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This chapter assessed internal and external environmental factors that affect variations in rural hospital profitability with a focus on the impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act regulations that resulted in the expansion of Medicaid eligibility, as well as four Medicare programs that target rural hospitals. A cross section of 2,114 rural US hospitals operating during 2015 was used. The primary source of data was Medicare Hospital Cost Reports. Ordinary least squares regression with correction for serial correlation, using total margin and operating margin as dependent variables, was employed to ascertain the association between profitability and its correlates.

The mean values for operating margin and total margin were −0.0652 and 0.0259, respectively. Hospital profitability was positively associated with location in a Medicaid expansion state, classification by Medicare as a Critical Access Hospital or Rural Referral Center (total margin only), hospital size, system membership, and occupancy rate. Profitability was negatively associated with average length of stay, government ownership, Medicare and Medicaid share of admissions, teaching status, and unemployment rate.

This chapter found that the Medicaid expansions provided modest help for the financial condition of rural hospitals. However, the estimates for the four targeted Medicare Programs (i.e., Critical Access Hospital, Medicare Dependent, Sole Community Critical Access Hospital, and Rural Referral Center) were either small or not significant (p > 0.10). Therefore, these specially targeted federal programs may have failed to achieve their goals of preserving the financial viability of rural hospitals. This chapter concludes with implications for practice.

The long-term financial stability of hospital systems represents a “grand challenge” in health care. New ownership forms, such as private equity (PE), promise to achieve better financial performance than nonprofit or for-profit systems. In this study, we compare two systems with many similarities, but radically different ownership structures, missions, governance, and merger and acquisition (M&A) strategies. Both were nonprofit, religious systems serving low-income communities – Montefiore Health System and Caritas Christi Health Care.

Montefiore's M&A strategy was to invest in local hospitals and create an integrated regional system, increasing revenues by adding primary doctors and community hospitals as feeders into the system and achieving efficiencies through effective resource allocation across specialized units. Slow and steady timing of acquisitions allowed for organizational learning and balancing of debt and equity. By 2019, it owned 11 hospitals with 40,000 employees and had strong positive financials and low reliance on debt.

By contrast, in 2010, PE firm Cerberus Capital bought out Caritas (renamed Steward Health Care System) and took control of the Board of Directors, who set the system's strategic direction. Cerberus used Steward as a platform for a massive debt-driven acquisition strategy. In 2016, it sold off most of its hospitals’ property for $1.25 billion, leaving hospitals saddled with long-term inflated leases; paid itself almost $500 million in dividends; and used the rest for leveraged buyouts of 27 hospitals in 9 states in 3 years. The rapid, scattershot M&A strategy was designed to create a large corporation that could be sold off in five years for financial gain – not for health care integration. Its debt load exploded, and by 2019, its financials were deeply in the red. Its Massachusetts hospitals were the worst financial performers of any system in the state. Cerberus exited Steward in 2020 in a deal that left its physicians, the new owners, holding the debt.

The purpose of this chapter is to apply structural functional theory and the concept of “unbundling” to an analysis of the deinstitutionalization and community mental health efforts that have shaped the current mental health services environment.

We examine the original goals of the institutional movement, the arguments supporting it, and the functions of the institutions that were created. We then examine the criticisms of that approach and the success of the subsequent deinstitutionalization process, which attempted to undo this process by recreating the hospitals’ functions in community settings. Finally, we address the question of whether the critical functions of psychiatric institutions have indeed been adequately recreated.

Our overview of outcomes from this process suggests that the unbundling of state hospital functions did not yield an adequate system of care and support, and that the functions of state hospitals, including social control and incapacitation with respect to public displays of deviance were not sufficiently recreated in the community-based settings.

The arguments for the construction of state hospitals, the critiques of those settings, and the current criticism of efforts to replace their functions are eerily similar. Actors involved in the design of mental health services should take into account the functions of existing services and the gaps between them. Consideration of the history of efforts at functional change might also serve this process well.

Change in ownership among U.S. community hospitals has been frequent and, not surprisingly, remains an important issue for both researchers and public policy makers. In the past, investor-owned hospitals were long suspected of pursuing financial over other goals, culminating in several reviews that found few differences between for-profit and nonprofit forms (Gray, 1986; Sloan, 2000; Sloan, Picone, Taylor, & Chou, 2001). Nevertheless, continuing to the present day, several states prohibit investor-ownership of community hospitals. Conversions to investor-ownership are only one of six types of ownership change, however, with relatively less attention paid to the other types (e.g., for-profit to nonprofit, public to nonprofit). This study has two parts. We first review the literature on the various types of ownership conversion among community hospitals. This review includes the rate at which conversions occur over time, the relative frequency in conversions between specific ownership categories and the observed effects of conversion on hospital operations (e.g., strategic direction and decision-making processes) and performance (e.g., access, quality, and cost). Overall, we find that the impact of ownership conversion on the different measures is mixed, with slightly greater evidence for positive effects on hospital efficiency. As one explanation for these findings, we suggest that the impact of ownership conversion on hospital performance may be mediated by changes in the hospital's strategic content and process. Such a hypothesis has not been proposed or examined in the literature. To address this gap, we next study the role of strategic reorientation following hospital conversion in a field study. We conceptualize ownership conversion within a strategic adaptation framework, and then analyze the changes in strategy content and process across sixteen hospitals that have undergone ownership conversions from nonprofit to for-profit, public to for-profit, public to nonprofit, and for-profit to nonprofit. The field study findings delineate the strategic paths and processes implemented by new owners post-conversion. We find remarkable similarity in the content of strategies undertaken but differences in the process of strategic decision making associated with different types of ownership changes. We also find three main performance effects: hospitals change ownership for financial reasons, experience increases in revenues and capital investment post-conversion, and pursue labor force reductions post-conversion. Membership in a multi-hospital system, however, may be a major determinant of both strategy content and decision-making process that is confounded with ownership change. That is, ownership conversion may mask the impact of system membership on a hospital's strategic actions. These findings may explain the pattern of performance effects observed in the literature on ownership conversions.

There is a large body of literature on the efficiency and productivity of hospitals. Most studies focus on the effects of environmental pressures on hospital efficiency, such as payment systems (Dismuke & Sena, 1999; Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2000), competition (Rosko, 1999, 2004), Sari, 2003), and property rights (Gruca & Nath, 2001). Other studies pinpoint their attention to economic phenomena, such as economies of scale (Lindrooth, Lo Sasso, & Bazzoli, 2003; Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003), economies of scope (Prior & Sola, 2000; Grosskopf, Margaritis, & Valdmanis, 2001; Li & Rosenman, 2001), chain membership (Menke, 1997), economic behavior (Blank & Merkies, 2004), and expense preference (Rodriguez-Alvarez & Lovell, 2004).

As all countries in the world, Polish health care system has to challenge four fundamental transformations: demographic, technological, epidemiological and cultural. Each of them generates serious threats for the sustainability of the system. The Polish society is ageing even faster than other in the European Union. For the sustainability of the system, the ageing of the population is a double challenge: on the expenditure side and on the financing side.

The Polish health care system is characterised by three negative features: under-financing of health care, misguided organisation of the health sector and health care entities and a dramatic shortage of health care professionals. The share of GDP devoted to health has remained constant over the last years at the level of 6.3%–6.7%. Poland has one of the lowest rates of practicing doctors and nurses in the EU countries. Lack of attractiveness of the medical professions caused by consistently low wages has created a huge generation gap.

Looking from the perspective of cost-effectiveness, we must to state, that the system, with its small financial outlays, provides a relatively high level of health for the population. However, it does not mean that better results could not be achieved. The majority of the public hospitals run in the form of independent public health care units that are highly inefficient and indebted. All attempts to restructure the sector and to solve the problem of arrears of the public hospitals failed so far.

To face the challenges, Poland must change its health policy. An increase in the sector's financing is needed, bearing in mind that increasing outlays alone is certainly not enough to solve all problems and secure sustainability. Deep structural and organisational changes are necessary. Unfortunately, politicians avoid making difficult but necessary decisions, e.g., drastic restructuring of the hospital sector, preferring above all to increase public spending on health.

Medicaid, Medicare, and managed care reimbursement changes since the early 1980s have put added financial pressure on hospitals, increasing fears that private hospitals will decrease support for indigent care and that those hospitals that serve a disproportionately large indigent population may be forced to close. Wilson and Kizer (1997) use the term “safety net” to convey the notion that public health facilities, such as Veterans Affairs Medical Centers (VA), municipal hospitals, community health centers, and local public health departments, are providing uncompensated care for an increasing number of uninsured due to increasing cost pressures on private health facilities. Other research efforts also give evidence of increasing patient demand pressures on public health facilities in recent years (Lipson & Naierman, 1996). However, these efforts are often cross-sectional in design or limited to information from only one or a few health facilities in a metropolitan area (Baxter & Mechanic, 1997). As such, it is very difficult to measure fully the extent to which new legislation and private market changes have an effect on the public health “safety net” over time.This research considers the longitudinal relationship between the effect of Illinois implementation of the ICARE Medicaid reimbursement program, private hospital closings and the demand for VA inpatient services in a large metropolitan market in Chicago in the 1980s. Analysis is conducted with a combination of VA hospital discharge data, zip code level sociodemographic data from the U.S. Census, and data on hospital closures in the Chicago area between 1980 and 1990. The combined data allow for a longitudinal analysis of the tradeoffs between new state policy and hospitals over the provision of care for the indigent, including the effects of changes in reimbursement for Medicaid patients.

Based on the Current Population Survey, 46.6 million Americans did not have health insurance in 2005 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2006). Lack of insurance is often associated with lower utilization rates, which may in turn adversely affect health status (Ayanian, Weissman, Schneider, Ginsburg, & Zaslavsky, 2000). Since universal health insurance is not provided for in the US, uninsured individuals must either self-pay or rely on charity care provided by hospitals and health clinics. The majority of charity care is produced in the public sector, either at the state, county, or local level (federal hospitals primarily serve a particular segment of the population – e.g., veterans in the case of Veterans Administration hospitals). Public hospital provision of “safety net” hospital services is particularly prevalent in large urban areas (Lipson & Naierman, 1996). These safety net hospitals are defined by the Institute of Medicine as having an “open door policy to serve all patients regardless of their ability to pay and provide substantial levels of care to Medicaid, the uninsured, and other vulnerable patients” (IOM, 2000). Private not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals also provide charity care but to a lesser extent than public providers, especially since the imposition of cost cutting measures both by Medicare and Medicaid (federal programs that fund health care for the elderly and indigent, respectively) and by managed care. Given that approximately 15% of US GDP is allocated to health care, cost cutting measures are laudable; however, care still needs to be provided for individuals who cannot afford it, and the burden of providing this care has to be borne somewhere in the health care system.