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The aim of this research is to study the implications of the human resources management practices on corruption in humanitarian aid as the phenomenon is under-researched (Akbar & Vujic, 2014; Melo & Quinn, 2015) and considered to be a hot topic since the determinants of corruption from an individual perspective have been scarcely discussed in the non-profit sector (Epperly & Lee, 2015; Mohiuddin & Dulay, 2015).

This research adopts grounded theory as a method and builds upon long experience in the humanitarian aid sector to generate theory from field observations and from 30 interviews conducted with respondents working in humanitarian organisations. The data collected from interviews was compared to observations data, leading the way to validating and expanding the findings.

The findings of this study are related to human resources administration weaknesses which appear to be directly linked to corruption in humanitarian aid. These weaknesses include issues in relation to Terms of Reference and organisational charts, irregularities in staff selection procedures, the short-termism of contracts, poor talent management, a lack of ethics awareness and mismanaged cultural diversity.

This study suffers from a few limitations pertaining to the sensitivity of the context, confidentiality issues, retrospection in some cases and possible bias resulting from staff frustration. These were dealt with through ensuring interviewees' utmost anonymity in publishing the results and through cross-checking answers of respondents from within the same organisation.

This research proposes a corruption preventive model which serves as a tool driving better human resources practices in humanitarian aid, and highlights the dangerous impact of corruption and raises awareness among humanitarian aid managers and workers about the importance of preventing it so that more vulnerable people are reached and that the donated money fulfils its intended target. The chapter brings value to research on humanitarian aid as it considers the corruption phenomenon with new lenses; focusing on individuals rather than on systems thus opening new horizons of study away from the traditional stream of research on service delivery.

Since World War II, the United States has played a leading role in development assistance in both volume of funds and role. Though the largest bilateral development agency, USAID is somewhat of an outlier in modes of operation, scope and nature of activities, and place within government. This chapter examines the development and character of U.S. foreign assistance. Like others, the United States provides foreign aid for multiple reasons – to relieve suffering and promote long-term economic and social development, to gain favor with allies, to open markets, to help ensure national security. Security and diplomacy do play a large role in U.S. foreign aid, even in basic education. In the context of U.S. internal politics, both humanitarian/development and diplomatic/security rationales have been necessary to sustain public and government support for foreign aid. Still neither rationale has prevailed; the budget is split nearly in half. The need for a humanitarian rationale may be characteristic of U.S. foreign assistance along with the emphasis on democracy. Yet these programs have sometimes been distorted by the diplomatic rationale and the security needs of the state. Many of these tensions and the constant need to justify foreign aid likely derive from the perennial periodic isolationist thread of U.S. politics, the particular adversarial institutions of U.S. policymaking, and the transparency which leaves these processes open. Even so, U.S. development assistance has played a prominent role in the trajectory of international development post-World War II, and has worked to address many of the great challenges of the times.

The humanitarian principle of impartiality requires that assistance be based on need alone. In order to ascertain needs, and later to assess whether assistance has been effective in meeting those needs, we need to gather evidence. In humanitarian crises this is generally done through assessments, monitoring and evaluation, and it generally involves seeking information from those we seek to assist. In the fast-paced environment of humanitarian crises, the question of whether the collection of this information is ethical is frequently overlooked. For research participants, the consequences can be extremely severe.

This chapter examines the ethics of research, primarily in the form of assessments, monitoring and evaluation, in humanitarian crises. The chapter first considers the question of what constitutes research in humanitarian crises, and why it is needed. It then examines the general principles of ethical research (respect, beneficence, research merit and integrity, and justice), and highlights three key considerations that require particular attention in humanitarian crises: the justificatory threshold, the vulnerability of research participants, and safety and security. The chapter also examines key components of the research process that are particularly important (and frequently overlooked) in humanitarian crises, including the privacy and confidentiality of research participants, informed consent and feedback to research participants. It concludes with the suggestion that basic instruction in the principles of ethical research should be included in the orientation and training provided to humanitarian practitioners, including to emergency response teams who are commonly involved in carrying out assessments in the early stages of a humanitarian response.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.