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Key elements in the establishment of an effective world‐wide aviation training network have been the standardisation of curricula and occupations and the systemisation of planning, administration and evaluation …

The ability to learn from previous events in support of preventing future similar events is a valuable attribute of aviation safety systems. A primary constituent of this mechanism is the reporting of incidents and its importance in support of developing learning material. Many regulatory requirements clearly define a structure for the use of learning material through organisational and procedural continuation training programmes. This paper aims to review aviation regulation and practice, highlighting the importance of learning as a key tenet of safety performance.

Applicable International Civil Aviation Organisation requirements and the European Union (EU) regulation in aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management have been critically reviewed through content analysis.

This review has identified gaps in the European implementing rules that could be addressed in the future to support a more effective approach to the delivery of lessons in the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management sector. These include light-touch of learning and guidance requirements, lack of methodologies for the augmentation of safety culture assessment, absence of competence requirements for human factors trainers and lack of guidance on standardised root-cause analyses.

This paper offers aviation safety practitioners working within the European Aviation Safety Agency regulatory regime an insight into important matters affecting the ability to learn from incidents.

This paper evaluates critically and independently the regulation and practice that can affect the ability of EU regulated aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management organisations to learn from incidents. The outputs from this research present a fresh and independent view of organisational practices that, if left unchecked, are capable of impeding the incident learning process.

Civil aviation, which only 35 years ago was still timidly trying its wings, today possesses a dense network of air links that provide regular service to almost every large city in the world and the aeroplane has become an indispensable part of our political, social and economic life.

European air transport policy, emerged through the confluence of case law and legislation, in four broad areas: liberalization, safety and security, greening, and the external policy. Following the implementation of the single market for air transport, policy shifted to liberalizing and regulating associated services and in recent years to greening, the external aviation policy, and safety and security. Inclusion of air transport in the Environmental Trading Scheme of the European Union exemplifies the European Commission’s proactive stand on bringing the industry in line with emission reduction trajectories of other industries. However, the bid to include flights to third countries in the trading scheme pushed the EU into a controversial position, causing the Commission to halt implementation and to give ICAO time to seek a global multilateral agreement. The chapter also discusses how the nationality clauses in air services agreements breached the Treaty of Rome, and a court ruling to that effect enabled the EC to extend EU liberalization policies beyond the European Union, resulting in the Common Aviation Area with EU fringe countries and the Open Aviation Area with the USA. Another important area of progress was aviation safety, where the EU region is unsurpassed in the world, yet the Commission has pushed the boundary even further, by establishing the European Safety Agency to oversee the European Aviation Safety Management System. Another important area of regulatory development was aviation security, a major focus after the woeful events in 2001, but increasingly under industry scrutiny on costs and effectiveness. The chapter concludes by arguing that in the coming decade, the EU will strive to strengthen its position as a global countervailing power, symbolized in air transport by a leadership position in environmental policy and international market liberalization, exemplified in the EU’s external aviation policy.

In spite of the extensive literature on the regulation of air transport services, until the development of the Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review (QUASAR) methodology no systematic review existed of the degree of liberalization granted through air services agreements. The chapter lays out QUASARs key features, and presents the main results its application has generated. It then elaborates on how the methodology could be further refined and extended to other segments of the air transport industry yet uncovered. Based on QUASAR, the chapter critically evaluates some commonly held beliefs about the liberalization of international passenger transport and then moves on to explore the technical feasibility of creating a liberal multilateral regime for air transport services. QUASAR has demonstrated that, although the air transport sector has experienced some liberalization over the past few years, this has been, overall, rather marginal. The skies are not truly open.

This study aims to determine the distance and duration to reach airports mixing height of 3,000 feet limit. Airport operations significantly contribute to the aircraft landing and take-off (LTO) cycle. Eurocontrol’s SO6 data sets comprise several abutted segment data to analyse the duration and distance for specific flights.

Two consequential methods have been used to calculate the distance and destination from the SO6 databases. First, SQL filtering and pivot tables were formed for the required data. Second, over 583,000 data lines for a year of Boeing 747–400 aircraft routes were calculated and filtered for the monthly assessments.

LTO cycles’ durations have deviated −24% to 76% from the ICAO assumptions. Distance facts determined for specific airports as 2.57 to 3.66 nm for take-off and 5.02 to 23.25 nm for the landing. The average duration of the aircraft’s in mentioned airport take-off are 66 to 74 s and 40 to 50 s; averages have been calculated as 70 to 44 s. Landing durations have been calculated for four different airports as 173 to 476 s.

This study provides a re-evaluation chance for the current assumptions and helps for better assessments. Each airport and aircraft combinations have their duration and distance figures.

This study has calculated the first LTO distances in the literature for the aerodrome. This method applies to all airports, airline fleets and aircraft if the segmented SO6 data are available.

Excluding a dip in 1977, this programme of aid to developing countries has experienced rapid growth over the past eight years and annual funding is expected to more than double by 1984…

“Cargo tariffs are agreed through the IATA machinery, and in theory approved by governments….the IATA Tarff Coordination Conferences still agree cargo tariffs on over 200,000 separate routes. But these tariffs bear little relevance to what is actually charged in the marketplace.” (Doganis, 2002)

“The stipulations ICAO standards contain never supersede the primacy of national regulatory requirements. It is always the local, national regulations which are enforced in, and by, sovereign states, and which must be legally adhered to by air operators making use of applicable airspace and airports……ICAO is therefore not an international aviation regulator, just as INTERPOL is not an international police force. We cannot arbitrarily close or restrict a country's airspace, shut down routes, or condemn airports or airlines for poor safety performance or customer service. Should a country transgress a given international standard adopted through our organization, ICAO's function in such circumstances…….is to help countries conduct any discussions, condemnations, sanctions, etc., they may wish to pursue, consistent with the Chicago Convention and the Articles and Annexes it contains under international law.” (ICAO, 2021)

In spite of being a growing liberalized global industry served by many firms, much of the international air cargo sector operated as an admitted cartel from 1999 through 2006. Partly due to the way the cartel was discovered, it seems very little empirical analysis to date has been done about the case. We use publicly available airline data to examine whether a diligent antitrust authority could have identified cartel/collusive behavior using established empirical methods. Our findings point to a regulatory failure in an industry whose long-standing business practices effectively “slipped through the cracks,” failing to protect the many shippers of air cargo.