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There is an extensive research stream devoted to evaluating host country political risk as it relates to foreign investment decisions, and in today’s geopolitical climate, this type of risk is becoming increasingly salient to business leaders. Despite notable advancements related to understanding the importance of government-related risk, inconsistent conceptualizations and findings remain. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive overview of how host country political risk has been conceptualized, measured and studied in relation to multinational enterprises' (MNEs’) investment decisions. After reviewing the relevant literature, five major aspects of non-violent (government type, public corruption, leadership change) and violent (armed conflict, terrorism) political risk were identified. The organization and review of each aspect of political risk provide insights on fruitful directions for future research, which are discussed.

To identify research articles on political risk and foreign investment, 13 leading management and international business journals were searched using relevant keywords (January 2000 to January 2023). Moreover, reviewing articles from these journals led to locating and reviewing additional relevant articles that the authors cited. Keyword searches were also conducted on Google Scholar and Web of Science in an effort to identify relevant articles outside of the 13 targeted journals.

Both violent and non-violent aspects of host country political risk have been studied in relation to MNEs' investment decisions. Specifically, five major aspects of host country political risk were identified (government type, public corruption, leadership change, armed conflict and terrorism). Although the general consensus is that risk related to the government often creates obstacles for MNEs, conceptualizations, measures and findings in prior research are not uniform.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of host country political risk and foreign investment. In doing so, the aspects of political risk are identified, organized and overviewed.

This study aims to examine how the effect of host country formal institutional uncertainty on the percentage of equity sought in cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) is moderated by the host country industry (i.e. targets from the technology versus those from the non-technology industry).

This study is based upon the legitimacy perspective of institutional theory and uses Tobit regression analysis on a sample of 1,340 CBAs.

Results show that cross-border acquirers prefer a lower equity level for targets in institutionally less developed countries and that this negative effect of the host country institutional risk on the equity percentage sought is more pronounced for technology-based targets.

Three major limitations of the study are as follows: The data were collected from only Japanese acquirers. The study measured formal institutional uncertainty by applying only secondary data. The study used the Bloomberg Industry Classification Systems, instead of the Standard Industry Classification that has been used widely in prior studies.

This study shows that the industry selected has a bearing on equity sought in CBAs. Investing in institutionally less developed countries is particularly challenging when the targets of acquisition are in the technology industry.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the moderating effects of an industry on the relationship between host country formal institutional uncertainty and the percentage of equity sought in CBAs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of bilateral political relations on the completion stage premium of cross-border mergers and acquisitions(CSPCMA) and the moderating roles of cultural distance, trade openness and the nature of firm ownership for this relationship.

Based on a sample of 401 cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) conducted by Chinese companies from 1995 to 2019 in the Statistical Data Center (SDC), this article used weighted least squares (WLS) to empirically test the impact of bilateral political relations between countries on the CSPCMA.

The better the target country of entry’s bilateral political relations with China, the lower the premium of the transaction price paid by Chinese companies at the completion stage of cross-border M&A. Among the moderators, the study found cultural distance positively moderates the relationship between bilateral political relations between countries and CSPCMA. The degree of trade openness of the target country negatively moderates the relationship between bilateral political relations between countries and CSPCMA. The negative relationship between bilateral political relations between countries and CSPCMA is stronger when the acquirer is a state-owned enterprise (SOE).

The findings of this study not only add to the knowledge about the relationship between bilateral political relations and corporate cross-border M&A premiums, but also have managerial implications for Chinese corporate managers to sustainably reduce corporate cross-border M&A premiums.

Going back into previously exited markets is a significant management risk. But, how are re-entry risks managed? By adding strategic reference point (SRP) rationales to the risk management literature, this chapter examines re-entry after initial entry and divestment on a sample of 654 multinational enterprise (MNE) re-entrants. The authors move away from narrow risk management lenses according to which risks happen in isolation and theorize that MNEs simultaneously manage international risk by exploiting the trade-offs among external and internal sources of risk. The authors explain that, for re-entrants, exit may become the SRP for evaluating future strategic choices. The results suggest that re-entrants tend to manage re-entry risk by choosing partner-based modes that enable them to maintain strategic flexibility at re-entry. Surprisingly perhaps, market-specific experience acquired during the initial market foray does not provide strategic flexibility, in that highly experienced firms still experience risk trade-offs.

This study examines the effect of host government interference with foreign investors’ assets on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. The author hypothesizes that the relationship between host government interference and FDI inflow takes the form of an inverted U shape. The author tests this hypothesis using data from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes between 1996 and 2017. The results support the above hypothesis. While host government interference with the assets of a few foreign investors may not deter FDI inflow, frequent interferences, which result in an increasing number of host state–foreign investor disputes, reduces FDI inflow in a host country. The analysis also shows that when faced with an increasing host country uncertainty, investors adopt a wait and see strategy. However, how long investors wait depends on the economic situation of the host country. For high-income countries, investors wait until approximately 10 disputes before reducing investments level in a host country, while for low-income countries, this waiting period is a mere two disputes. The findings of this study suggest that countries seeking to attract more FDI should not interfere with the activities of foreign investors, however, if they do, disputes should be settled at home, not in international arbitration courts, because doing so frequently may poison the host environment and deter other foreign investors from investing in the host country.

While there is a general belief that a defective institutional environment will lead to higher compliance risk, the current state of knowledge about how the institutional environment affects enterprises' compliance is equivocal. This study aims to explore how does the host country's institutional environment affect the compliance risk perception of international engineering contractors and how to mitigate this impact.

This study empirically tests the impact of the institutional environment from the two dimensions of the institutional environment: legal completeness reflects whether the formal regulations are clear, detailed and comprehensive and legal effectiveness reflects whether rules and policies can be implemented effectively when the proper legal codes are provided. Based on 213 questionnaire data, this study uses partial least squares structural equation model (PLS-SEM) and Smart PLS software to test the hypothesis.

This study finds a negative relationship between the host country's legal completeness (LC) or legal effectiveness (LE) and a contractor's compliance risk perception. Further, the results show potential absorptive capacity (PAC) and realized absorptive capacity (RAC) of a contractor are critical for mitigating the impact of low LC in the host country, but not when LE is low.

The findings will be useful for international engineering contractors to respond to the compliance risk of the host country, both in choices of overseas investment locations and compliance capacity building.

This study reveals the impact of the host country's institutional environment on the compliance risk perception of international contractors, and provides theoretical guidance for how to alleviate the compliance barriers brought by the host country's institutional environment to international engineering contractors.

This research seeks to understand how shareholder constituencies including controlling family, nonfamily insiders, as well as domestic and foreign institutions in the corporate governance system of emerging economy firms perceive institutional risks in terms of regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions and influence strategic choices in the internationalization of their invested firms.

The sample data are Taiwanese publicly listed companies in the electronics and computer industry. Panel data of the parent firms and their overseas affiliates are available from the annual report and Taiwan Economic Journal database. Country-level data are available from the World Investment Report and the IMD World Competitiveness Report. Statistical regression models including tobit and logistic regression are used to analyze the data.

Controlling family and nonfamily insider shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to enter in institutionally smaller host countries through a shared ownership. Domestic institutional shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to adopt a shared ownership and enter in host countries with larger and smaller institutional distances in terms of regulative and normative institution, respectively. Foreign institutional shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to enter in institutionally smaller host countries through a whole ownership.

The strategic choices of foreign market entry made by emerging economy firms are significantly shaped by the different risk perceptions of shareholder constituencies in their corporate governance system toward the institutional distances between the home and the host country.

This research seeks to understand the drivers of outward foreign direct investments (FDIs) by state-owned emerging economy firms, the characteristics of their overseas FDI projects and investment locations, and the effects of home and host institutions on the market entry strategies, taking into account the legitimacy of state ownership.

The discussion is based on a comprehensive review of conceptual and empirical literature, as well as case studies available from recognized journals in the field.

State-owned emerging economy firms pursue outward FDIs to respond to policy incentives of the home government and to reduce its political influence over the firm. FDI projects are often large and risky and have low business values. They often enter countries where state ownership is perceived as more legitimate while engaging in legitimacy-building activities in these countries. When their home country has a high level of institutional restrictions, they are less likely to use acquisitions or hold high levels of equity control in foreign subsidiaries. To strengthen local legitimacy, they often use greenfield investments or share equity control with local firms in foreign subsidiaries, particularly when the host country is endowed with strategic assets or when it has a high level of institutional restrictions. However, when having high levels of state ownership or strong political connections, they often commit a high level of resources and hold a high level of equity control in foreign subsidiaries.

The literature mostly investigates the FDI of firms that are structurally separate from the institutions. When the institutions are endogenous as presented in this research, their strategic choices are substantially influenced by noncommercial political motives and perception on their political image.