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Key elements in the establishment of an effective world‐wide aviation training network have been the standardisation of curricula and occupations and the systemisation of planning, administration and evaluation …

The ability to learn from previous events in support of preventing future similar events is a valuable attribute of aviation safety systems. A primary constituent of this mechanism is the reporting of incidents and its importance in support of developing learning material. Many regulatory requirements clearly define a structure for the use of learning material through organisational and procedural continuation training programmes. This paper aims to review aviation regulation and practice, highlighting the importance of learning as a key tenet of safety performance.

Applicable International Civil Aviation Organisation requirements and the European Union (EU) regulation in aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management have been critically reviewed through content analysis.

This review has identified gaps in the European implementing rules that could be addressed in the future to support a more effective approach to the delivery of lessons in the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management sector. These include light-touch of learning and guidance requirements, lack of methodologies for the augmentation of safety culture assessment, absence of competence requirements for human factors trainers and lack of guidance on standardised root-cause analyses.

This paper offers aviation safety practitioners working within the European Aviation Safety Agency regulatory regime an insight into important matters affecting the ability to learn from incidents.

This paper evaluates critically and independently the regulation and practice that can affect the ability of EU regulated aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management organisations to learn from incidents. The outputs from this research present a fresh and independent view of organisational practices that, if left unchecked, are capable of impeding the incident learning process.

Civil aviation, which only 35 years ago was still timidly trying its wings, today possesses a dense network of air links that provide regular service to almost every large city in the world and the aeroplane has become an indispensable part of our political, social and economic life.

This study aims to determine the distance and duration to reach airports mixing height of 3,000 feet limit. Airport operations significantly contribute to the aircraft landing and take-off (LTO) cycle. Eurocontrol’s SO6 data sets comprise several abutted segment data to analyse the duration and distance for specific flights.

Two consequential methods have been used to calculate the distance and destination from the SO6 databases. First, SQL filtering and pivot tables were formed for the required data. Second, over 583,000 data lines for a year of Boeing 747–400 aircraft routes were calculated and filtered for the monthly assessments.

LTO cycles’ durations have deviated −24% to 76% from the ICAO assumptions. Distance facts determined for specific airports as 2.57 to 3.66 nm for take-off and 5.02 to 23.25 nm for the landing. The average duration of the aircraft’s in mentioned airport take-off are 66 to 74 s and 40 to 50 s; averages have been calculated as 70 to 44 s. Landing durations have been calculated for four different airports as 173 to 476 s.

This study provides a re-evaluation chance for the current assumptions and helps for better assessments. Each airport and aircraft combinations have their duration and distance figures.

This study has calculated the first LTO distances in the literature for the aerodrome. This method applies to all airports, airline fleets and aircraft if the segmented SO6 data are available.

Excluding a dip in 1977, this programme of aid to developing countries has experienced rapid growth over the past eight years and annual funding is expected to more than double by 1984…

Although not a known serious problem now, ICAO and Member States are watchful for potential future harmful effects on the environment …

European co‐operation at all levels of political, economic, technical and social life has been and will continue to be a talking point for many years. In some cases there have been major achievements in co‐operative effort, in others there have been abysmal failures but for the most part the talking still goes on. In the field of civil aviation it is difficult to recognise national frontiers and although this has been acknowledged in the evolution of world standards and procedures through the medium of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, Europe has some very particular problems which need more detailed attention than can be effected at the ICAO level. This need can only be fulfilled by co‐operative effort and goodwill on the part of all the European States.

At the 66th IATA Technical Committee meeting all members were agreed that there was no early requirement for the operational use of MLS. The majority of members felt that it would be ten years before commercial airlines would be using MLS on a significant scale. Nevertheless, the need for an early decision by ICAO in respect of the MLS Technique to be adopted was strongly supported solely on the basis that the current requirement for MLS at small airports was already leading to a proliferation of non standard systems. No evidence as to the scale of implementation or locations where this was occurring was offered nor was it explained how this would affect international aviation.

The purpose of this paper is to calculate the probability of collision of flying aircraft crossing on straight paths in any direction.

The probability of deviations from the intended flight paths is used to calculate the probability of collision that is integrated over time to cover whole events.

The probabilities of collision are calculated in terms of the r.m.s. position errors and encounter geometry, that is aircraft velocities and flight path angles and crossing angles.

The method does not apply to aircraft flying in parallel tracks at the same velocity in air corridors: that case has been covered elsewhere, as well as the case of climbing or descending aircraft.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) specifies as target level of safety (TLS) a probability of collision not exceeding 5×10⁻⁹ per hour. To meet the ICAO TLS standard, it is necessary to calculate collision probabilities for all stages of flight.

A low collision probability is a safety metric; the value does depend on a realist choice of probability distribution.

Calculates the probability of collision for crossing flights, corresponding to a common scenario on air traffic management.

The purpose of this research is to investigate the pragmatic failure and other language-related risks between pilots and air traffic controllers in intercultural aviation communication. The paper attempts to provide recommendations for the minimization of these risks, thereby improving aviation safety by reducing the rate of aviation incidents and accidents. Pragmatic failure refers to the miscomprehension of intended pragmatic meaning. As opposed to semantic meaning, it depends on the context and is highly influenced by culture.

The risk of pragmatic failure in aviation is presented hypothetically, and examples of language-related communication failure in air-to-ground communication between pilots and air traffic controllers (ATCOs) involving language are examined, including an example involving pragmatic failure. A questionnaire has been developed to survey pilots and ATCOs who communicate over radiotelephony. Results from 212 respondents are presented and conclusions are drawn.

The authors propose, based on linguistic theory and the results of this survey, that native English-speaking aviation operators gain more familiarity with the inner workings of the English language, in particular regarding the difference between semantic and pragmatic meaning. They benefit from this awareness whenever communicating with people of other cultures to develop the valuable skill of focusing on semantic meaning while avoiding adding pragmatic meaning. This minimizes the potential of misunderstanding when an emergency arises that cannot be dealt with through the International Civil Aviation Organization standard phraseology and when the listener of this message is someone from a different culture.

Language and communication are the main tools that play a vital role in reducing the rate of aircraft incidents and accidents. In aviation, pilots and ATCOs are neither in face-to-face contact nor have a video speech interface between them while communicating with each other. Their communications are conducted entirely through radio messages using a specialized language designed to make communication as accurate and efficient as possible. This study, therefore, is important in terms of investigating the risks of pragmatic failure and of language errors in general between pilots and air traffic controllers. This research will be a useful guide for designing training for operators (pilots and ATCOs) as well.

The main focus of the study is to investigate reasons for pragmatic failure and other language-related causes of misunderstanding between pilots and air traffic controllers over air-to-ground communication. To illustrate these roles, a questionnaire has been developed for pilots and ATCOs who communicate over aeronautical radiotelephony and examples of aircraft accidents were given.