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The recent economic and political focus on rising income inequality and the extent of government intervention into pay policies has renewed the interest in executive compensation. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of changing regulatory landscapes on executive pay and its components.

This study examines a recent 23-year period divided into three distinct intervals separated by two major regulatory changes, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and the Dodd–Frank Act. Bonus, long-term and total compensation are separately modeled as a function of each regulatory change while controlling for firm size, performance and year. The model is estimated using panel data with firm fixed effects. An industry analysis is also conducted to examine sector variations.

Total compensation increased 29 percent following SOX and 21 percent following Dodd–Frank, above what can be explained by size, firm performance and time. Total compensation increased following both SOX and Dodd–Frank in all industries except for the financial services industry where total compensation was unchanged. Results are robust to using smaller windows around each regulation.

This study does not seek to determine whether executive compensation is at an optimal level at any point in time. Instead, this study focuses only on the change in executive compensation after two specific regulations.

The debate over the extent to which the government should intervene with executive compensation has become a frequent part of political and non-political discourse. This paper provides evidence that over the long-term, regulation does not curtail executive compensation. An important exception is that total compensation was restrained for financial services firms following the Dodd–Frank Act.

There is limited discussion in the teacher education literature about the experiences of pre-service black male teachers generally and the ethnic diversity among black male pre-service teachers specifically. Thus, this paper aims to explore the experiences of Frank, a black male refugee health education major attending an historically black college and university (HBCU).

This research study is theoretically guided by selected tenets of Bush and Bush’s (2013) African American male theory and Goodman et al.’s (2006) transition framework and uses a qualitative approach to explore Frank’s transition experiences when coming to America, attending college and engaging in his student teaching experience.

Frank experienced some difficulty transitioning to America, as a result of not having a strong financial foundation. During his college transition, Frank believed that the HBCU environment was nurturing; however, he encountered numerous ethnocentrically charged hostile confrontations from US-born black students at his university because of his accent. While he had some disagreements with the US education system in terms of discipline, Frank believed that his accent served as an asset during student teaching.

This study adds to the burgeoning research that explores the intersectional identities among pre-service black male teachers. As we argue in this paper, researchers, policymakers and practitioners cannot treat black male teachers as a monolithic group and must contemplate the unique supports needed that can attend to the racial and ethnic needs of black male teachers.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and how banks’ financial constraints affect their cash tax avoidance. The authors hypothesize that banks engage in more tax planning to generate additional cash to mitigate their financial constraints.

The authors use a sample of US banks to conduct the panel regression analysis. The authors measure the bank tax avoidance using the cash effective tax rate and measure the bank financial constraints using the Z-score and annual payout ratio. The authors further use the implementation of the Dodd–Frank Act as a quasi-natural experiment to conduct the difference-in-difference analysis.

The authors document that financially constrained banks exhibit lower cash effective tax rates. The authors further show that banks facing greater financial constraints are less likely to pursue tax-saving activities following the Dodd–Frank Act. Moreover, the authors find that non-performing loans increase the influence of financial constraints on tax avoidance, while a financial crisis amplifies the impact of financial constraints on bank cash tax savings.

By extending previous research on financial constraints and tax planning, this paper is the first study to recognize financial constraints, along with the Dodd–Frank Act, as determinants of banks’ tax avoidance. This study informs policymakers about the regulation of tax avoidance in the banking industry and sheds light on possible future research on banks’ tax-planning strategies.

Are franking credit balances priced? This paper aims to investigate the valuation of franking credit balances via a determinant analysis and value relevance analysis.

The determinant analysis examines the factors that contribute to the increasing cumulative level of franking credit balances. Value relevance studies explore whether franking credit balances are priced in the market.

The results provide strong evidence of a size effect that the level of franking credit balances increases with firm size and weak evidence of an international focus effect that the level of franking credit balances increases with international ownership. They also find an individual dividend clientele effect that the level of franking credit balances decreases with individual ownership. They find significant evidence that franking credit balances are priced in the market. One dollar of franking credit is worth 1.4 dollars in firm value. That franking balances are capitalized at more than their face value suggests that franking credits signal firms' future dividend policy. They also find that the market valuation of franking balances increases with firm size but decreases with international focus.

This study provides direct evidence that franking credit balances are capitalized into equity prices. In the determinant analysis, this paper improves Heaney's (2009) model by using the percentage of international ownership as the proxy of international focus, thus addressing the limitation of his measure. In the value relevance tests, the study uses a modified model that includes log-transformation to reduce the skewness of variables based on Tanza's (2014) value relevance model. Moreover, the study suggests that the market valuation of franking credit balances increases with firm size, which contradicts Heaney's (2009) findings.

The authors investigate the extent to which online talk can influence contemporaneous and future stock trading, especially when market news is unpresented.

The authors propose an improved sentiment formula incorporating online hype, neutral sentiment and poster reputation. In addition, they conduct event study, OLS regression analyses and probit models.

First, investors tend to be more talkative in relation to firms that are (1) smaller size, (2) more growth-like, (3) with lower prices and higher short interests and (4) of higher beta. Second, the bullish tone of investors positively affects the abnormal returns of small-capitalization stocks. However, online talk has little impact on large-capitalization stocks, except that more postings boost trading liquidity. Third, online talk predicts the presence of future news regardless of firm size, with stronger predictive power found for small-capitalization stocks.

It is of interest to practitioners and researchers to study online talk so as to better understand the trading psychology of retail investors and the effects on the stock market. Furthermore, policymakers are interested in tracking activities on stock message boards in order to prevent security fraud and protect investors' interests.

The results are robust and suggest that online talk has significant impacts on stock trading exploiting an information asymmetry. This study of stock message board posting activities helps researchers to understand whether message contents contain valuable and unique content compared with information available via more traditional media channels.

Ostrander went to Chicago at the urging of his Williams professor Walter B. Smith who had studied with Frank Knight at Chicago in the early 1920s. He took four courses from Knight: the history of economic thought, economic theory, current tendencies, and economics from an institutional standpoint (his notes taken in these courses have appeared in volume 22B and 23B in this series). At the beginning of the academic year in which he was a graduate student at Chicago, Ostrander’s major professor at Williams, Walter Buckingham Smith, wrote Knight introducing Ostrander to him. Ostrander did not know of this exchange of letters until he read a draft of this piece that I had sent him. The letters are useful in regard to Knight’s legendary pessimism and candor.September 30, 1933Dear Professor Knight:I am writing to tell you that we are sending you a graduate student named Ostrander from Williams. To a considerable extent he is coming to the University of Chicago on my recommendation. I particularly want him to work with you and with Professor Viner and with Professor Douglas. I’ll be interested to see what you do with him. In my opinion he has “promise.”Mr. Ostrander graduated here in 1932 and spent last year in Oxford. He seems to have survived a year at Oxford. Usually a year or two there is pretty hard for an American to get over. Ostrander, contrary to the usual rule, seems to have benefited rather than deteriorated under the direction of his English tutors.Ostrander is much interested in theoretical economics. My hope is that you will be able to do for him what I think you have a unique capacity to do. I hope that you can make him see economic theory not as a body of neat precepts nor as dogmas that one must learn but rather as a critical philosophizing about the categories. Needless to say, I’m not trying to tell you what you should teach your students. I’m merely telling you that I think that Ostrander is an intelligent enough person to understand you if you do in the class room what you used to do when I listened to you. He will understand; and he won’t reproach you if your lectures don’t enable him to get up a good note book.I spent the year before last in Berkeley at the University there and got very well acquainted with your brother M.M. Needless to say, that was one of the most valuable things that happened to me while I was there. I don’t understand why some eastern institution does not make M.M. a good offer and take him away from Berkeley where he is highly esteemed by all but sadly overlooked on pay-day.Do you ever come east? If you do we would be delighted to entertain you and Mrs. Knight here in Williamstown. I would like ever so much to be able to talk with you about economics. If you should come this way you may be sure that we would be very glad to see you.Sincerely yours,[signed] Walter SmithOctober 5, 1933Dear Smith:(I don’t know how I ought to address you, but can’t bring myself to “Professor” you, even though you did me.) I was just going to write you anyway when your letter came in the mail. Your man Ostrander arrived last week, and I had a couple of hours’ talk with him, business being slack on the first day of registration. He impressed me quite favorably. One thing he may have gotten in Oxford or in part from his eastern bringing up (we have a Princeton boy who is fully as bed [sic]) is an extremely deferential air which is embarrassing to me. I very much appreciate your comments, and I am, of course, quite set up at your sending him to us as against Harvard.By all means, any possible opportunity to get together and talk about economics. I am so depressed that it is really serious for my work. I have to fight the conviction that anything in any degree fundamental is impossible, hopeless. On one hand I agree very largely with the “rebels” that rationalistic economics doesn’t amount to a terrible lot, even if it were sound. But on the other hand the little that it does have to say about social relations and problems seems to me as peculiarly fundamental as it is limited in scope. But I suspect that man, in his well known capacity of “political animal,” is an inveterate romanticist, and will never see things in balance or perspective. He will either be a rationalist to the point of romanticism – the “Enlightenment” attitude – or else insist on scorning all fundamentals and transforming the world by wish[ful] thinking or some magic formula.I wonder what you think about current developments. I hope it may partly be due to a run-down physical condition, but actually my feeling is that we are seeing from day to day the “finish” of all we have educated ourselves to call the principal cultural fruits of western civilization. What gripes me is less this fact than the fact that I cannot rationally oppose the abolition of liberty and [the] establishment of tyranny. I feel that the regime of liberty has been a failure, or an experiment with negative results, that it has shown the incapacity of large masses of people to reach any sound conclusion by thinking and discussion – indeed the inevitability of their ending up by selling out to some hero-prophet. If this is the wrong view of events, I wish you would give me any possible help in reaching a view in which my own kind of person and of activity would have any place. I wonder if your failure to write may be based on a feeling similar to this one of my own, which is making it increasingly difficult for me to pretend to try to fan the wi[nd] of culture history into a new direction with a hen feather of words. Indeed, it is making it take an actual moral struggle a good deal of the time to open the door and go into an economics classroom and hold forth.Sincerely,Frank H. KnightNovember 24, 1933Dear FH:Thank you ever so much for your letter about Ostrander. You will be interested to know that Ostrander writes with the very greatest enthusiasm for your course. I am sure that you are doing him a lot of good. Before the year is over I would be interested to have your opinion of him and of his capacities to undertake the arduous job of being an economist. He has seemed promising to me. If this promise seems not to be fulfilled in your opinion, I should feel disposed to tell him so and urge him to resume his plans for going to the Harvard Law School.Your remarks about being depressed over the apparent disillusion of the existing economic order I very much sympathize with. Not only am I troubled about that but I am also very much troubled about the intellectual confusion and the lack of good sportsmanship on the part of the better trained economists these days. President Roosevelt seems to me to be willing to listen to reasonable and constructive suggestions and he has shown an extraordinary disposition to do some social experimenting. In the face of this extraordinary state of affairs it seems to me that the great body of well trained economists has contented themselves with growling quietly to one another and saying nothing in public. From the standpoint of maintaining one’s prestige that is in some ways the wise policy for it enables one to say “I told you so” when things in the world of business fact go wrong. It does seem to me, however, that under the circumstances economists ought to make their position known, that is[,] to point out where they think the existing policies are leading, the important and possibly conflicting goals of different lines of economic policy and certain long run changes in the set up of our legal economic structure. If the economists can’t do that much then it seems to be that they are confessing that their field is in such a state of intellectual confusion that it is practically worthless, or else they are confessing that they are a timid lot of thin-blooded academics who have no right to object if this country is run by the Babbitts.This letter comes to you to find out if there is any possibility of starting a movement or making the opinion of the economists heard. Personally I think we ought to speak out or else publicly admit that the study and teaching of economics is a racket.Sincerely yours,[signed] Walter Smith

To open your heart to others is a physical act of leadership. It can include crying and inspire hugs. In this chapter, I explore what it means to open your heart, why doing so is an act of leadership, how to do it, and why it is difficult to do. Opening your heart to others is both the simplest, most natural thing in the world, and tremendously difficult at the same time. It means sharing a part of ourselves that others will recognize as real and true, and important in a way that feels incredibly vulnerable. Opening your heart is a way of creating and working with the connection between people. Actors have long recognized that the single biggest barrier to achieving the kind of connection that comes from opening your heart is playing status games with each other. The challenge for the leader is to transcend the status game and stop playing it in a way that doesn’t damage their status as a leader. I offer an example of how Frank showed real leadership by overcoming his fear and opening his heart to his employees.