sociological and political science literature provides the theoretical lens. The standard setting projects on segment reporting and intangible assets were studied in detail.

The results show that the process can be best characterized as a mixed power system where no party is accorded the absolute power potential to dictate IAS. Nonetheless, while the user group is the target beneficiaries of IAS, the preparer group has significant influence, as inferred from the changes made to the IAS in line with the preparers' preferences.

There is always the possibility of researchers missing out on “secret” exercise of power, given that the focus of this study was on “public” paths of influence. After this study, the IASB's meetings became open to public, providing new opportunities for future research.

This paper contributes to understanding accounting standard setting for international harmonization.