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The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of bracketing, one of the most central philosophical and theoretical constructs of phenomenology, as a theory of mind. Furthermore, we wanted to showcase how this theoretical construct can be implemented as a methodological tool.

In this study we have adopted an approach similar to a qualitative meta-synthesis, comparing the emergent patterns of two empirical projects, seeking synergies and contradictions and looking for additional insights from new emerging patterns.

On a philosophical level, we have found that bracketing, as a theoretical construct, is not about the achievement of objectivity; quite to the contrary, it embraces subjectivity and puts it centre-stage. On a theoretical level, we have achieved a better understanding of Husserl's phenomenology, as a theory of mind. On a methodological level, we have achieved a powerful way of supplementing and/or clarifying research findings, by using a theoretical construct as a methodological tool.

Our paper contributes to the phenomenology literature at a philosophical, theoretical and methodological level, by offering a better understanding and a novel implementation of one of the central theoretical constructs of phenomenology.

This chapter outlines the potential of phenomenology to illuminate how individuals experience the emotions replete within organizations. It employs one particular type of phenomenological approach known as Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). The chapter considers how the hermeneutic and phenomenological foundations of this approach lend themselves to the study of affect. The chapter then clarifies and develops established IPA guidelines to render them more appropriate for research on emotions. In doing so, the chapter demonstrates how IPA can produce contextualized accounts that explore the role of emotions in individuals’ experiences of organizational events and processes.

In 1923, an issue entered the discussion between Schreier² and myself, though hardly anyone else in Vienna was interested in it at that time. Historically, the topic was connected with the question of intuition or Wesensschau, but substantially, in my opinion, the two were quite distinct. Elaborating on ideas of the 19th century algebraist L. Kronecker and eloquently supported by Weyl,³ the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer developed what he called intuitionistic mathematics, the mathematical controversy centred on existential propositions. But those who closely associated intuitionism in mathematics with the intuition in Husserl's pure phenomenology or Bergson's metaphysics were misled by the similarity of the two words. Whatever, if anything, Brouwer's reconstruction of mathematics and the phenomenology in Husserl's Ideas had in common, they certainly had opposite effects: Husserl claimed for his Wesensschau (and Bergson for his intuition) insights that empiricists such as Schilck denied or regarded as empty words. Brouwer, to the contrary, rejected statements that everyone else claimed to be solid parts of mathematics, and he denied or regarded as empty words theorems proved by men such as Hilbert.

This current paper attempts to bring more light to the current debate of understanding phenomenological research methods, in order to clarify the interpretive phenomenological inquiry with Heidegger's philosophy of phenomenology.

The paper uniquely presents the three distinctions of Heideggerian thoughts in conducting interpretive phenomenological research: (1) realizing the problem of identity; (2) recognizing the inadequacy of ontology; and (3) interpreting the subject matter through historical critiques.

The paper also discusses the basis of phenomenological research issues of a priori knowledge, data analysis process and qualitative research issues of validity, reliability, and creditability. In the conclusion and recommendation, this paper suggests six key points to implement a proper research strategy to employ Heideggerian phenomenological inquiry in social science and policymaking research where investigators are dealing with the multiplicity of existing and alternative worldviews.

The paper idea is fresh and adds new knowledge to the field.

Proposes that while it is not unfeasible that we will be able to communicate directly with computers in ordinary language, it is highly unlikely that this will ever be achieved. As Heidegger pointed out, language is not normally used for the exchange of information but calls to attention some aspect of the world the language users already share. Without this experience of the world, computers are unable to place language in context. Moreover, humans continue to develop and experience, so the context for language is ever changing. This is the challenge for artificial intelligence researchers. Also discusses the practical consequences of this fundamental problem, current solutions and their social implications and dangers.

The purpose of this paper is to look at how phenomenology can be used to explore the meaning and experience of organizational life. It argues that phenomenology provides more than just themes or leitmotifs for post hoc analysis of narrative data; in its basic formulation, phenomenology is a way of thinking – a method – which illuminates the embodied, subjective and inter-subjective qualities of the life-world.

The paper follows Husserl's command to “go back to the things themselves” to access raw experience, asking ourselves, “what does experience mean phenomenologically?” We draw on the work of Merleau-Ponty to “flesh out” the embodied aspects of that phenomenological experience, outlining how the idea of a “field of presence” grounds our reflections in the here-and-now and gives our selfhood its coherence.

The paper presents data on the diverse meanings of “experience” to suggest that phenomenological and organizational understandings can be differentiated in terms of both temporality and selfhood. The paper argues that these differentiations expose different ways of thinking about the world more generally, drawing on Husserl's philosophy of the “natural attitude” to propose that one of its derivations, an “organizational attitude”, is obscuring our view of embodied experience.

The paper provides practical guidelines for those interested in researching the embodied, experiential qualities of organizational life. These emphasize the need to suspend the “organizational attitude”, modify how the authors position and explain the research, and attend to the interplay between the felt sense of the world and the words used to articulate it.

The logic of the body helps the authors to work towards a more integrative, conciliatory epistemological position for qualitative organizational research. The paper uses a phenomenological view of embodiment – as both subjectively experienced and objectively presented to the world – to suggest that the body, particularly when it is sick, is giving us clues for how to conceptualize the life-world of work.

The authors discuss the lifeworld as a research concept for the field of information behaviour, which serves to problematise the concept of unit of analysis. In so doing, the authors demonstrate how the lifeworld can be adopted as a unit of analysis in information behaviour research, that is, how research can be based in the lifeworld rather than merely looking at the lifeworld. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors first situate our discussion in the current of information behaviour scholarship. The authors then introduce the concepts of lifeworld and unit of analysis and consider how they intersect. Next, to show the importance of the lifeworld, the authors present two recent studies in which the lifeworld emerged. Finally, the authors discuss how lifeworld-based research can be conducted more conscientiously.

Though many research approaches deal with lived experience in one way or another, they tend not to fully grasp these experiences. As opposed to units of analysis such as individual, social group, person-in-situation, etc., using lifeworld as a unit of analysis allows phenomena to be researched holistically and without reductionism.

The authors limit the discussion to the concept of the lifeworld as developed by Husserl, the concept’s originator. The lifeworld has been discussed and extended by other authors since, but this work is not considered here. The viewpoint is offered as a supplementary perspective, meant to be enriching to our field of study, rather than divisive.

This is the first time the concept of the lifeworld has been fully explicated in information science. As the authors discuss, two recent information behaviour studies that “discovered” the lifeworld through their analysis. Future studies that attend to the lifeworld from the start have the capacity to build on this work and extend the horizons of information science.

This paper aims to illuminate the possibilities of phenomenology in hospitality, enriching methodological rigor necessary to study holistic experiences, which are increasingly recognized as a central component of hospitality businesses.

It first presents the main tenets of phenomenology, along with its two orientations (descriptive and hermeneutic) and three associated methods (descriptive phenomenology, hermeneutic phenomenology and interpretive phenomenological analysis). Second, it undertakes a critical review of post-2010 hospitality and tourism phenomenological studies. Third, the author focuses on Giorgi’s phenomenological method in psychology and illustrates the main methodological aspects with the data gathered for the study on the user experience of hotel smartphone apps. Finally, it discusses challenges and suggests prospective areas for hospitality phenomenological research.

Phenomenology can address a variety of subjects in hospitality, ranging from hospitality guests and workers to business owners, entrepreneurs and members of larger communities.

For the academic audience, the paper demystifies philosophically rich methodology of phenomenology by highlighting its methodological aspects and practical applications. It also hopes to contribute to practitioners’ greater appreciation of phenomenological knowledge of lived experiences.

Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) offers management researchers an approach which allows deep examination of the relationship between individuals and their environments, particularly in complex social situations. Phenomenology studies phenomena, or things and events, as they are perceived by people's consciousness. Interpretivism allows researchers to access such internal awareness of research participants by attempting to understand the words used by subjects to describe their experiences and perceptions. Inherently subjective, this approach requires self-awareness by the researcher and the willingness to abandon preconceived notions in favor of interactive listening and exploration, relying on terms and concepts volunteered by participants rather than nominated by theory or preceding literature. Qualitative text analysis software can be utilized to facilitate aggregation and distillation of the voluminous narratives that result from the open-ended semi-structured interviews typically employed to collect data for IPA. However, impartiality and discernment on the part of the researcher remain essential in interpreting any automated analytical results. The researcher becomes in essence a second-hand observer, peering through windows voluntarily opened by participants, attempting to understand their understanding of their world.

This chapter introduces IPA, providing an overview of its rationale and approach, and illustrates its application in a management-related setting, focusing on cultural adaptation of immigrant professionals.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore, analyze, and compare the different solutions that Luhmann has provided throughout his work to the problem of the psychic element. We depart from the construction of a corpus of texts that includes most of the Luhmann's published production. They are chronologically analyzed to observe the evolution and changes. The categories of this analysis are divided according to the two distinct periods of Luhmann's production. For the preautopoietic writings, we looked at system/environment as inside/outside the system, and selectivity as the difference between process and system. In the autopoietic writings, we analyzed operation and selection, medium and form, operation and observation, structural coupling and operational closure, and differentiation. The chapter shows how, from an initial superposition of concepts, Luhmann distinguished the personal aspect (a structural trait) from the operation of the system. Then, the problem becomes how to unify all the capacities of consciousness under a single operation. We individualize the two main hypotheses and their shortcomings. This also includes the discussion of the possibility of differentiation of consciousness. The chapter avoids discussing single texts or temporally limited concepts. Instead, it discusses the problem throughout the complete work of Luhmann. As a result, it identifies the distinct hypotheses, their changes, and their weaknesses, offering a systematic study of the theme.